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A PLURALIST ACCOUNT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Debates over intellectual property’s justifications tend to treat natural rights and utilitarian 
accounts as competitors, but they should be seen as complements instead. Lockean and Kantian 
theories of intellectual property highlight the strong interests that intellectual property creators 
have in profiting from and exercising some degree of control over their work, but neither theory 
gives sufficient justification for the full assortment of rights that intellectual property owners have 
under current law. Utilitarian accounts provide an essential supplement to these natural rights 
theories by focusing on society’s interests in the production of useful information and creative 
expression, but that does not mean intellectual property law should single-mindedly strive only to 
maximize social welfare. Developing both natural rights–based and utilitarian justifications, this 
dissertation advances a pluralist account of intellectual property that understands different features 
of copyright, patent, and trademark law to be serving different normative interests. 
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1. ON JUSTIFYING  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
              
 
The earth and its contents have great importance in the lives of creatures like us, but we 
disagree, sometimes sharply, about what to do with them. One social response to our disagreement 
is private property ownership, which empowers specific individuals or groups—owners—to make 
authoritative decisions about how the things they own may be used. Yet the powers of ownership 
breed disagreements as well as resolve them, and so philosophers and others have thought long and 
hard about private property ownership’s justifications. Today, physical objects are no longer the 
only kind of privately owned things. Intellectual property ownership shapes modern life to nearly as 
great an extent as physical property ownership, and the nonphysical things it regulates have 
extraordinary importance of their own. Not surprisingly, then, intellectual property ownership 
generates plenty of controversy too, and its justifications warrant careful attention. 
To date, however, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to intellectual 
property ownership as such. There are at least two possible explanations, the first of which is 
merely historical. Compared to its earthier relative, intellectual property ownership is a very young 
social institution. One can find scattered examples of very old laws whose effects are quite close to 
intellectual property laws’. In ancient Sybaris, for instance, someone who accomplished outstanding 
culinary feats was reportedly entitled to be the only authorized maker of the award-winning dish 
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for a period of one year.1 This rule, though, seems to have been more a Sybarite idiosyncrasy than 
part of a systematic effort to protect intellectual property. For such efforts, at least in the West, we 
have to wait until early modern Europe. As the printing press and other technologies spread across 
the continent, so too did Europeans’ pleas to their governments for recognition as the sole lawful 
makers of specific goods. Many of these pleas were individually answered, but it was not until 1474 
that lawmakers set out to create general rules for the granting of such privileges. That was the year 
Venice enacted the first known patent legislation, which allowed the inventor of “any new and 
ingenious” device to obtain a decade-long exclusive privilege to make it.2 Venetian copyright 
legislation followed in the 1500s.3 England followed a similar path slightly later. Its sovereigns 
routinely bestowed royal privileges, or letters patent, on favored subjects, and Parliament ultimately 
responded in 1624 with the Statute of Monopolies, which authorized fourteen-year patents for new 
inventions.4 Several different statutes regulated the printing industry prior to the 1710 Statute of 
Anne, which created a copyright for books lasting a maximum twenty-eight years.5 People have 
been placing their distinctive marks on goods for thousands of years, but trademark ownership’s 
beginnings seem to coincide with the beginnings of patent and copyright ownership.6 And not 
                                            
1 3 ATHENAEUS, THE DEIPNOSOPHISTS bk. 12, ch. 20, at 835 (C.D. Yonge ed. & trans., London, Henry G. Bohn 
1854) (c. 230).  
2 Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948). 
3 See, e.g., HORATIO F. BROWN, THE VENETIAN PRINTING PRESS 73–82 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891). 
4 See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 626–35, 
649 (1959). 
5 See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143–50 (1968). 
6 See, e.g., Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 140–41 (1955). 
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until the last century did all these forms of intellectual property become an unavoidable feature of 
everyday life. Compared to physical property ownership, then, intellectual property ownership is 
still a youngster, and philosophers’ comparative inattentiveness to it might just be a consequence of 
its youth. 
Or the relative scarcity of attention to intellectual property’s philosophical grounding could 
be due to a substantive assumption: what has already been said about physical property ownership 
can be translated into the intellectual property context easily enough, and so no separate account of 
intellectual property ownership is necessary. This assumption should be rejected. Intellectual 
property raises unique issues and deserves philosophical scrutiny in its own right. Familiar accounts 
of physical property ownership certainly aid our thinking about intellectual property, but they do 
so by providing starting points, not conclusions. We will see it is not so easy to figure out how 
justifications for private ownership of physical goods apply to intellectual ones, which are different 
in significant ways. 
Indeed, we encounter difficulties as soon as we get started. For before proceeding to 
possible justifications, we must first determine just what intellectual property ownership is. The 
phrase “intellectual property” encourages us to think that we are simply dealing with ownership of 
one particular species of property—the “intellectual” one. There is some truth to this suggestion 
because intellectual property ownership, like any kind of ownership, consists in having special 
entitlements to particular things. These entitlements come in different forms, such as rights and 
correlative duties, privileges or liberties, and powers to alter the normative situation of others.7 But 
                                            
7 See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920). 
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the specific entitlements that make up intellectual property ownership are not the same as the ones 
that make up physical property ownership. The entitlements of copyright ownership are not even 
the same as those of patent or trademark ownership. And so we must guard against fallacy when we 
talk of physical property ownership and intellectual property ownership as different species of a 
single genus. In particular, because ownership amounts to a different thing in the intellectual 
property setting, arguments claiming that private ownership of land or moveable objects is justified 
because certain conditions obtain do not automatically support the conclusion that private 
ownership of intellectual objects is justified to the extent that the same conditions obtain.8 In 
order to assess intellectual property ownership’s justifications, we need to understand what it 
actually involves. But before we can do that, we should take a closer look at the various kinds of 
things that can be owned under intellectual property law. 
Unlike chattels and realty, intellectual property concerns intangibles. And unlike other 
intangible property, copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and rights of publicity are 
grouped under the heading intellectual property because they concern valuable kinds of thoughts and 
imagery. Copyright governs particular ways of expressing ideas, facts, and feelings. Patents and 
trade secrets regulate useful information. Trademark law restricts the use of symbols of relations 
                                            
8 The following reasoning, whatever else we might say about it, would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation: 
P1. X is a sufficient condition for justified private ownership of physical things. 
C1. Therefore, X is a sufficient condition for justified private ownership of any thing. 
P2. X sometimes obtains in the case of intellectual things. 
C2. Therefore, private ownership of intellectual things is sometimes justified. 
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between commercial goods or services and their source. And rights of publicity concern depictions 
of people. Because of its intellectual character, it is often true that something an intellectual 
property owner owns can be used by another person without taking it away from its owner.9 If I 
create a beautiful sculpture for my garden, for instance, someone who stumbles upon it can go on 
to make a replica for himself while leaving me to enjoy the original. Tangible resources are not 
often enjoyed by multiple people so painlessly. If the passerby instead takes with him the sculpture 
itself, not just his impression of it, I am significantly worse off. 
One can get a better idea of what intellectual property is by considering paradigm cases. 
Copyrights essentially cover artistic works—that is, creative and original expressive material that 
has been fixed in some tangible form. Exemplars include sculpture of course, and painting, 
photography, musical compositions and performances, films, architectural works, poetry, and 
prose.10 One cannot copyright merely factual information (as opposed to particular expressions of 
it),11 though some discoverers of time-sensitive facts receive temporary protection against free-
riding competitors by a cousin of copyright known as the misappropriation doctrine.12 Patents and 
trade secrets, on the other hand, typically do cover factual information. Patents protect information 
on how to produce copies of a useful, non-obvious invention or how to execute a new, non-
                                            
9 Economists frequently say that intellectual property concerns non-rival goods, where non-rivalry means that one 
person’s enjoyment of the good need not threaten anyone else’s. There are rare examples of information that 
characteristically loses value as it becomes widespread, such as stock market tips.  
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
11 Id. § 102(b). 
12 See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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obvious process that achieves a useful result.13 Famous patents include Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, 
Samuel Colt’s revolver, Charles Goodyear’s method for vulcanizing rubber, Louis Pasteur’s 
technique for pasteurization, and Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone. Trade secrecy law protects 
much the same sort of information—Coca-Cola’s recipe is the classic example—but does so by 
preventing certain unauthorized disclosures and uses of the information by those who have been let 
in on the secret or acquired it improperly14 rather than by requiring the inventor to disclose the 
information and then prohibiting unauthorized uses of it, as patent law does.15 Trademarks, such as 
logos, brand names, and distinctive slogans, are symbols representing a connection between 
commercial products and the particular entities that are their source or endorsers, or occasionally 
between products and the product line or family of which they are members. Similarly, rights of 
publicity protect individuals (usually celebrities) from having their name, likeness, or distinctive 
characteristics used for commercial purposes without permission.16 Common rights of publicity 
lawsuits involve advertisements associating a celebrity with a product, often in a way that 
misleadingly suggests his or her endorsement.17  
With these examples of intellectual property in view, we can proceed to take a closer look 
at what owning intellectual property involves. In his classic account of physical property 
                                            
13 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. 
14 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), (2), (4) (amended 1985). 
15 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 271. 
16 See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
17 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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entitlements, A.M. Honoré looked to property law to identify “standard incidents of ownership”—
not necessary conditions for ownership so much as constituents of a somewhat idealized form of 
“full” ownership.18 So too can we find guidance about what intellectual property ownership is in 
the various bodies of intellectual property law. A detailed account of the rights, privileges, and 
powers set out in different intellectual property doctrines would fill a good many pages, but to get 
started scrutinizing the justifications for intellectual property ownership a sketch of its standard 
incidents will do. As with physical property, rights relating to use and disposition are at the core of 
intellectual property ownership.19 But the use and disposition of intellectual things are in key 
respects unlike the use and disposition of physical ones. Therefore, in order to develop an idealized 
conception of intellectual property ownership it is necessary to examine how the concepts of use 
and disposition operate in intellectual property law.  
Let us consider use rights first. Property owners may use their property almost any way 
they like so long as they do not harm others.20 This feature of property law is just a privilege in 
Wesley Hohfeld’s terms; the law neither prohibits use nor guarantees it. But of course the privilege 
is supplemented because when it comes to using the resource the owner has pride of place. Thus 
an owner of physical property has claim-rights against all non-owners that they not unreasonably 
                                            
18 A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
19 Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138 (claiming that an Englishman’s property rights “consist[] 
in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws 
of the land”). Some accounts of property add “possession,” see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 59 (1985), which unlike use and disposition is not 
straightforwardly applicable in the field of intellectual property. 
20 There are, to be sure, important regulations of property use—for instance, through zoning restrictions—but the 
default is that owners may use their property at their discretion provided they do no harm. 
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interfere with her use and enjoyment of her property, whether by preventing her from using the 
property or by making the property less suitable for her use. In practice, owners generally have a 
privilege to use their resources that is exclusive of everybody else’s unauthorized use of them. Call 
this combined privilege and claim-right “against the world” an excluding privilege. An excluding 
privilege exists just in case its holder has (1) a privilege to engage in some action and (2) a claim-
right against virtually all others that they not act in the same way without special permission. For 
physical resources, this sort of exclusivity serves the important purpose of shielding the owner’s 
uses from others’ choices. Trespass law goes even further, though, and not only gives landowners 
use-priority but also forbids others’ unauthorized entry onto privately owned land regardless of 
whether the entry would impair the owner’s use of the land.  
In intellectual property, the owner’s exclusive privileges are more like this right against 
unauthorized entry in the law of trespass to land than like a mere right against interference with 
owner use. The law marks a great many uses of intellectual property off-limits for everyone but 
their owners, and not just when use by a non-owner would hinder use by the owner. Patent law’s 
use prohibition seems to sweep very broadly at first glance: anyone who “uses” a patented invention 
(without the owner’s permission) is an infringer.21 Trademark law prohibits only certain sorts of 
use, such as using a protected mark commercially in a manner likely to confuse consumers.22 A 
clear-cut example would be the unauthorized placement of a protected mark on commercial 
products that are of the same type as the mark owner’s own products—think of fake Louis Vuitton 
                                            
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
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bags. Copyright law forbids making new copies of the copyrighted work.23 Patent law targets 
duplication separately, prohibiting everyone but the patentee from producing individual 
incarnations of a patented invention.24 The reason why patent law includes a prohibition on 
making as well as one on using simpliciter is that the latter is heavily qualified by a venerable 
doctrine known as patent exhaustion, which basically holds that a patentee’s intellectual property 
rights with respect to a particular article embodying his patented invention are exhausted as soon as 
he sells the product.25 Thanks to patent exhaustion, someone who bought an incandescent electric 
light from Thomas Edison would have been mostly free to use it notwithstanding Edison’s patent, 
but would not have been free to replicate Edison’s light bulb after theirs had burned out. So 
although intellectual property owners generally have a privilege to use the owned resource (subject 
to the usual laws prohibiting harm to others),26 this privilege turns out not to be theirs alone 
because the law permits many non-owner uses of intellectual property. The quintessential way 
intellectual property owners receive special use-rights is through an excluding privilege to embody the 
thing they own in tangible objects or actions. On any account, this excluding privilege should be 
listed as a standard incident of intellectual property ownership. 
                                            
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
24 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
25 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–28 (2008). 
26 The privilege to use is not explicitly recognized by patent law, and in fact it is possible for an inventor to obtain 
a patent but be “blocked” or prohibited from using his invention because doing so would infringe another person’s 
preexisting patent. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886). 
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But embodying the very thing an intellectual property owner owns is not the only way to 
use her intellectual property unlawfully. Copyright law, for instance, also forbids making new 
works that closely resemble the original protected work27 as well as those that are derived from it, 
including translations into different languages or adaptations for new media.28 Trademark law 
likewise prohibits use not only of the exact logo, slogan, or brand name that someone else has 
previously been using to identify his commercial products or services, but similar ones as well if 
they are likely to confuse consumers.29 Moreover, regardless of the likelihood of consumer 
confusion, using famous marks or close variants in association with products unrelated to the 
trademark owner’s own products qualifies as trademark dilution if the unauthorized use weakens 
the distinctiveness of the original trademark30 or tarnishes its referent’s reputation.31 These 
copyright and trademark prohibitions are relaxed by doctrines of “fair use,”32 which among other 
things permit parody and criticism even when these derive from the privately owned work.33 And 
patent law actually allows making new versions of patented inventions: patents protect only the 
                                            
27 Such works are said to be “substantially similar” to the original copyrighted work. See, e.g., Comptone Co. v. 
Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958) (per curiam). 
28 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2).  
29 See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 253 (1877). 
30 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984). 
31 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010). 
32 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4), 1125(c)(3)(A); 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
33 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute 
Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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specific invention claimed in the filing34 and barely altered variants made up of equivalent 
elements.35 But taking our cue from copyright and trademark doctrine, perhaps we can still say 
that full ownership of intellectual property would include an excluding privilege to develop it. 
In addition to these two use-focused incidents of intellectual property ownership, 
intellectual property law standardly recognizes disposition-focused incidents. First, intellectual 
property owners have certain disposition rights over objects that embody the intellectual thing they 
own—for instance, the physical books that contain a copyrighted text. Most notably, unauthorized 
sales of that sort of object qualify as copyright, patent, or trademark infringements over and above 
any preceding violations of the owner’s exclusive right and privilege to embody and develop her 
intellectual property.36 These bodies of law also recognize unauthorized international importation 
of such objects as a variety of infringement.37 Although these rights too are qualified by exhaustion 
and “first sale” doctrines, which among other things allow people who purchase such objects from 
the relevant intellectual property owners to resell the objects second-hand,38 we can identify an 
                                            
34 See, e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423–24 (1891). 
35 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (explaining patent law’s 
“doctrine of equivalents”). 
36 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 
F.2d 392, 396 (2d Cir. 1986). 
37 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124; 17 U.S.C. § 601(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1526; 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (g). 
38 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109; Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913); 553 U.S. 617, 625–28 (2008); Sebastian 
Int’l, Inc., v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995).  
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excluding privilege to distribute embodiments of intellectual property as one of the standard incidents 
of full intellectual property ownership.39  
 Intellectual property owners also have disposition rights over the intellectual things 
themselves. As in the context of physical property, whose owners can transfer their ownership in 
part (for example through leases) or in whole (through full title transfers), intellectual property 
owners also have various powers to dispose of their intellectual property partially (through licenses) 
or completely (through assignments). Intellectual property licenses and assignments are governed 
by various doctrines not relevant here. What they have in common as Hohfeldian powers is that 
they alter the entitlements that were established earlier by the first owner’s ownership and 
subsequent developments. So through her powers to license and assign what she owns, an owner of 
intellectual property can transfer away any of her entitlements to it. This power is located solely in 
the owner herself, at least initially, and generally cannot be exercised by anyone else against her 
will. Private persons clearly cannot make use of others’ intellectual property legally permissible, 
and, although the issue is murky, it is possible that not even the government can do that without 
compensating the owner.40 To the extent that an intellectual property owner’s claim-rights and 
other entitlements cannot be diminished by others, we can identify a variety of Hohfeldian 
                                            
39 This distribution incident includes copyright law’s exclusive rights to publicly perform and display specified 
category of copyrightable works, such as plays, songs, movies, and visual artwork. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(6). 
40 Compare Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013–14 (1984) (holding that the federal government’s 
disclosure of a trade secret can in certain instances constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution), with Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that the federal 
government’s taking of a license to use a patent is subject to scrutiny under statutory provisions, but not the Fifth 
Amendment). 
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immunities from expropriation41 as together constituting a final standard incident of intellectual 
property ownership. But I will not pursue that project here. 
 In sum, American law suggests that intellectual property ownership is made up of five 
standard incidents: 
1. An excluding privilege to embody the intellectual property. 
2. An excluding privilege to develop the intellectual property. 
3. An excluding privilege to distribute embodiments of the intellectual property. 
4. Powers to license and assign the intellectual property. 
5. Immunities from expropriation of the intellectual property. 
This portrait of intellectual property ownership does not imply that any intellectual property owner 
worthy of that description possesses each of these standard incidents. Rather, in the same spirit as 
Honoré, I put forward these standard incidents to indicate what an idealized form of full ownership 
of an intellectual thing might look like, using the intellectual property laws that presently exist as 
inspiration. 
Now that we have examined the entitlements that ownership of intellectual property entails 
as well as the kinds of intellectual things that can be privately owned as intellectual property, we 
have enough of an understanding of the concept of intellectual property ownership to begin 
inquiring into its possible justifications. But before we move on to that inquiry, it is worth taking 
                                            
41 According to Hohfeld’s analysis, for any normative relation X that holds between A and some other person, A 
has an immunity as against B with respect to X if and only if B has no power to change X. See HOHFELD, supra note 7, 
at 60. The phrase “immunity from expropriation” originates in Honoré’s analysis of the standard incidents of 
ownership. See Honoré, supra note 18, at 119. 
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one final moment to prepare ourselves by considering what it means to justify intellectual property 
ownership. This dissertation will consider two different types of potential justification for 
intellectual property ownership, which are also on display in discussions about physical property’s 
justifications. The first type, which I will call a natural rights–type justification, seeks to establish 
that someone meeting certain requirements would be entitled to the standard incidents of 
intellectual property ownership (or at least some of them) regardless of what the applicable legal 
institutions and social conventions had to say about the matter. In the next two chapters, I will 
examine first John Locke’s and then Immanuel Kant’s natural rights–type justifications of physical 
property ownership, as well as their scattered comments on intellectual property ownership. The 
second type of justification, which I will refer to as the social convention–type, is characteristically 
grounded in considerations about the common good rather than individual entitlement. In Chapter 
4, I will take up social convention–type justifications of property ownership, famously advanced by 
Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarian successors, but also by nonutilitarians like Aristotle.  
My ultimate conclusion is that justifying intellectual property ownership in full requires a 
social convention–type justification. Natural rights–type justifications do support a few specific 
aspects of our intellectual property laws, but these are relatively few in number and modest in 
scope. Aside from this particular conclusion, however, I want to establish that intellectual property 
ownership affects our interests in a variety of important ways and, consequently, that no account of 
intellectual property ownership that attends to only one sort of affected interest is likely to be a 
convincing one. The word “interest” has several possible meanings in philosophical and everyday 
discussions, so I should say what I am taking it to mean here. Sometimes “interest” refers to a 
 15 
subjective passion or curiosity, as when we say that a person happens to take an interest in some 
esoteric hobby or field of study. More technically, interests are occasionally held to be aspects of a 
person’s well-being, which can be understood in more subjective or objective terms. I will use the 
word in its more objective sense, but without insisting that all interests concern well-being. That 
is, when I say that someone has an interest in X, I mean to say that she has good reason to care 
about X as it relates to herself, or to engage in X-type actions, or to pursue what leads to X, 
depending on the case.42 Social convention–type justifications of intellectual property ownership 
typically draw attention to interests that are shared widely throughout society, while different 
natural rights–type justifications draw attention to different interests of intellectual property 
owners specifically. As I argue in what follows, intellectual property ownership is justified not by 
any single sort of interest on its own, but by multiple, distinguishable interests of the various 
affected parties. In this respect, my account of intellectual property ownership’s justifications is a 
pluralist one.  
 
                                            
42 Of course, what we have good reason to care about often depends on our more subjective features, like our 
personal tastes, but there are also things that we all have good reason to care about whether we happen to care about 
them or not, such as having an adequate supply of clean drinking water. 
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2. NATURAL RIGHTS I:  
INTERESTS IN MATERIAL GAIN 
[P]roperty I have nowhere found more clearly explained, than in a book intitled, 
“Two Treatises of Government.” 
- John Locke1 
Locke makes many insightful claims in his justification of property rights in the Second 
Treatise, but it would be a stretch to call his discussion clear. That may actually be the only point 
on which all Locke commentators agree. They have otherwise used his relatively compact 
discussion in the Two Treatises of Government to support widely diverging theories of physical 
property rights. Some amount of divergence is understandable given Locke’s writing, which 
contrary to his own opinion really is not a model of clarity. He freely and repeatedly uses what can 
seem like metaphors (such as the image of mixing labor with physical objects) without disclosing 
any non-literalist intentions. He also appears to qualify his defense of private ownership by means 
of potentially significant conditions (such as the so-called proviso that requires acts of private 
appropriation to leave “enough, and as good” for others’ use) without fully revealing their desired 
force. And, though it is no failing of Locke’s, his outdated English hardly helps matters. Whatever 
the explanation, someone looking at past scholarly interpretations of Locke’s property theory can 
                                            
1 Letter from John Locke to Richard King (Aug. 25, 1703), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, IN TEN VOLUMES 
305, 308 (London, J. Johnson et al. 1801). I first came across this line in Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 3, 3 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689). 
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find just about everything—from a defense of extremely strong and broad property rights2 to a 
defense of common ownership of all possessions.3  
It is therefore well worth our while to look closely at Locke’s account of physical property 
before turning to its implications for intellectual property. The interpretation I will develop in this 
chapter falls someplace between the extremes—supporting private property rights whose force does 
not depend on social agreement or convention, but not as broad a set of property rights as we find 
in American positive law. Locke’s argument, as I understand it, is thus more modest than today’s 
reader might expect, but when compared to the property theorists who preceded him, Locke’s 
argument proves not so modest after all. And whatever lingering disappointment that modern 
audiences might feel because Locke’s argument does not go further is mitigated by the fact that 
interpreters who have sought significantly more ambitious arguments have often judged Locke’s 
efforts completely unsuccessful.4 The interpretation that I advocate, by contrast, accounts well for 
the interests we all have in obtaining material benefits through our labors. It does not, however, 
furnish a natural rights–type justification for very many cases of intellectual property ownership. It 
justifies only a fairly narrow right that overlaps with parts of our trademark doctrine, though in my 
view this is no embarrassment for Locke’s theory. 
 
                                            
2 See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 199 
(1962). 
3 See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 164–65 (1980). 
4 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 252 (1988) (“[Locke] gave two arguments, and 
both were very weak.”). 
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2.1 LOCKEAN PROPERTY, THE “MEDDLE” WAY 
Locke’s discussion of private property begins with the claim that God “has given the Earth 
to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common.”5 By Locke’s time, this point of 
departure was familiar, and the history of the common ownership premise helps to reveal what it 
meant to Locke. Hugo Grotius had proceeded from some version of the premise to an account of 
private ownership grounded in mutual agreement.6 His efforts garnered criticism from Robert 
Filmer, an apologist for divine right monarchy and Locke’s ideological adversary,7 who dismissed 
the idea that resources were commonly owned in the state of nature for two reasons: First, if the 
earth’s resources were initially owned in common by the law of nature and yet universal consent 
could nevertheless forbid humanity from treating those resources as common property, the law of 
nature would be absurdly “changeable” and “contrary to itself” in first prescribing and then 
proscribing common ownership. Second, universal consent could never be procured in the way 
Grotius’s view seems to require.8 As others have pointed out, Filmer’s first concern is a weak one, 
for it depends on the assumption that natural law would be violated by consensual transfer of any 
rights and obligations.9 This assumption receives no defense by Filmer or anyone else for that 
                                            
5 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 25, at 286.    
6 See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURI BELLI AC PACIS: LIBRI TRES bk. 2, ch. 2, § 2, at 186–90 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Clarendon Press 1925) (1646). 
7 Peter Laslett makes the case for reading Locke’s property discussion as a response to Filmer in the notes 
accompanying that discussion in his critical edition of Locke’s Second Treatise. See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 25, at 
285–86. 
8 See ROBERT FILMER, OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE ORIGINALL OF GOVERNMENT (1652), reprinted in 
PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 184, 234 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). 
9 See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 4, at 151. 
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matter, which is not surprising given the assumption’s implausible implication that one cannot 
making a binding promise to perform actions not otherwise required by the natural law. But one 
virtue of Filmer’s first objection is that it brings attention to the ambiguity in the Grotian common 
ownership premise: What exactly does common ownership amount to in the state of nature? 
Modern property law recognizes a form of common ownership of land, tenancy-in-
common, which endows the co-owners or “co-tenants” with a Hohfeldian privilege to access any 
part of the parcel and a claim-right not to be excluded or “ousted” by the other co-tenants.10 
Common ownership in the state of nature could be like that. Indeed, Samuel von Pufendorf seems 
to have thought that Grotius’s critics wrongly held some such conception of common ownership in 
mind when they leveled their critiques.11 Pufendorf sought to clarify matters by distinguishing 
between “negative” and “positive communion”: in a state of negative communion, specific resources 
do not yet belong to anybody; in a state of positive communion, specific resources belong “to many 
Persons together . . . in the very same manner” that private property belongs to one person alone.12  
Now, if positive communion, perhaps along the lines of modern property law’s tenancy-in-
common, were indeed the starting position in a Grotian state of nature, Filmer’s second objection 
to Grotius would have real force. Actual universal consent cannot realistically be procured because 
privatization of the commons would change everyone’s normative circumstances radically, and 
perhaps not for the better. Before the agreement, each person has a claim-right not to be excluded 
                                            
10 See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §§ 41, 49 (2011).  
11 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS bk. 4, ch. 4, § 2, at 363 
(Basil Kennett & George Carew trans., London, J. Walthoe et al. 1729) (1672).  
12 Id. bk. 4, ch. 4, § 2, at 362. 
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from any part of the commons. Afterward, most such claim-rights give way to duties not to use 
what one does not own, which in short order will limit everyone’s access to the overwhelming 
majority of the world’s resources. Even a single hold-out would stymie the privatization of the 
commons because that person would have a claim on all resources just as strong as everyone 
else’s.13 On Pufendorf’s understanding of common ownership in the state of nature, however, 
individuals never had any such claim-right to make use of the world’s resources; they simply were 
permitted to do so if they could. For, according to Pufendorf, the world’s resources were subject to 
a negative communion before social agreements instituted rules of private property: “all things lay 
free to any that would use them, and did not belong to one more than to another.”14  
But Filmer’s second objection, concerning the improbability of actual agreement, is not so 
easily overcome. Even in the negative communion Pufendorf imagines, individuals necessarily lose 
something valuable in the shift to private ownership. Specifically, they lose their privileges to use 
all resources within their reach, at least for the resources that are now (purportedly) the private 
property of somebody else. And of course a person who refused to give up that state-of-nature 
freedom would not be bound by others’ private property compact on a wholly consent-based view 
                                            
13 And Filmer raised exactly this objection against Grotius: 
Certainly it was a rare felicity that all the men in the world at one instant of time should agree 
together in one mind to change the natural community of all things into private dominion. For 
without such an unanimous consent it was not possible for community to be altered. For if but one 
man in the world had dissented, the alteration had been unjust, because that man by the law of 
nature had a right to the common use of all things in the world, so that to have given a property of 
any one thing to any other had been to have robbed him of his right to the common use of things. 
FILMER, supra note 8, at 234. 
14 PUFENDORF, supra note 11, bk. 4, ch. 4, § 5, at 366. 
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of property. Since no one wants to entertain the possibility that figuring out who is bound by 
property laws must be done on a case-by-case basis, the negative/positive communion distinction 
does not help consent-based views with Filmer’s second concern.  
Filmer denied common ownership, claiming that God had given Adam exclusive private 
ownership over all the world’s resources and plenary authority to distribute them as he saw fit. 
Locke himself retains a sort of common ownership premise, but he avoids the problem that 
Grotius and Pufendorf face by insisting against them that private property rights can arise even 
without “any express Compact of all the Commoners.”15 Locke agrees that no one has any special 
claim-right to the exclusive use of particular resources “in their natural state,”16 implying that 
generally everyone has a privilege to use any unclaimed natural resource.17 But he parts ways with 
Grotius and Pufendorf over their view that consent is the only way that this use-privilege is lost. 
On Locke’s view, “the great Foundation of Property” derives from each man’s ability to transform, 
through labor, natural resources for material gain or, as he says, for “the Support or Comfort of his 
being.”18 Thus unlike the natural commons Grotius and Pufendorf imagined, in Locke’s commons 
everyone’s use-privileges are qualified by a Hohfeldian liability: for any unclaimed resource, each 
                                            
15 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 25, at 286; see also id. bk. 2, § 28, at 288 (“If such a consent as that [i.e. “the 
consent of all Mankind”] was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him.”). 
16 Id. bk. 2, § 26, at 286. 
17 This implication follows from the fact that privileges are “jural correlatives” of Hohfeld’s inelegantly named “no-
rights.” See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING 38–39 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920). As we shall see, however, Locke believes that the general 
privilege to use any resource is qualified by (inter alia) others’ superior claim on resources necessary for survival. See 
infra p. 12. 
18 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 44, at 298–99. 
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person has a Hohfeldian power19 to labor upon it and thereby replace others’ moral privilege to use 
it with a duty not to do so.20 But how is it that labor has this impressive ability to transform goods 
from commonly to privately owned? Locke articulates his position in a variety of ways, some more 
felicitous than others.  
In what may be the most often quoted section of the argument, Locke seems to justify an 
individual’s property rights in tangible resources by invoking that individual’s preexisting “Property 
in his own Person” and “Labour.”21 “Whatsoever [the laborer] removes out of the State that Nature 
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his Property.”22 So it seems the way that mixing labor with a natural 
resource transforms it (from something available for anyone’s use to something others now have a 
duty not to use) has something to do with the fact that the resource now has within it a substance 
that belongs to the laborer—namely, his labor.23 In the very next section, though, Locke abandons 
this mixture/joining imagery, instead speaking of labor less as substance and more as activity: “The 
labour that was mine, removing [natural resources] out of that common state they were in, hath 
                                            
19 For Hohfeld, to say that A has a power over B with respect to normative relation X (e.g. a claim-right or duty) is 
just to say that A can act in such a way that alters the normative relation X between B and someone else. And to say 
that A has a power over B with respect to X is just to say B has a liability to A with respect to X because powers and 
liabilities are jural correlatives. See HOHFELD, supra note 17, at 50–51.  
20 John Simmons also emphasizes this moral power in his description of Locke’s state of nature. See A. JOHN 
SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 72 (1992). 
21 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 27, at 287, 288;   
22 Id. bk. 2, § 27, at 288. 
23 See id. bk. 2, § 27, at 287–88; id. bk. 2, § 32, at 291 (“He that . . . subdued, tilled and sowed any part of [the 
Earth] thereby annexed to it something that was his Property, which another had no Title to, nor could without injury 
take from him”). 
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fixed my Property in them.”24 Later, Locke varies his phrasing yet again: “he that so employed his 
Pains about any of the spontaneous Products of Nature, as any way to alter them, from the state 
which Nature put them in, by placing any of his Labour on them, did thereby acquire a Propriety in 
them.”25  
Because of this loose use of language it is odd as a matter of interpretation to assume, as 
Robert Nozick and Jeremy Waldron do, that Locke’s mixture/joining imagery does its intended 
philosophical work only if taken quite literally. They are right to express doubt about the 
proposition that labor can be combined with physical objects as though it were a substance, 
perhaps like water can be mixed with flour, and they are also right to resist the idea that mixing 
something one owns with something one does not own establishes ownership of the resulting 
mixture.26 But they are wrong to suggest that Locke is committed to either the spooky 
metaphysics or the implausible moral claim. In saying that we mix labor with natural resources, 
there is no reason to believe he had anything so literal in mind. After all, Locke elsewhere spoke of 
mixtures of ideas and dance moves.27 Rather than concluding that Locke’s labor-mixing passage 
                                            
24 Id. bk. 2, § 28, at 289. 
25 Id. bk. 2, § 37, at 294–95. 
26 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–75 (1974); Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries About 
Mixing One’s Labour, 33 PHIL. Q. 37, 39 (1983) (“[T]he argument based on mixing labour . . . is defective to the point 
of incoherence . . . .”). Much earlier, David Hume voiced his own concerns about the labor-mixing imagery and 
preferred to view labor as the activity of altering natural resources. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
bk. 3, pt. II, § 3, at 505 n.1 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740) 
(“We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense.”). 
27 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. 2, ch. 33, § 16, at 399 (Peter H. 
Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690) (relating an account “of a young Gentleman, who having learnt to Dance, and that to great 
Perfection, there happened to stand an old Trunk in the Room where he learnt. The Idea of this remarkable piece of 
household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his Dances, that though in that Chamber he could Dance 
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should be interpreted literally despite the problems such an interpretation generates, we ought 
consider the possibility that he meant something else.28  
Fortunately there is a way of understanding Lockean labor that makes sense of the labor-
mixing passage and the other key parts of Locke’s discussion. For Locke, labor is a certain sort of 
deliberate resource use for the sake of material gain. More specifically, labor is intentional activity 
aimed at using resources for survival and comfort.29 Human beings, on Locke’s account, have 
overwhelmingly strong reasons to put the earth’s resources to good use.30 In part, we owe such 
behavior to God because of His commands to enjoy the world He created, but we also have 
independent reason to use resources to improve our own well-being.31 We should “enjoy” and 
“make use of” nature’s gifts “to any advantage of life”32 and draw from them “the greatest 
                                                                                                                                             
excellently well, yet it was only whilst that Trunk was there, nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that, 
or some such other Trunk had its due position in the Room” (emphasis added)). 
28 On this point, I follow STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 152, 174 (1991); 
SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 273; and T.M. Scanlon, Natural Wrongs and Institutional Rights I: Property 12 (Feb. 
1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). My understanding of Locke’s argument owes a great deal to 
their accounts. 
29 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 273. 
30 This view is also found in the First Treatise, where Locke describes the “Right to the use of the Creatures” as 
“founded Originally in the Right a Man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniences of Life.” LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 1, 
§ 97, at 212. Locke’s primary purpose in that part of the First Treatise, however, is to challenge Filmer’s theory that a 
royal line of succession began with Adam and bestowed sovereignty over all his children to one of them in particular. 
See id. bk. 1, § 84, at 204. 
31 See id. bk. 2, § 32, at 291 (“God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to 
labour, and the penury of his [i.e. Man’s] Condition required it of him. God and his Reason commanded him to 
subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his 
labour.”); cf. id. bk. 2, § 26, at 286 (“God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason 
to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience. The Earth, and all that is therein, is given to Men for 
the Support and Comfort of their being.”). 
32 Id. bk. 2, § 31, at 290 (emphasis omitted). 
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Conveniences of Life” that we are capable of.33 When an individual in Locke’s state of nature 
labors, she is using resources in the way they ought to be used. To say that an individual mixes her 
labor with a resource is merely to say that she is using that resource in order to gain what is 
necessary or convenient for life.34 The fact that a laborer is now using this resource distinguishes it 
from the other, still-common resources and removes it “from the common state Nature placed it 
in.”35 For Locke, this distinguishing characteristic—the fact that someone has started using the 
resource for material gain—is morally significant. In certain conditions, he claims, laboring gives 
the laborer L a claim-right against another person N such that N may not to make certain 
unauthorized uses of the resources R that figure in L’s labor. He gives a pair of reasons to support 
this claim. 
First, some of N’s unauthorized uses of R will impose a hardship on L. If L cultivates some 
land for the sake of producing food, and N swoops in and takes over some of the land L was 
working upon, N’s interference with L’s labor injures L: “He that in Obedience to this Command 
of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of [the earth], thereby annexed to it something that 
was his Property, which another . . . could [not] without injury take from him.”36 But note that 
Locke does not claim here that every unauthorized use of R by N would wrong L. He focuses on 
                                            
33 Id. bk. 2, § 34, at 291. 
34 See SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 273–74. 
35 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 27, at 288; accord id. bk. 2, § 28, at 288 (“That labour put a distinction between 
them and common.”); id. bk. 2, § 37, at 294–95; cf. A. John Simmons, Makers’ Rights, 2 J. ETHICS 197, 210 (1998), 
reprinted in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY 249, 262 (2001). 
36 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 32, at 291. 
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the case in which N’s unauthorized use takes the improved version of R away from L and thereby 
causes injury. Likewise, he limits L’s right against N to situations in which L is actually putting R 
to use. “Nothing,” Locke insists, “was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy” for no purpose.37 
According to Locke, this prohibition of pointless waste is the principal limit on property rights in 
the state of nature. And any unauthorized use of another’s possessions that does not actually 
interfere with that person’s constructive laboring is not wrongful. For L has “no Right” to his 
resources R “farther than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him 
Conveniences of Life.”38 Locke does not even appear to relax this limit where R would not exist 
were it not for L’s labors. If L goes to the trouble of growing fruit on unclaimed land but allows 
the fruit to perish, the land is “still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any 
other”;39 presumably any still-living vegetation comes with it. In places, Locke further claims that 
waste actually wrongs other people.40 This claim is distinct from the claim that using what is being 
wasted by somebody else is entirely permissible, and seems to require a separate defense that Locke 
nowhere explicitly provides.41 In any case, where L is not wasting R but using R to gain what is a 
                                            
37 Id. bk. 2, § 31, at 290.  
38 Id. bk. 2, § 37, at 295. 
39 Id. bk. 2, § 38, at 295. 
40 Locke describes waste as robbery and as an injury to others. Id. bk. 2, § 46, at 300.  
41 To my mind, it is harder for Locke to explain the impermissibility of waste in a world of abundance than the 
permissibility of using what is being wasted. Perhaps he thinks waste wrongs others because taking possession of a 
common resource, for example by enclosing land with a fence, communicates to others that they may no longer use it. 
Cf. id. bk. 2, § 51, at 302 (“[W]hat Portion a Man carved to himself, was easily seen.”). Since taking possession signals 
to others that their use-privileges have been taken away, the possession-taker must make good on his signal or else he 
will be “dishonest,” as Locke says. Id. bk. 2, §§ 46, 51, at 300, 302. But this interpretation would account for only 
some of the language that Locke uses to condemn waste. 
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necessity or a convenience for him, and where, further, N’s use would interfere with L’s use of R, 
the fact that N’s use would harm L is a good reason for N not to use R in that way. In one 
important but frequently overlooked passage, Locke expresses this point using language quite like 
the notion of interference: a person “ought not to meddle with what was already improved by 
another’s Labour.”42 
Second, N sometimes has no good reason for accessing R. Early on, Locke rules out the 
possibility that L has a duty to labor on N’s behalf, saying that N has “no right to” “the benefit of 
another’s Pains.”43 Moreover, Locke observes that N is not harmed by the duty not to interfere 
with L’s labor provided that N retains the ability to labor as he pleases on enough resources that 
are as good as R: “For he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take 
nothing at all.”44 In the secondary literature, there is some controversy about whether this “enough 
and as good” condition, which Nozick dubbed “Locke’s proviso,”45 should be seen as a necessary 
condition or as a sufficient condition for duties to refrain from using others’ property.46 There are 
good reasons for thinking that it is necessary condition within the particular argument that Locke 
                                            
42 Id. bk. 2, § 34, at 291 (emphasis added). 
43 Id. bk. 2, § 34, at 291. On its face, this passage is consistent with another interpretation, namely that X has no 
privilege (in Hohfeld’s sense) to benefit from L’s pains. That interpretation would certainly rule out X’s unauthorized 
use of R, but it is inconsistent with Locke’s insistence on a privilege to use what is being wasted.  
44 Id. bk. 2, § 33, at 291; see also id. bk. 2, §§ 27, 34–36, at 288, 291–93. 
45 NOZICK, supra note 26, at 175; see also id. at 178–82. 
46 Nozick and Simmons are among those inclined to treat the proviso as a necessary condition, while Judith Jarvis 
Thomson and Waldron favor interpreting it as nothing more than a sufficient condition. Compare NOZICK, supra note 
26, at 178, and SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 294, with Judith Jarvis Thomson, Property Acquisition, 73 J. PHIL. 664, 666 
(1976), and Jeremy Waldron, Enough and As Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q. 319, 321 (1979). 
 28 
is advancing in the Second Treatise. That seems to me the most straightforward reading of his claim 
that labor grounds exclusive use rights “at least where there is enough, and as good left in common 
for others.”47 The proviso cannot be sufficient for property duties because, as we have seen, there is 
also the necessary condition that the property owner must not be letting the property spoil 
pointlessly. But we need not understand the proviso as a necessary condition for justifying private 
property rights in any conceivable situation whatever. If, as Waldron imagines,48 we enter a world 
with no preexisting social agreements and a keen scarcity of essential resources, Locke need not 
reject the possibility of us being able to make some sort of justified exclusive use of those resources. 
He must, however, acknowledge that in such a setting any justification for using resources to the 
exclusion of others would have to proceed differently than the account he has offered. He does not 
discuss the issue, however, because he is quite confident that original acquisition began in a world 
that as a matter of fact did contain plenty of resources for humanity’s survival and convenience.49 If 
that assumption were false, Locke would have to abandon his argument. But as long as he is 
                                            
47 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 27, at 288 (emphasis added). 
48 Waldron, supra note 46, at 325. 
49 Locke is confident for at least two reasons: First, the foolishness of accumulating more than one could make 
use of before it spoiled would limit private holdings considerably. See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 46, at 300. Second, 
because labor and its consequences are responsible for the vast majority of the usefulness or “value” of resources, a little 
bit of natural resources goes a long way toward furnishing the necessities and conveniences of life, and it takes 
widespread agreement to adopt an arbitrary system of value, such as currency, with the potential to generate conditions 
that incentivize privatizing enough resources that “enough and as good” no longer remain. See id. bk. 2, §§ 43–50, at 
298–302.  
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assuming plenitude, he need not take a position on whether (or how) appropriation would be 
permissible in a state of nature where resources are scarce.50  
 Locke thus argues that rights to use resources exclusively arise in the state of nature 
whenever (1) a laborer is seeking to benefit from the resources and others’ use of the resources 
would threaten the laborer’s success and (2) the laborer’s exclusive use of the resources does not 
constrain everyone else’s ability to labor on other resources of sufficient quantity and comparable 
quality. When both conditions are met, others have a duty not to meddle with or interfere with 
the laborer’s actions. If, however, either condition is not satisfied, Locke’s main argument does not 
condemn others’ use of the resources the laborer is using. 
It should be clear that this argument for a variety of natural property rights falls quite short 
of justifying the rights that appear in contemporary property law. Other writers have pointed out 
several ways that a right against interference with labor differs from what we think of as property 
ownership today. Stephen Buckle notes that Locke’s property right does not give the right-holder 
absolute control over the disposition or use of the thing she owns even to the extent of permitting 
the thing’s pointless destruction.51 Simmons makes the related point that in contemporary legal 
                                            
50 Nor is Locke prohibited from endorsing more complex principles of justice in a civil society marked by 
inequality. He is already on the record stating that “Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, 
as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise” and that “Man can no more justly 
make use of another’s necessity, to force him to become his Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him to 
afford to the wants of his Brother.” Id. bk. 1, § 42, at 170. This demand of charity could perhaps be expanded or 
supplemented in ways consistent with Locke’s commitments. To be sure, Locke explicitly says that the agreement to 
treat precious metals as valuable constitutes an agreement “to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth,” 
see id. bk. 2, § 50, at 302, but it is not at all clear what this statement means, why it is credible, whether Locke 
approves of the putative agreement, or how immutable the agreement remains in civil society. In any event, I will not 
explore this idea further here. 
51 BUCKLE, supra note 27, at 181. 
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systems, owners’ exclusive rights are not restricted to situations where they are actually using their 
property.52 Finally, T.M. Scanlon emphasizes the difference between Lockean and ordinary 
understandings of the transferability of property, pointing out that on Locke’s labor theory the 
transferee does not obtain a claim-right against interference by third parties going forward unless 
she makes use of the transferred object to obtain the necessities and conveniences of life.53 
Property laws, perhaps alongside other social conventions, have relaxed Locke’s waste limitation 
and made transfer of property subject to fewer such contingencies.  
But this development is no surprise to Locke, who clearly envisioned social convention and 
agreement playing an important role in refining the basic natural right against meddling with labor. 
Civil societies, he says, “have made and multiplied positive Laws to determine Property,” although 
those laws often still implement the “original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property, in what 
was before common,” such as common stocks of fish in the ocean which may be kept by anyone 
who catches them.54 Elsewhere in his discussion of property, he describes communities as enacting 
laws to “regulate[] the Properties of the private Men of their Society, and so, by Compact and 
Agreement, settl[ing] the Property which Labour and Industry began.”55 This regulation of property 
                                            
52 SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 277. A good example of Simmons’s observation can be found in modern trespass 
law, which generally prohibits entering onto someone’s land even if that entry does not interfere with any use that the 
landowner is making of her land. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
53 Scanlon, supra note 27, at 25–27; accord SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 137. Locke does, of course, categorize the 
gratuitous giving away of resources and trade as use rather than waste on the transferor’s part. See LOCKE, supra note 1, 
bk. 2, § 46, at 300. But that categorization does not entail that the transferee gains exclusive rights apart from 
beginning to put the resources to good use. 
54 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 30, at 289; see also id. bk. 2, § 50, 302 (“For in Governments the Laws regulate 
the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.”).  
55 Id. bk. 2, § 45, at 299. 
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is precipitated by or at least follows conventions that introduced money as a means of transferring 
and accumulating value.56 Locke does not give a comprehensive description of the ways that 
positive law “settles” property rights, but he does hint that one of the major ways it does so is by 
making property rights more secure. This rationale is at the heart of Locke’s theory for why people 
enter into civil society. Because an individual in the state of nature would know that “enjoyment of 
the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure,” he consequently agrees “to joyn in 
Society with others . . . for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates.”57 
Civilized society is attractive in large part because it, unlike the state of nature, offers a means for 
resolving disputes by appeal to an impartial authority.58  
Although Locke does not discuss the subject, civil society’s ability to safeguard rights can 
theoretically extend beyond adjudication of disputes that have already arisen by promulgating 
explicit rules that clarify the rights and duties of its members and therefore make disputes less 
likely to arise. When Pufendorf leaned so heavily on property conventions, he did so in part 
because of the essential role they play in making individual rights and duties clear.59 Although 
                                            
56 See id. bk. 2, §§ 45–50, 299–302. 
57 Id. bk. 2, § 123, at 350. It is worth noting that when Locke speaks of “Property,” he is not in line with modern 
usage but is rather referring to “Lives, Liberties and Estates” together. Id.; accord bk. 2, §§ 87, 173, at 323, 383. 
Locke’s usage was not unusual at the time he wrote Two Treatises. See id. bk. 2, § 27 editor’s note, at 287. 
58 See id. bk. 2, § 21, at 282 (citing conflict resolution as “one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society”); 
id. bk. 2, § 124, at 350–51 (explaining that the state of nature “wants an establish’d, settled, known Law, received and 
allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all 
Controversies between them”); cf. id. bk. 2, § 19, at 280 (defining the state of nature by reference to its lack of “a 
common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between” individual disputants). 
59 See PUFENDORF, supra note 11, bk. 4, ch. 4, § 9, at 372 (“[N]either could others know what any Person 
intended to keep for his own . . . .”); id. bk. 4, ch. 4, § 10, at 372 (“[T]here was need of some human Act and 
Agreement, that others might know what belong’d to every distinct Person . . . .”).  
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Pufendorf overstated the extent to which conventions are absolutely necessary for normative 
guidance, he was right to observe their usefulness in making violations of property rights less likely. 
Locke is perhaps overly optimistic in suggesting that his labor-based account of property would 
leave “no room for Controversie about the Title, nor for Incroachment on the Rights of others” 
because “what Portion a Man carved to himself, was easily seen.”60 Surely such disputes are easy to 
imagine even among people who honestly attempt to respect the rights of others. Consider the 
classic example of the acorn-gatherer.61 A pile of acorns sitting under an oak tree indeed appears to 
be something only human intelligence would produce. (Any other nut-gathering animal would be 
prudent enough to hide his or her stash.) But imagine that a highly conscientious acorn-gatherer 
goes around naively collecting acorns that, as it turns out, were purposefully arranged under a tree 
to look as though they were in their natural state as part of a “Postmodernism in the State of 
Nature” art exhibition. (The tree, you see, is actually a maple.) Human beings would certainly make 
some honest mistakes about what would interfere with others’ use of abundant tangible resources, 
even in the state of nature, and so Locke should take a modest cue from Pufendorf and allow that 
property conventions help to clarify the boundaries of natural rights. But I also think he should 
happily acknowledge that positive laws expand property rights beyond those that exist in the state 
of nature. And it may even be possible to give those expansions a social convention–type 
justification, though I will not pursue this possibility. 
                                            
60 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 51, at 302; see also id. bk. 2, § 31, at 290.  
61 See, e.g., id. bk. 2, § 28, at 288. 
 33 
Even with the large role that convention and agreement eventually play in Locke’s story of 
the transition to civil society, the interpretation I have been advocating still preserves a significant 
difference between his views and those of the Continental natural lawyers who preceded him. In 
asserting that individuals have a natural claim-right that others not interfere with their harmless 
efforts to make life better for themselves, Locke parts company with his predecessors who saw 
mutual agreement as the only possible source of any such right. Although Grotius approvingly 
cited Cicero’s comparison of property in the state of nature to the claiming of an open seat at a 
theater, he did not seem to judge that there was any more robust form of natural property rights 
that could extend beyond the time one was physically in possession of the object62 or beyond the 
resources necessary for bare subsistence.63 Pufendorf was apparently not willing to allow even that 
very thin sort of natural property right.64 While Grotius concluded that “whatever each had . . . 
taken [arripuerat] for his own needs another could not take [eripere] from him except by unjust 
act,”65 Pufendorf denied that it was wrong, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, to take 
resources that another person had seized to sustain himself: “that one Man’s seizing on a thing 
should be understood to exclude the Right of all others to the same thing, could not proceed but 
                                            
62 See GROTIUS, supra note 6, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 2, at 186 (“Although the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to 
say that the seat which a man has taken belongs to him.” (quoting CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM bk. 
3, § 20 (45 B.C.))). 
63 See, for example, Grotius’s explanation of how the exclusive use rights that existed in the earliest state of nature 
were acceptable only so long as people maintained the simplest of lifestyles. Id. bk. 2, ch. 2, § 4, at 189. 
64 I have benefited here from Michael Zuckert’s clear comparison of these two natural lawyers’ views. See MICHAEL 
P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 251–52 (1994). 
65 GROTIUS, supra note 6, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 2, at 186. 
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from mutual Agreement.”66 To obtain exclusive rights to a theater seat, therefore, one had to rely 
on a prior agreement, even if only a tacit one, that established the possibility of gaining such rights 
by occupying the seat.67  
Locke goes beyond Grotius and still further beyond Pufendorf in defending exclusive rights 
to resources outside the period of physical possession or occupation. Indeed, the difference between 
these writers is conspicuously on view when Locke parts ways with Grotius and Pufendorf over the 
point at which wild animals become private property. The latter both argue that physical 
possession (or infliction of a mortal wound) is required68 while Locke says that one begins a 
Property in a wild animal as soon as one discovers it and gives chase.69 On the noninterference 
interpretation, Locke’s conception of beginning a property is simply exercising one’s prerogative to 
labor, which generates a claim-right against interference by others. An intermeddler can interfere 
                                            
66 PUFENDORF, supra note 11, bk. 4, ch. 4, § 4, at 365; see also id. bk. 4, ch. 4, § 9, at 372 (“[T]hat [seizure or 
physical possession] might be capable of producing a Moral Effect, or an Obligation in others to forbear what each 
Man had taken for his particular, must necessarily have depended on the force of some precedent Covenant.”). 
67 See id., bk. 4, ch. 4, § 10, at 373. 
68 See GROTIUS, supra note 6, bk. 2, ch. 8, § 3, at 296–97; PUFENDORF, supra note 11, bk. 4, ch. 6, § 10, at 392. 
Grotius of course generally thinks that in the state of nature seizure of something common gives one minimal exclusive 
rights to it, but in the passages on wild beasts he is concerned with interpreting positive law. He expressly states that 
the law could be changed so as to let ownership of wild animals begin at an earlier point. GROTIUS, supra note 6, bk. 2, 
ch. 8, § 5, at 297. Pufendorf too is interpreting positive law (as is Locke, for that matter), but he expressly denies that 
the law could permit ownership at a point before possession (or mortal wounding). See PUFENDORF, supra note 11, bk. 
4, ch. 6, § 7, at 390. For a terrific overview of these sources, see Charles Donahue, Jr., Animalia Ferae Naturae: Rome, 
Bologna, Leyden, Oxford and Queen’s County, N.Y., in STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR SCHILLER 
55–59 (Roger S. Bagnall & William V. Harris eds., 1986). 
69 See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 30, at 290 (“[E]ven amongst us the Hare that any one is Hunting, is thought 
his who pursues her during the Chase. For being a Beast that is still looked upon as common, and no Man’s private 
Possession; whoever has imploy’d so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby 
removed her from the state of Nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a Property.”).  
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with a person’s labor, and therefore commit a wrong, even before the laborer has gained physical 
possession of the labored-on resource.70 Likewise, such interference can occur after the laborer has 
set down the resource, at least provided that he is still using it to gain life’s conveniences or 
necessities. And so even if our acorn-gatherer sets down his haul in order to attend to other sylvan 
matters, it is wrong for another person to snatch up the gathered acorns regardless of whether a 
common agreement exists saying so.71 Such an act would be wrong, on Locke’s view, because it 
interferes with the acorn-gatherer’s labor—specifically his use of these particular examples of an 
abundant resource. Thus although my interpretation of Locke’s argument sees him as justifying a 
set of rights that falls rather short of the modern legal understanding of property ownership, in 
itself that fact is no argument against its accuracy as an interpretation. Locke did not need to 
justify a fuller collection of rights to distinguish himself from the property theorists who preceded 
him. 
 
2.2 DEFINING INTERFERENCE WITH LABOR 
According to the foregoing account, Lockean property rights prevent interference with 
labor. Yet saying that something interferes with something else can be a loose way of speaking. 
Unsolicited advice can interfere with a person’s concentration or decisionmaking. A new 
                                            
70 Locke is sometimes criticized for being out of step with the legal authorities here. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 100 n.18 (2009) (“All the classic discussions reject 
the Lockean view.”). But this criticism is too hasty. As Charles Donahue has explained, Roman law likely would have 
seen intentional interference with a hunter’s efforts to obtain a wild animal as an actionable injury. See Donahue, supra 
note 68, at 48–50.  
71 See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 28, at 288. 
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competitor can interfere with business plans. Skillful defensive game play can interfere with the 
offense’s strategy. Often, but not always, labeling an act “interference” is a way of criticizing it. The 
task of this section is to specify a sense (or, as we shall see, senses) of interference with labor to 
pick out the behavior that is wrongful under Lockean principles. For the follower of Locke, it is 
important to be able to furnish some such analysis of the concept of interference that does not rely 
entirely on social practices72 because Locke himself thought it was important to provide an account 
of exclusive rights that do not depend on implicit or explicit social agreement for their normative 
force. If the only way to identify impermissible interference requires consulting a list of interfering 
actions that were proscribed within the social group, Locke’s goal is not going to be attainable.  
Arthur Ripstein has recently expressed skepticism about the possibility of articulating a 
coherent concept of Lockean interference. For Ripstein, either the concept of interference with 
another’s labor amounts to nothing other than interference with her person, or it does no 
philosophical work of its own but rather demands independent appraisals of the laborer’s and 
interferer’s actions.73 Ripstein’s concerns are prompted by cases in which it is obviously permissible 
to interfere with the labor of someone else—just imagine that person is trying to cut your hair 
without permission.74 Surely Ripstein is right that it is permissible to stop this officious barber, but 
that does not demonstrate any flaw in Lockean principles of noninterference. Anyone who affirms 
                                            
72 I will, however, be assuming that linguistic social practices are already in place because it is difficult to imagine 
deliberative action without language. 
73 RIPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 101. 
74 See id. 
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rights against bodily interference and rights to engage in acts of self-defense, as Ripstein does,75 
must accept the possibility that interference is permissible when it is interference with something 
impermissible.76 The aggressor’s right against bodily interference does not prohibit his victim from 
responding to his threat with force. But this truth does not imperil the right against bodily 
interference in any way; it simply requires that we be clear about what that right protects. So too 
with the Lockean right against interference with labor. Labor, like any sort of action, is bounded 
by “the Law of Nature,”77 and so labor that is morally objectionable for some special reason does 
not merit protection against interference. There is no duty to forbear interfering with labor that 
would violate another’s right of bodily integrity, just as there is no duty, as Locke points out, not 
to interfere with labor that denies others what they need to survive. This particular kind of 
example poses no danger to Locke’s argument.  
But it remains true that Locke’s argument requires some account of what qualifies as 
wrongful interference with labor. Some labor seems not to deserve protection from interference 
because of others’ interests, even when the labor itself does not wrong them impermissibly. 
Suppose, for example, that I choose to read one of my philosophy papers to you. Please assume at 
                                            
75 See id. at 41, 177. 
76 Of course, we could debate the details of precisely when such interference is permissible. Ripstein understands 
self-defense (in the state of nature) as permissible whenever the threatened person forms a good-faith belief that he or 
she is under a wrongful threat, regardless of whether such is the case. See id. at 178–79. But one could entertain many 
different accounts, according to which self-defense would be permissible, just to name a few possibilities, only if (1) the 
self-defender had a true belief that she was under a wrongful threat, (2) the self-defender had a reasonable belief 
(whether or not true) that she was under a wrongful threat, or (3) the self-defender truly was under a wrongful threat 
(whether or not she believed this). There is room for similar refinement of an account of permissible interference with 
labor, but I will not take a position on any of these details here. 
77 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 4, at 269; see also Scanlon, supra note 27, at 13. 
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least for argument’s sake that my doing so is not immoral. Although your walking away during the 
course of my speech would interfere with my presentation to you, you would not (except in bizarre 
circumstances) wrong me by departing. It is permissible to interfere with my reading to you because 
that act, unlike an act of simply reading aloud, requires your participation, and your own interests 
in deciding whether to participate have great moral importance. Now to be sure there are ways you 
could wrongfully interfere with my actions in this scenario—for instance, you could snatch the 
paper out of my hands. But the difference is readily explained. Actions can often be described in 
multiple accurate ways, and the wrongfulness of interference with the action may be evident only 
under certain descriptions. Here, my act of reading the paper to you is also an act of reading the 
paper aloud, but your departure interferes with my act only under the former description because I 
can continue to read my paper aloud. The same cannot be said of your taking the paper away from 
me, which prevents me from reading the paper out loud in addition to reading it to you. When an 
act of labor is described in a way that implies the participation of another party—like the acts of 
reading to, selling to, marrying, and so forth—interference with the act so described is permissible, 
for all we know, because of the other party’s strong interests in deciding whether to participate. Of 
course, if the other party has promised to participate or wishes to participate, interference might 
well be impermissible. And so a third person who drowned me out as I was reading my paper to 
you, an eager listener, would wrong both of us, but if he only made you decide you would rather 
not stick around to hear what I have to say and you were under no obligation to do so, neither of 
you would wrong me. As a rule, then, we should reserve the concept of wrongful interference with 
labor for cases where the labor is described in a way that does not presuppose a second party’s 
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participation.78 Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion below will assume that any interfered-
with labor is permissible and interfered with under a description that does not imply somebody 
else’s participation. 
The foregoing remarks help clarify what sorts of labor fit within Locke’s notion of 
interference with labor, but the relevant type of interference still needs clearer description. There 
are, I believe, at least three different sorts of behavior that can be characterized as wrongful 
interference with labor, beginning with a sort of interference in the most straightforward sense that 
strikes in the middle of the laborer’s activities and best captures Locke’s notion of meddling. This 
interference, which I call disruption, occurs after a person has begun doing something that can be 
called labor in Locke’s sense, when another person comes along and either prevents the laborer 
from continuing with the activity so described or reverses the consequences of what the laborer has 
been doing for the sake of producing those very consequences. So, for example, if I make off with 
your lumber supply while you are in the middle of building a fence to keep vegetable-eating beasts 
away from your crops, I have engaged in wrongful interference of the disruptive sort because you 
cannot continue with your fence-building without the wood I have taken. Likewise, I disrupt your 
labor if I make off with the most recently installed plank or two every time you disappear to collect 
more lumber even if you eventually overcome the obstacle and complete your fence; here I wrong 
you by undoing your accomplishments. The reasons for thinking this disruption wrong are the 
                                            
78 I do not mean to imply that the second party’s interests always justify interfering with the laborer’s actions. 
Rather, I only mean to claim that we need some special explanation for prohibiting interference that would admittedly 
serve others’ interests. Here is a silly example: even if it redounds to the benefit of thirsty consumers, it is not clearly 
permissible for Country Time to start selling its products next to a child’s lemonade stand. 
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reasons Locke cited to justify natural property rights in the Second Treatise: meddling with what 
you have been doing makes your pursuits more difficult and, where there are adequate other 
resources for me to use in my own pursuits, the burden of not bothering you is inconsequential.79  
By contrast, the burden of not interfering would be oppressively high if we were generally 
obligated not to interfere with activities that had not even begun but were something the agent 
expected, intended, or wanted to do. A whole lot more of what any particular person contemplated 
doing would come into conflict with others’ rights if duties of noninterference encompassed not 
only projects already underway but also projects that had been conceived of but not yet 
commenced. A virtue of the disruption variety of interference is that it only encompasses those 
actions that interfere with labor that is already happening in the world rather than sweeping in 
every action that makes others’ success more difficult. Consider the neighbor who puts out food to 
attract predatory animals onto her property so they will scare off smaller creatures that have been 
eating her crops. If I devise a better way to attract the same predators, I have interfered with my 
neighbor’s plans—though not with anything she yet started to do. But since there is no reason to 
think either of us has a better claim the predators’ protection, it seems right for the principle 
against disruption not to forbid either of us from carrying our plans forward.  
Ripstein seems concerned that Lockean duties of noninterference would prohibit many 
instances of intuitively permissible competition. He imagines a situation where A buys the last 
bottle of milk while B is heading to the store with the goal of purchasing milk, and Ripstein 
                                            
79 The burden is not entirely nonexistent, though, because it is something of a challenge for a person to take 
precautions ensuring that she does not interfere with others’ labors and to acquire alternative natural resources if the 
ones already in use are more conveniently located. 
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concludes, plausibly, that A has not wronged B even though A has, in some sense, interfered with 
B’s activities.80 Now in dealing with this example it is tempting to take a cue from the preceding 
paragraph and insist that B was not yet engaged in any intentional action that A could be said to 
have disrupted. Certainly B was traveling to the store, but just as certainly A did not interfere with 
B’s movement. And it is hardly obvious that B was buying milk at the time that A came along and 
grabbed the last bottle. Whether B was buying milk at that time seems to depend on contingent 
contextual facts—such as the fact that milk typically abounds in A and B’s locale. Where milk 
shortages are rare, it may be plausible for a person to claim to be buying milk while he is making 
his way toward the dairy aisle. (“I’m buying milk. What does it look like I’m doing?”) By contrast, 
one probably could not claim to be buying milk if going to the store with money provided at most 
a hope of walking away with the goods.81 If you enter your name into a lottery drawing for a 
concert ticket and someone else walks away the winner, you would not, before the drawing 
occurred, claim to be getting a concert ticket. You would instead say you were trying to get a ticket 
or entering a drawing in order to get a ticket. But given the typical abundance of milk in grocery 
stores, it is not entirely clear to me that the statement “B is buying milk” was false at every relevant 
moment of the imagined example even though it is clear that B did not buy milk. Moreover, we 
can fill out the example with other details that make it look even more like case of interference 
                                            
80 RIPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 101. 
81 Cf. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION § 23, at 40 (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000) (1963) (“[T]he less normal it 
would be to take the achievement of the objective as a matter of course, the more the objective gets expressed only by 
‘in order to.’ E.g. ‘I am going to London in order to make my uncle change his will’; not ‘I am making my uncle 
change [his] will.’”). 
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with B’s actual activities under a different description. Suppose B is in the process of making a 
béchamel sauce and suddenly realizes a need to go to the grocery store to by the necessary milk. It 
is hard not to say that A’s purchase interfered with B’s béchamel-making. 
However that may be, there is a more fundamental problem with Ripstein’s milk example: 
like many examples involving competition, it presumes some sort of scarcity. The level of scarcity is 
never made clear, but our inclination to describe A’s action as interference and justification for 
labeling it wrongful seem to depend on what we assume about the remaining availability of milk. If 
B can buy milk at the pharmacy next to the supermarket, then we might rightly find no real 
interference to begin with. And then even if A bought the last milk in town and we are inclined to 
describe this as interfering with B’s actions, Lockean principles simply do not tell us whether or 
not A wronged B. As I explained in the previous section, Locke’s argument for property rights 
assumes away conditions of scarcity. To the extent Ripstein’s example presumes not “enough and 
as good” milk for both A and B, it does not envision circumstances in which Lockean natural 
property rights are meant to exist. If we needed to figure out who gets the milk, we would have to 
have principles for dealing with limited supplies of resources given multiple evidently equally 
deserving claimants. Such principles are quite important, of course, but Locke does not propose 
any. Thus the milk example cannot be a reductio ad absurdum of the suggestion that interference 
with labor is wrong because it strays from the background conditions necessary for Locke to 
condemn such interference. 
Nor does the example, combined with the uncontroversial judgment that it would be 
wrong for A to push B in order to get the milk for himself, support Ripstein’s conclusion that the 
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“only way” A could wrong B here “is by wrongfully interfering with [B’s] person.”82 It is not clear 
what the grounds for this inference are supposed to be, or whether Ripstein means to claim (1) 
that, in any case of milk buying, the only intelligible sort of interference that might be in play is 
interference with another’s person or rather (2) that in the particular hypotheticals he proposes, 
where A gets to the last bottle first, A cannot wrong B without interfering with B’s person. But it 
seems to me either claim would be false. 
First, the Lockean arguments I have been presenting show A could wrongfully interfere 
with B’s actions without engaging in any sort of unwanted touching in possible scenarios near to 
the one Ripstein describes. Suppose B has taken a bottle of milk from its shelf in the dairy section, 
wheeled his cart to the checkout line, and momentarily disappeared to pick up one last item. 
Suppose as well that A watches B do this. Proceeding to take the milk from out of B’s cart during 
B’s absence would (at a minimum) be prima facie wrongful interference with B’s milk purchasing 
even if A never makes physical contact with B’s person in the process.  
Second, I believe we can and should extend Locke’s basic line of argument beyond cases of 
disruptive interference and establish that in a narrow range of cases, non-disruptive interference 
with another’s use of resources is impermissible, even when the resources are in short supply. The 
milk example could be developed into such a case. Suppose that A never drinks milk because of 
lactose intolerance, but wants to keep B from having it because he is tired of hearing others sing 
the praises of B and his wonderful sauces. Even if A gets to the milk before B, Lockean principles 
allow us to say that A acts impermissibly in interfering with B’s efforts. For Locke, resources ought 
                                            
82 RIPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 101.  
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to be used, and in this scenario, B is the only person prepared to make use of the milk; A, who 
cannot drink milk, will only throw it out. As we know, Locke holds that waste of resources merits 
no protection, and B would be fully justified in taking milk from A given the certainty that A 
would waste it. Similarly, it would seem to be wrong to appropriate scarce resources simply to 
waste them when others would put them to good use. So I believe we can identify a second type of 
wrongful interference, which I call spite, that occurs when one person acts in order to make another 
person’s actual or potential labor more difficult without having any reason to do so. Unlike 
disruption, spite can be wrongful even when Locke’s proviso is not satisfied. For what makes 
spiteful interference wrong is that the interferer is going out of his way to oppose the laborer’s 
permissible attempts to create a better situation for himself without any justification for this 
opposition. Normally conditions of scarcity make it hard to draw definitive conclusions about who 
ought to be able to use the scarce resource since multiple persons have reasons for doing so. Cases 
of spite are different because the spiteful party is preventing others from using the scarce resource 
for no reason when the others do have reason to use it.  
Spite also differs from disruption by applying to labor that is not yet taking place. Recall 
the protective predator example, which I argued did not involve wrongful disruptive interference. If 
I put out food to lure predators to my property to protect my own crops, I have a good reason for 
doing so, and even my neighbor can see that since he is acting on the same sort of reason. But if I 
put out food without any crops to protect, only to ensure that the rabbits on my (unjustly hated) 
neighbor’s property continue to destroy his vegetation, I have no such reason. I seem, rather, to be 
competing with my neighbor only for the sake of doing him unjustified harm, and so my 
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interference with his plan to benefit from the area’s predatory wildlife is impermissible83—even 
though he is not yet doing anything that I am disrupting. For purposes of determining whether 
spiteful interference has occurred, then, nothing seems to turn on whether the wrongdoer 
interfered with any action that his victim was already engaged in.  
There is perhaps one final version of wrongful interference with labor, which I call 
presumption. It arises in cases where the interference is with what the laborer is doing 
unintentionally yet might have decided to do intentionally if she had possessed the information the 
interferer had. Suppose another person in Locke’s state of nature finds a handsome tree that is not 
yet anyone’s private property, and decides to transplant it to an unclaimed field nearer to where he 
lives simply because he likes its appearance and thinks it will provide nice shade for him to sit in on 
hot sunny days. At that time of planting, he does not know that it is a lemon tree but he will likely 
learn this information as he continues to care for it. So although he is acting intentionally under 
some description such as <tending to the tree> and although he truly is growing lemons, he is not 
acting intentionally under the description <growing lemons>. Hence if I pick all the lemons off his 
tree without him ever realizing they were there, I have not interfered with the labor that he was 
intentionally performing. I have therefore not interfered with his labor according to my sense of 
disruptive interference. Neither have I necessarily acted with spite, for my aim may have been to 
have healthful fruit on hand for my own consumption. So this example does not seem to be an 
instance of either of the previously identified varieties of wrongful interference with labor. 
                                            
83 Tort law reflects this judgment as well. See Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (Minn. 1909) (recognizing a 
cause of action where defendant allegedly opened barbershop solely to drive established barber out of business). 
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Nonetheless, Lockean principles offer some support for the conclusion that something 
about my lemon-picking was wrongful. This claim is perhaps counterintuitive, because the planter 
did not lose anything that was of value to him while I gained something that was of value to me. 
There seems to be no harm in what I have done. But we have to examine this aspect of the 
example alongside my reasons for desiring these lemons in a world of “enough and as good” where 
I could grow my own lemon tree or possibly pick some naturally growing lemons. The reason why 
I would not want to do this is presumably that it would be something of a bother to do so and 
much easier to take lemons that already exist. Locke, however, is insensitive to the trouble that 
growing my own lemon tree would put me to. At least that is how I interpret his remark that we 
do not generally have a right to the benefit of others’ pains. And it also seems like a necessary 
implication of the “enough and as good” proviso. After all, if I were allowed to treat resources that 
another had made better through his labor as better for purposes of the proviso, it would be 
impossible to have property rights in many of Locke’s examples. Uncultivated land is not “as good” 
as the land someone else has improved. So if we follow Locke on this point, the situation seems to 
be that it costs the planter nothing if I take the lemons and costs me nothing (that counts) if I do 
not. And so we might judge that it is permissible for either of us to take the lemons, with 
impermissibility not entering the picture. But I am reluctant to go this route. One thing the 
planter loses out on if I proceed to take the lemons is highly useful knowledge that he otherwise 
would have gained, and laborers have a strong interest in learning the natural course of events that 
ensues when they embark on a new project.84 If I presume to take all the lemons without notifying 
                                            
84 I only mean to include here the laborer’s interest in learning about naturally occurring processes that do not 
involve other human beings. It seems to me that when labor affects other persons, they also have important privacy 
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him or asking permission, he does not learn that he has been growing a useful and tradable 
resource. Even if I only take some of the lemons, and he eventually sees that the tree yields fruit, 
he may never become aware of the extent to which his lemon tree is valuable if he forms an 
inaccurate belief about its production. This loss of information seems unjustified if I can obtain 
substitute resources through my own labor and can inform the inadvertent lemon grower easily 
enough. So although this case goes well beyond Locke’s explicit discussion, I am inclined to think 
that the planter has some sort of claim against me. This claim need not, however, correlate to a 
duty that I have not to take the lemons without giving their grower fair warning and the 
opportunity to claim the lemons for his own consumption or for trade with me.85 Perhaps it is 
enough that I give him an accurate description of the natural occurrence that his labor caused and 
my interference obscured from view. But it would be prima facie wrong, I suggest, for me to take 
the lemons without giving him the information he lost.  
In this section, I have argued that Lockean considerations allow us to identify three distinct 
types of wrongful interference with labor. These can be summarized as follows: 
Disruption: A wrongfully interferes with B’s labor if (1) B is acting permissibly in 
laboring, (2) there exists a true description X of B’s actions such that (a) B is acting 
intentionally under the description X in order to obtain the necessities or 
conveniences of life and (b) B’s X-ing does not require another person’s 
participation, (3) A either prevents B from continuing to X or eliminates the 
intended consequences of acts that constitute B’s X-ing, and (4) A has access to 
                                                                                                                                             
interests in not divulging all the labor’s effects on them. But I do not know exactly where to draw the line when such 
interests conflict with the laborer’s. 
85 Of course, if I did give the planter that opportunity and he decided not to use the lemons in either of these 
ways, that would be waste in Locke’s sense and I would be permitted to take the lemons. 
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resources of roughly the same quality as those used in B’s X-ing that are sufficient 
for any labor that A might wish to do.  
Spite: A wrongfully interferes with B’s labor if (1) B is acting permissibly in laboring, 
(2) A is acting in order to make it harder for B to labor, and (3) A has no reason to 
act in this way. 
Presumption: A wrongfully interferes with B’s labor if (1) B is acting permissibly in 
laboring, (2) there exists a true description X of B’s actions such that (a) B is acting 
intentionally under the description X in order to obtain the necessities or 
conveniences of life and (b) B’s X-ing does not require another person’s 
participation, (3) there also exists a true description Y of B’s X-ing, although B does 
not knowingly act under the description Y, (4) A acts in a way that would be 
disruption if B were acting intentionally under the description Y and thereby 
prevents B from discovering that B was Y-ing, (5) A has access to resources of 
roughly the same quality as those B was using that are sufficient for any labor that A 
might wish to do, and (6) A can easily enough inform B that he had been Y-ing but 
does not do so. 
Together, these definitions of disruptive, spiteful, and presumptuous interference capture the main 
themes of Locke’s discussion of natural property wrongs and present a sharper picture of the 
discussion’s implications. Thanks to these definitions, the concept of interfering with another’s 
labor is clear enough to be of use in evaluating specific cases.  
 
2.3 LOCKEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
One who believes property ownership is a natural right earned through effort might well 
suspect there are natural rights of intellectual property ownership with the same origin.86 The toils 
                                            
86 In the eighteenth-century words of the Massachusetts State Legislature, “the legal security of the fruits of their 
study and industry . . . is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly man’s own than 
that which is produced by the labour of his mind.” An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right 
and Benefit of Publishing their Literary Productions, for Twenty-One Years (1783), reprinted in THE PERPETUAL 
LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 369, 369 (1789). 
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of a musician who composes and rehearses a new work seem no less meritorious than those of an 
apple tree planter—at least not because the fruits of the musician’s labor are incorporeal. Some 
such thought lies behind many attempts to model rights over intangibles after rights over 
tangibles, and because labor grounds Locke’s justification for the latter, many have thought that 
his arguments furnish a natural rights–type justification for intellectual property ownership, too.  
Locke, however, never attempted to apply his theory to justify private ownership of 
information, particular ways of expressing ideas or feelings, or any other kind of intellectual things. 
He says nothing about intellectual property ownership in the Two Treatises.87 In later writing, he 
does touch upon the subject of intellectual property while arguing that Parliament should not 
renew the Licensing Act of 1662. That statute was one of a series of laws that gave the Stationers’ 
Company (essentially a publishing guild) control over the whole of England’s book trade. Locke’s 
writings on this matter are informal, and consist of criticisms of the 1662 statute as well as 
comments on a proposed replacement statute drafted by his friend Edward Clarke of the House of 
                                            
87 Adam Mossoff, however, cites a passage in the Second Treatise as part of the evidence behind his assertion that 
“Locke explicitly recognized that his property theory justified intellectual property.” Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse 
of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2048 (2009). Here is the section he cites, in its 
entirety: 
From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, yet Man (by 
being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or Labour of it) had still in 
himself the great Foundation of Property; and that which made up the great part of what he applyed 
to the Support or Comfort of his being, when Invention and Arts had improved the conveniences of 
Life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others. 
LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 44, at 298–99. Although this passage does include the words “Invention and Arts,” it 
does not hint that anyone should have exclusive rights in the intellectual goods that allow human beings to extract 
greater value from natural resources. It does not even say that inventing is a form of labor, as Mossoff claims. See 
Mossoff, supra. Inventing should qualify as Lockean labor, in my view, but this passage does not say so. I cannot see 
how it is even slightly relevant to the topic of natural intellectual property rights. 
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Commons.88 Locke’s criticisms are not shocking: he bristles at the extreme political and religious 
censorship agenda that lay behind the Crown’s support for the Stationers’ monopoly,89 and finds it 
“absurd” that anyone should have the sole right to print monumental works by long dead authors, 
least of all publishers who cannot be bothered to put together decent editions.90 In his suggestions 
for the draft replacement statute, Locke proposes an addition that seems at first glance to 
countenance some form of copyright: 
To secure the author’s property in his copy, or his to whom he has transferred it, I 
suppose such a clause as this will do . . . : 
And be it further enacted that no book, pamphlet, portraiture or paper printed with 
the name of the author or publisher upon it shall within ___ years after its first 
edition be reprinted with or without the name of the author to it without authority 
given in writing by the author or somebody entitled by him, for so doing under the 
penalty of the forfeiture of all that shall be so reprinted to the author [or] his 
executors, administrators or assigns.91 
Without more, though, we should not conclude that the language Locke suggests adding bespeaks 
his personal endorsement of intellectual property ownership. The passage does not disclose Locke’s 
motivation for trying “[t]o secure the author’s property.” It might have been that he felt strongly 
about this issue as an author and natural rights theorist,92 but that is just speculation. In fact, 
                                            
88 See John Locke, Liberty of the Press, in POLITICAL ESSAYS 329, 329 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) (1694–1695). 
89 Id. at 330–31. 
90 Id. at 333; see also id. at 337 (“That any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of ancient 
authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning.”). 
91 Id. at 338. Locke offers an alternative as well. See id. at 338–39. 
92 See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 902 (2006); cf. 
Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies), 27 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 555, 560 (2010) (“Locke’s choice of ‘secure[ing]’ the ‘author’s property’ may intimate a preexisting right and 
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Locke was clearly responding to a concern explicitly raised in the letter to which he was replying—
to wit, the Stationers’ Company (among others) opposed Locke’s friend’s proposed legislation 
because, in the words of Locke’s correspondents, they found it “wanting as to the Securing of 
Property.”93 Those who wish to see Locke as personally committed to intellectual property rights 
overlook the fact that this securing property language was not Locke’s own.94 Within its context, 
then, Locke’s suggestion seems to reflect political strategy more than philosophical conviction. The 
only certainty in any of this, though, is that Locke nowhere developed an argument for intellectual 
property rights. 
 From a philosophical perspective, of course, it is more important to figure out whether 
Locke’s arguments support natural rights of intellectual property ownership than whether he 
himself did. Surely the concept of labor includes making and improving the sorts of things that 
intellectual property law protects, whatever Locke’s own thoughts on the matter.95 One suspects 
that those who invest time and energy developing copyrightable works, discovering useful new 
information, or marketing their goods using distinctive symbols are ordinarily doing so for the 
purpose of obtaining the necessities and conveniences of life. Beyond this threshold determination 
                                                                                                                                             
Locke also makes a comment in the memorandum that may hint at some natural rights–based property interest being 
trampled by the then Licensing Act.”). 
93 Letter from John Freke & Edward Clarke to John Locke (Mar. 14, 1695), in 5 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF 
JOHN LOCKE 291, 291 (E.S. De Beer ed., 1979).  
94 The Freke/Clarke phrasing receives no mention, for instance, in Hughes, supra note 92; Mossoff, supra note 87; 
or Zemer, supra note 92, all of which take for granted that the phrasing is Locke’s own. 
95 Compare LOCKE, supra note 27, at 10 (describing himself as “an Under-labourer in clearing Ground a little, and 
removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge”), with John Locke, Labour, in POLITICAL ESSAYS, 
supra note 88, at 326, 328 (1693) (distinguishing between the “thought and reading” of the “gentleman and scholar” 
and “honest labour”). 
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that intellectual labor qualifies as true labor, many commentators have gone on to conclude that 
Locke’s labor theory of property does indeed support exclusive rights over intellectual objects as 
much as or more than it supports exclusive rights over tangible ones. Given the interpretation of 
Locke’s theory I developed above, that conclusion would seem to depend on the extent to which 
intellectual property ownership prevents interference with intellectual labor.  
In my view, the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership go far beyond 
protecting intellectual labor from interference—especially within the areas of copyright and patent 
law. To see this, let us think through a few examples, supposing that I am in some Lockean state 
of nature going about my business. If I come upon a person singing a song of her own creation and 
take out my tablet and stylus to jot down the lyrics and chord progression because I like the song 
and want to remember how it goes, I am not disrupting anything that this person is doing. For 
this way of giving physical embodiment to her song does nothing to restrict her ability to continue 
singing or developing the song as she pleases, nor have I undone any of her accomplishments. I 
have not, therefore, engaged in any disruptive interference nor, it would appear, in any spiteful or 
presumptuous interference, even though I have acted in a way that would constitute a violation of 
an intellectual property owner’s excluding privilege to embody her work. Likewise, I do not 
interfere with her labor if I deny her the standard incidents of development and distribution by 
arranging the song in an alternative way or publicly performing it within the community.  
Now imagine that I have found not a singer but a wheeled handcart, which some clever 
person has invented to transport heavy objects long distances. Although making off with the 
prototype for my own use would be a clear case of wrongful interference (assuming that the 
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inventor is still making use of it), I would not be interfering with the inventor’s labors if I go home 
to replicate the cart for my use, or if I alter its design so that it may be pulled by beasts of burden, 
or if I trade the carts I have made to our co-citizens in the state of nature. She would remain as 
capable of using her cart and her design after my actions as before.  
One might dispute this claim, however, by pointing out that she can no longer continue to 
use the cart in one particular way. Specifically, once she begins selling carts or the information 
needed to make them to buyers, their subsequent unauthorized use of her design may interfere 
with her ability to continue profiting from it financially. This observation is correct, but not 
indicative of Lockean natural property rights.96 Recall that interference with labor is not wrongful 
when the labor depends on the participation of another person and that person is neither obligated 
nor eager to participate. The reason is that that other person has her own interests, and to 
determine what treatment the laborer is owed we must account for those interests alongside the 
laborer’s interests. Thus while it is true that infringers can limit intellectual property creators’ 
ability to sell or license their creations for commercial gain, such actions are impermissible 
interference only if the would-be buyers or licensees themselves wish or have a duty to buy a 
product or license from the intellectual property owner. In the crucial sort of case, infringers are 
not interfering with any sales to those preferring to buy from the intellectual property creator; 
rather, they are luring willing buyers away from the owner by charging a lower price. And without 
some independent reason to think that the buyer is obligated to buy from the creator herself, this 
objection simply begs the question. As I understand Locke’s labor theory, then, it does not offer a 
                                            
96 In Chapter 4, however, I will argue that this sort of point is quite important to our moral duties after 
intellectual property law has been instituted for the purpose of advancing the common good. 
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natural rights–type justification for the standard incidents of embodiment, development, or 
distribution in paradigmatic cases of copyright and patent infringement.  
The situation is quite different, though, within the domain of trademark law. Imagine that 
the cart-inventor also produces and sells her carts, marking them all with a distinctive symbol to 
indicate that she was the person who produced them. Perhaps she does so because everyone knows 
that her products are extremely well made and willingly pays more for them than for alternatives. If 
I put that symbol on the carts I make and thereby lead cart-buyers to believe that the carts I am 
selling were actually made by inventor/producer herself, I quite likely interfere with her ability to 
communicate to the buying public. If my carts are not as well made as hers, I disrupt her labor by 
undoing the intended results of her efforts to establish a good reputation for her products. 
Additionally, if word gets out that I am using her symbol too, she can no longer continue using it 
to inform buyers that she is the one who made the carts bearing the symbol. This interference 
harms her, and often harms consumers as well, who presumably prefer to have accurate 
information about the things they buy.97 Furthermore, since plenty of other symbols remain for 
my legitimate purposes, Locke’s proviso is generally satisfied in a case like this one.98 And so when 
                                            
97 That consumers have such a preference may well be doubted, especially to the extent that a trademark infringer 
sells comparable goods at a significantly lower price. In the next chapter, I advance an argument for trademark rights 
that does not depend on consumers’ preferring not to be deceived about the source of the goods they are buying. 
98 As others have noted, however, the proviso is not invariably satisfied in trademark disputes. See, e.g., Wendy J. 
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
YALE L.J. 1533, 1590 (1993) (explaining how poorly designed trademark laws could fail to leave individuals with 
enough and as good ways of expressing their views). For instance, someone who is blocked by trademark from using 
his own name to describe his goods has arguably not been left with enough and as good symbols for his own legitimate 
use. Cf. Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (ruling against trademark defendant for using 
his own last name in naming his business). 
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I pass off my goods as my rival’s without sufficient reason—and I take it for granted that 
misleading potential customers for my personal gain does not suffice—the harm to her and to 
consumers is unjustified. To be sure, modern trademark doctrine covers much more than this 
simple example. But at least this core case of trademark infringement can be seen as morally 
wrongful using the Lockean model I am defending.99 
 
2.4 ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF LOCKEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Of course those who believe Locke’s labor theory goes further in justifying intellectual 
property ownership interpret it rather differently than I do, and so we must examine the 
differences and the reasons behind them. These scholars tend to line up behind one or more of 
three positions, each of which is, I argue, mistaken on the merits and as an interpretation of 
Locke. 
Alternative #1: Treating the Lockean Proviso as a  
Sufficient Condition for Exclusive Property Rights 
 The first alternative line of argument on behalf of Lockean intellectual property argues 
(1) that claiming ownership of presently unowned things through labor is justified whenever it 
leaves nobody else worse off than they otherwise would have been, (2) that, in the relevant sense of 
“worse off,” intellectual property ownership makes no one worse off than they otherwise would 
                                            
99 This conclusion is consistent with Mark McKenna’s historical account of trademark’s justifications. He argues 
that trademark originally prohibited passing off in order to protect producers from unfair competition, but has since 
been expanded in ways that go beyond this grounds of justification. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations 
of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1843–44 (2007). 
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have been, and then concludes (3) that intellectual property ownership is justified. It is true that 
intellectual property rights do not typically worsen the position of non-owners: if they remain free 
to engage in their own intellectual labor irrespective of the innovation that preceded them, 
intellectual property does not necessarily limit their opportunities to interact with ideas and 
creative expression.100 Let us assume, then, that intellectual property rights will generally comply 
with Locke’s proviso.101 The more severe problem with this argument is in proposition (1), which 
treats satisfaction of Locke’s proviso as a sufficient condition for property rights. Some defenders of 
natural intellectual property rights frankly acknowledge that they are construing Locke’s enough-
and-as-good proviso as a sufficient condition.102 The problem with the construction is that it is 
hard to defend as a substantive matter and clearly inconsistent with Locke’s text. 
                                            
100 Current intellectual property law, however, does not conform to this generalization. Whereas copyright law 
recognizes independent creation as a defense against infringement allegations, patent and trademark law do not. 
Compare Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Proof of copying is crucial to any claim of copyright 
infringement . . . .”), with Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (noting that patent protection 
prohibits not only actual copying of the patented invention but also “independent creation” of it), and Rebel Debutante 
LLC v. Forsythe Cosmetic Grp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 558, 575 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (examining whether the defendant’s use 
of a trademark “originated independently” from the plaintiff’s as one non-dispositive factor in determining whether it 
was likely to confuse consumers). 
101 Wendy Gordon, however, has argued that an intellectual property can in some hypothetical circumstances 
worsen non-owners’ overall position by exposing them to an idea or form of creative expression and then invoking 
intellectual property rights to restrict their use of it severely. Gordon, supra note 98, at 1567–70. I am not so sure 
about the force of her examples, but since my aim is to make an independent argument against the idea that Locke’s 
theory supports strong intellectual property rights, this is no place to explore doubts about Gordon’s very interesting 
argument. 
102 Adam Moore does this most clearly. See ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
CONTROL 106–07, 108 (2d prtg. 2004). Wendy Gordon’s analysis of Locke is more difficult to interpret, because she 
asks rhetorically how the proviso could be anything other than a sufficient condition even while acknowledging Locke’s 
prohibition against waste and duty of charity. See Gordon, supra note 101, at 1565 & n.179. 
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The general thought behind treating the proviso as a sufficient condition for property 
seems to be that doing so is unobjectionable because it only justifies ownership that leaves no one 
harmed: “no harm, no foul.”103 But this thought can do little philosophical work in the intellectual 
property setting. As I argued in the Chapter 1, ambiguous terms like “property” and “ownership” 
obscure highly relevant details—specifically, which entitlements the “no harm, no foul” principle 
must justify. Now, if no one is harmed, an intellectual property creator is almost certainly entitled 
to use her creation. Intellectual property ownership, however, is controversial only because it 
includes, besides the owner’s right to use, various rights against others that they not use the new 
creation in certain ways even though they would benefit from so doing and their use and 
enjoyment would not jeopardize the owner’s. If we endorse the “no harm, no foul” principle, we are 
committed to accepting others’ use of the creation if it does not harm the owner. As with any 
harm-based principle, we must determine a baseline from which to measure the relevant sorts of 
harm. Obviously it will not do simply to respond that non-owner use harms (or otherwise wrongs) 
the intellectual property creator by violating her rights to exploit her innovation commercially, 
because that is the very question at issue.104 To justify the standard incidents of intellectual 
property ownership using this argument, then, we need some independent grounds for concluding 
that unauthorized embodiment of intellectual property, for example, harms or wrongs its creator. 
And no such grounds have yet been proposed. 
                                            
103 MOORE, supra note 102, at 109, 114. 
104 It would be just as circular, from the opposite perspective, to resist the “no harm, no foul” argument in support 
of intellectual property by insisting that not having access to intellectual property harms non-owners.  
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In any case, Locke himself seems to reject the “no harm, no foul” principle. Although it is 
possible to take apples from common trees without violating the enough-and-as-good proviso,105 
Locke claims that taking those apples and failing to use them before they spoil wrongs others.106 
But the apple-taker’s waste of the apples on a single occasion does not make others any worse off 
than they would have been had he eaten them instead. If the appropriation of those apples is no 
proviso-violating harm in the first case, neither is it in the second case. Committing harm, in the 
sense of making others worse off, is therefore not strictly necessary in Locke’s view to commit a 
foul.107 Locke repeatedly insists that wasteful appropriation is impermissible whether or not the 
proviso is violated.108 Given Locke’s conviction that waste is impermissible, it is hard to maintain 
that he accepts the proviso as a sufficient condition for justified appropriation. 
Alternative #2: Interpreting Locke’s  
Opposition to Waste Quite Narrowly 
Many who believe that Locke’s theory justifies intellectual property also acknowledge that 
his views about waste place a further constraint on appropriation beyond the enough-and-as-good 
proviso. They think, though, that the waste prohibition simply does not pose a serious barrier to 
                                            
105 See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 28, at 288. 
106 Id. bk. 2, § 46, at 300. 
107 The view that a person may be wronged without a reduction in his overall level of well-being remains a live one 
today. See, e.g., James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 808–11 (1986). 
108 See id. bk. 2, §§ 31, 37 38, 46, at 290, 295, 300. 
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justifying intellectual property’s standard incidents.109 Some of these writers reach this conclusion 
simply by observing that intellectual property does not perish in the same way as the examples 
Locke produces to illustrate his waste prohibition.110 Locke singles out hunters and gatherers who 
let their venison putrefy and their fruit rot.111 Ideas and creative expression are not victims of this 
sort of decay, and their imperishability can make the waste prohibition seem out of place.112 Other 
commentators have thought through the possibility of intellectual property waste more carefully 
but still concluded that it does not significantly constrain intellectual property ownership. For 
instance, Robert Merges insists Locke’s interpreters need a deeper understanding of waste than a 
quick mention of superficial features of the Second Treatise examples, and ultimately he advances an 
interpretation of Locke’s opposition to waste that does rather little to constrain on intellectual 
property ownership. To waste what one owns, Merges claims, the owner “must truly not use it at 
all, must let it go completely to waste.”113  
Now, it is true that if we care only about “abject waste,”114 to use Merges’s label, we will 
not find ourselves tempted to think waste undermines the standard incidents of intellectual 
                                            
109 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 66 (2011); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy 
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO L.J. 287, 300 (1988) (“We can justify propertizing ideas under Locke's approach with 
three propositions: first, that the production of ideas requires a person’s labor; second, that these ideas are appropriated 
from a ‘common’ which is not significantly devalued by the idea’s removal; and third, that ideas can be made property 
without breaching the non-waste condition.”). 
110 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 109, at 328. 
111 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 37, at 295. 
112 Cf. id. bk. 2, § 46, at 300 (claiming that hoarding “durable” items like shells, pebbles, diamonds would not 
necessarily violate the waste prohibition). 
113 MERGES, supra note 109, at 57.  
114 Id. at 61. 
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property. Abject waste of expression or information seems relatively rare. Sure, a creator might 
decline to do anything useful with some very important thoughts, or even go so far as to create an 
embodiment of her thoughts but then leave the thing embodying them in utter disuse.115 One can 
also imagine abject waste by a creator’s choice to destroy all embodiments of her creation (such as 
all copies of her artwork) or some physical materials necessary to benefit from her creation, such as 
research notes.116 Situations like these, however, arise infrequently and constitute only a minimal 
limitation on the justifiability of intellectual property rights. One could see, then, the appeal of the 
suggestion that natural intellectual property rights exist because they ordinarily result neither in 
waste nor in violation of the enough-and-as-good proviso.  
Although Merges deserves credit for thinking about why the waste prohibition exists 
instead of simply relying on obvious differences between intellectual property and Locke’s examples 
of wasted physical objects, his abject waste standard is too strict. Let us set aside intellectual 
property for the moment and reconsider spoilage of physical objects. Suppose an inhabitant of 
Locke’s state of nature greatly enjoys root vegetables and successfully grows and survives on 
turnips, beets, carrots, and radishes, among others. Despite his fondness for healthful produce, 
however, this character turns out not to like leafy greens and so never makes use of these 
vegetables’ edible tops. He simply removes and discards the turnip greens, beet greens, and so on. 
                                            
115 See id. at 58. Merges also thinks it is possible to commit waste by claiming ownership of variants of one’s 
creation that the claimant never produces. Id. at 58–59. But he ultimately downplays this possibility because such 
aggressive claims can prove useful to the owner by preventing competition. Id. at 60. And he also points out that it is 
hard to tell in advance whether the aggressive claimant will eventually decide to make use of the variations. Id. at 61. 
After these qualifications, it is hard to see how on Merges’s understanding of it the waste prohibition meaningfully 
restricts intellectual property rights. 
116 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 101, at 1551. 
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Salad lover that I am, I approach him about the possibility of mutually beneficial exchange. 
Unfortunately, he is none too impressed by my heirloom arugula or anything else I have to offer. 
Self-sufficient and somewhat standoffish, he is not particularly enthusiastic about working out a 
deal but also does not want to give me something for nothing. So we cannot agree to terms. On 
my way out, I notice his cutting board and take a handful of already-removed radish greens with 
me, knowing with certainty that he would make no use of them. As I understand it, Merges’s 
conception of Lockean waste forbids this—because the radish-grower was getting some use out of 
what he was producing through his labor.117 At the same time, though, Merges apparently would 
agree that I could permissibly take this man’s lettuce in similar circumstances if he had cultivated 
some by mistake. There would be abject waste of the lettuce he has grown, but not the radishes, 
because its grower has absolutely no use for any part of the former. But why treat these two takings 
differently? No reason leaps to mind. 
Locke does not address any examples of what might be called partial waste, but what he 
does say seems more consistent with classifying as permissible my hypothetical taking of the radish 
greens. Although Merges quotes Locke’s condemnation of waste, he does not cite any passage in 
particular to support his abject waste standard.118 Yet there is some evidence that calls that 
                                            
117 I interpret Merges as committed to this result because if he were instead to respond by distinguishing between 
use/waste of the roots and use/waste of the greens, he would be opening the door to a much broader application of the 
waste prohibition to intellectual property. For just as plants can be carved up according to different compatible uses, so 
too can creative expression (and innovative ideas), perhaps to an even greater degree. Imagine that Thomas Edison is 
marketing his light bulb in New Jersey but not in Delaware. And that J.K. Rowling is developing a movie for the 
Harry Potter franchise but not a stage show. Surely Merges would not want to say, in those circumstances, that 
someone else could sell Edison’s inventions in the First State or bring Hogwarts to Broadway without the creators’ 
permission. Such a concession would recognize significant limits to the standard incidents of distribution and 
development. 
118 See MERGES, supra note 109, at 49, 56–61. 
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standard into doubt as a faithful reflection of Locke’s own views. Twice, Locke states that the 
scope of natural property rights is bounded by the right-holder’s use and enjoyment of the 
resource. After introducing his idea that it is permissible to use up the common stock through 
labor, Locke explains: 
The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also bound 
that Property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 17. is the Voice of 
Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As 
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much 
he may by his labour fix a Property in.119 
By claiming that property rights are justified as “far” as they promote enjoyment, Locke indicates 
that enjoyment of resources constitutes not only the purpose of property rights, but also sets the 
limit to which they extend. Locke reiterates this position later when he explains why the person 
who wastes food has done wrong: “he had no Right, farther than his Use called for any of them, and 
they might serve to afford him Conveniences of Life.”120 These two passages suggest Locke’s views 
about waste are ultimately grounded in the thought that property rights extend only so far as is 
necessary to protect the owner’s use and enjoyment of what she owns. In other words, property 
rights simply protect against interference, and taking steps to use property that is being wasted is 
permissible because it does not interfere. For the most part, then, Locke’s views about waste 
merely reinforce the central theme of his argument for property rights as I have interpreted it: 
unauthorized uses of property that do not impair the owner’s use and enjoyment of it do not 
                                            
119 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 31, at 290. 
120 Id. bk. 2, § 37, at 295. Note that Locke expressly recognizes trade or donation of a resource as the right sort of 
use of it. Id. bk. 2, § 46, at 300. 
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violate Lockean property rights.121 My unauthorized consumption of the radish greens would not 
conflict with any use the grower had for the produce of his labor and would not be wrongful 
because, as Locke might put it, the right called for by the grower’s use extends only to the radishes 
themselves. This view about waste further suggests that (other things equal) it is permissible to use 
another person’s intellectual property without authorization to the extent that use does not 
interfere with the owner’s use of it.122 
                                            
121 Although we reach nearly the same bottom line, my argument differs at this very point from the one advanced 
by Seana Shiffrin in her important article on Locke and intellectual property. She argues that the best interpretation of 
Locke’s view holds that any resource is owned in common if “fully effective use” of it does not require that only one 
person (or a few) have exclusive rights to it. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual 
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 152 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 
2001). This approach, like mine, denies that Lockean principles much support intellectual property rights by 
emphasizing the so-called non-rivalrousness of intellectual property. But I am not attracted to Shiffrin’s idea of 
dividing possible objects of intellectual property into a category that requires exclusivity for fully effective use (and 
therefore is a proper object for private ownership) and a category that does not (and therefore is not). It is not clear 
that many physical objects—including resources that Locke’s account certainly seems to support exclusive rights in—
require exclusivity for fully effective use, as Shiffrin herself seems to acknowledge. See id. at 163. The only obvious 
examples of objects that do require exclusivity for fully effective use are items that are fully consumed, like food, and 
highly personal items like toothbrushes, undergarments, engagement rings, and (maybe) homes. I confess, however, 
that I am not entirely sure what Shiffrin means by “fully effective use.” Instead of focusing on whether resources fall 
into one or the other of Shiffrin’s two categories, I prefer to view the existence of exclusive rights as turning on 
whether the putative duty-holder’s actions would disrupt or otherwise interfere with the putative right-holder’s actual 
use of the relevant good.  
122 At least three other writers have argued that Locke’s conception of waste limits natural intellectual property 
rights, but they see it only as a second “proviso” or a moral principle standing free of the rest of Locke’s argument for 
private property rather than as a corollary of the natural rights against interference that Locke justifies. E.g., Daniel 
Attas, Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE 29, 45 
(Axel Gosseries et al. eds., 2008); Gordon Hull, Clearing the Rubbish: Locke, the Waste Proviso, and the Moral 
Justification of Intellectual Property, 23 PUB. AFF. Q. 67 (2009); Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural 
Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1193–94 (2003). Perhaps because they do not draw the 
connection between the scope of Lockean property rights and the waste prohibition, they propose differing 
formulations of the prohibition. Compare Hull, supra, at 81 (“[S]poilage occurs when (a) there is irrevocably unmet 
demand, (b) the goods to satisfy that demand already exist, and (c) property claims prevent satisfaction of those 
demands.”), with Attas, supra, at 47 (describing waste as “the recklessly suboptimal use of resources”), and Damstedt, 
supra, at 1194 (“Waste occurs where a unit of a product of labor is not put to any use.”). Although I agree with these 
three that the waste prohibition is important for understanding Lockean intellectual property, I do not endorse any of 
their formulations. 
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 There is, however, one potential text-based objection to my use of the waste prohibition. 
Every time Locke condemns waste, he does so in the context of resources that were once in the 
commons. Indeed, he voices his condemnation in terms of wasting “the common Stock” and 
destroying “part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others,”123 and insists, “Nothing was 
made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”124 Copyrighted works and patented inventions, it is fair 
to say, do not exist before some human creates them, and so it seems entirely possible that 
intellectual property ownership does not usually require removing anything from the commons. 
Intellectual property ownership differs in this respect from ownership of land or naturally growing 
food or the other resources that Locke identifies as things that can be wasted. To be sure, 
innovation relies enormously on others’ previous accomplishments, but it is only what the 
innovator adds, not what she takes, that could possibly be described as wasted by the exclusivity 
that intellectual property rights guarantee. So one might argue that Lockean waste places no 
significant limits on intellectual property ownership because the owner “has not deprived 
consumers of anything in the common” whereas the person who wastes natural resources has done 
exactly that.125  
In my view, this argument misunderstands the common ownership thesis. Recall that, for 
the purposes of Locke’s discussion, common ownership is a problem to be overcome in any defense 
of property rights: How can it be permissible for somebody to remove something from the 
                                            
123 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 46, at 300. 
124 Id. bk. 2, § 31, at 290 (emphasis added). 
125 David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 48 (2004). 
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commons for his own sole use, Locke asks, unless everyone else grants him permission to do so?126 
Locke’s own solution, as we saw above, was to take it for granted that God gave humanity 
everything in common so that they could enjoy it, and then to conclude that it must be 
permissible to make use of these common things, even to the exclusion of others if necessary.127 In 
non-theological terms, the common ownership thesis simply says that anyone who can use and 
enjoy something without giving others cause to complain should be free to do so. And Locke was 
hardly the first person to advance this claim. Cicero, whose ethical writings Locke knew and 
admired,128 held that that we ought “to bestow even upon a stranger what it costs us nothing to 
give.”129 In support of this counsel, Cicero pointed to the Roman poet Ennius, who had noted that 
the person who lights his lamp by another’s fire does not make that fire shine any less brightly.130 
Today, this imagery is more familiar from Thomas Jefferson’s oft-quoted work opposing natural 
rights of intellectual property and often thought of as opposing Locke’s views too: “He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”131 But nothing in Locke’s writings gives us 
                                            
126 See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 25, at 286. 
127 Id. bk. 2, § 26, at 286–87. 
128 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, in POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra 
note 88, at 348, 351 (recommending Cicero’s De Officiis to one wishing “to see how far the heathen world carried that 
science” of morality without aid from the New Testament Gospels) (1703). 
129 CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. 1, § 16, at 55 (Walter Miller trans., 1913) (44 B.C.). 
130 Id. bk. 1, § 16, at 55. 
131 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907). 
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reason to think he would have disagreed. It is much more likely that he would have found it 
permissible to avert waste of most things—even those things that never were natural resources—
when using them did not interfere with others’ labor.  
As we have seen, however, there are really two distinct parts to Locke’s view on waste: the 
permissibility (for non-owners) of averting waste through non-interfering use,132 and also the 
impermissibility (for owners) of causing waste.133 To my mind, the second part of this view often 
would be implausible if extended to non-naturally occurring ideas and creative expression. Those 
who create an expressive work, for instance, may be entirely justified in not sharing it for a variety 
of reasons. By way of example, just think of someone’s privacy interests in the contents of a 
personal journal. Or of artists’ interests in only releasing work once they are happy with it. True, 
some artists have been known for holding themselves to unreasonably high standards, but at least 
as a general matter it seems those who create intellectual property bear no obligation to share it—
even though that might be counted as waste—beyond what duties of beneficence require in other 
areas of morality. To some extent, the two parts of Locke’s view on waste are independent. And 
regardless of the impermissibility (or not) of intellectual property owners’ decisions to cause waste, 
it seems to me entirely justified to count non-owners’ non-interfering use of others’ intellectual 
creations as permissible. But I will now turn to another argument to the contrary. 
                                            
132 See LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 38, at 295 (claiming that land wasted by one person “might be the Possession 
of any other”). 
133 See, e.g., id. bk. 2, § 37, at 295 (describing waste as an “offen[se] against the common Law of Nature”). 
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Alternative #3: Arguing That It Is Typically Wrong  
to Benefit from Others’ Efforts for Free 
Finally, Locke’s arguments can seem to support intellectual property rights on the theory 
that the person who has worked to create a valuable resource more deserves to benefit from it than 
the person who has not put in that work. The person who benefits from another’s work without 
contributing anything is frequently denounced for free-riding134 or for reaping where he has not 
sown.135 Both formulations find something unfair and impermissible in freely benefiting from 
another person’s efforts without getting prior permission or giving adequate compensation.  
Varieties of this argument do not try to establish that the standard incidents of intellectual 
property ownership are exactly what the laborer is owed for his efforts. The laborer may have a 
claim to some reward for adding value to others’ lives, but not necessarily an excluding privilege to 
embody, develop, or distribute.136 Monetary compensation might be adequate, although it is 
unclear how we would calculate the proper amount of compensation because intellectual property 
creators are never solely responsible for every last bit of their creation’s value.137 The principal claim 
                                            
134 E.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle 
in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 139–40 (2004).  
135 E.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918); Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property and 
Literary Works, 14 LEGAL THEORY 257, 276 (2008). 
136 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 149, 192 (1992); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 41 (1989). 
Jonathan Peterson, however, argues that a “maker’s right” interpretation of Locke—according to which a thing’s maker 
has a right to what he has made (rather like the way God, on Locke’s view, has rights to the human beings He 
creates)—explains why intellectual resource creators are owed some sort of what I call excluding privileges. See 
Peterson, supra note 135, at 277; see also GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 62 
(1995) (advocating the maker’s right interpretation of Locke). For reasons that John Simmons has laid out, I do not 
believe the maker’s right argument is plausible either as an interpretation of Locke or as a general theory of property 
rights. See Simmons, supra note 35, at 197.  
137 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 136, at 190–91; Hettinger, supra note 136, at 37–38. 
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here is that it is wrong for someone to benefit from another’s work for free, at least if the laborer 
intends to be compensated for the benefits her work produces. Yet I think this intuition, though 
common enough in intellectual property discussions,138 is rarely correct and in some tension with 
Locke’s arguments.  
Before testing the intuition, let us set aside a couple of possible distractions. First, no one 
denies that compensation is normally required of the person who solicits the work of another while 
encouraging the laborer to expect compensation. And of course there will be hard cases for 
determining whether a beneficiary encouraged the laborer’s expectation of compensation. So in a 
case testing the intuition, the decision to undertake the labor should be made without the 
beneficiary’s active influence. Second, since the case for required compensation is weakest when the 
benefit conferred and effort expended are both negligible, we should assume that the laborer exerts 
himself considerably and the beneficiary receives a substantial benefit.  
With those points out of the way, consider the following case: 
Stage of Nature. While walking through the unclaimed wilderness, Anthony hears 
distant music, which, upon closer investigation, proves to be famed tenor Juan 
Diego performing a notoriously difficult aria. Not only are the ringing high notes 
and bel canto passage-work physically demanding, but Juan Diego has also spent 
much effort over the years training his voice and even paid an orchestra on this 
occasion to make recordings for sale. Anthony, a life-long opera lover, moves closer 
to get a good listen and then enjoys a first-rate performance. 
                                            
138 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609, 624 (1993) 
(“A person who produces a public benefit, by way of morally permissible (but not required) actions, deserves to receive 
a fitting and proportional benefit from the public for doing so.”).  
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Does Anthony owe Juan Diego compensation for the former’s entertainment and the latter’s 
troubles? In my view, the answer is no. Perhaps Anthony should reciprocate if he finds himself in a 
position to provide a benefit to Juan Diego later on at no significant cost to himself—for example, 
by sharing his (not-secret) family recipe for sautéed radish greens. And perhaps Juan Diego 
deserves Anthony’s praise, admiration, or gratitude. But what seems implausible is that Anthony 
needs to suffer some detriment or identify some benefit to give Juan Diego on pain of having acted 
wrongly—as though the benefit he received from witnessing the performance needed to be evened 
out somehow. My claim is that Juan Diego does not have a right any such behavior from Anthony. 
Those who have an intuition that at least some uncompensated, unauthorized benefiting 
from another’s labor is wrongful stress that lack of compensation can threaten the laborer’s ability 
to earn a living through her labor.139 But this threat constitutes grounds for complaint only if she 
can justifiably expect to be able to earn a living through the particular sort of labor she has engaged 
in. And it is hard to see what would justify such an expectation once we set aside the possibility 
that the beneficiary has encouraged it. There does not seem to be any general principle justifying 
an expectation of financial support from others when one does things that benefit them, whether 
this benefit is judged objectively or from the supposed beneficiaries’ own perspectives. Perhaps it 
would benefit me if some person truthfully (let us suppose) and convincingly spoke well of me in 
front of lots of people. Still, no one has a right to employment as my publicist.  
                                            
139 See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 109, at 41 (rooting an intellectual property–related right “to earn something” for 
one’s labor in one’s interest in flourishing); Gordon, supra note 101, at 1548.  
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In a relatively small subset of free-riding cases, however, an expectation to be compensated 
might be justified for other reasons. Consider, for example, this scenario: 
Pain in the Neck. The entire local population has recently begun to experience 
moderate chronic pain, the cause of which remains unknown. Everyone has agreed 
to pool resources to find a cure, except for one person who consistently refuses to 
contribute. When others discover through great effort that a local herb relieves the 
pain, the non-contributor makes use of this knowledge to relieve his own pain but 
declines to compensate those whose work uncovered the cure.140 
If what the non-contributor does here is open to criticism, the explanation, I suggest, is not merely 
that he is free-riding on others’ substantial efforts and deriving a substantial benefit for himself. 
Rather, the operative fact is that he did so when he had decisive reason to direct some of his own 
effort to pursuing the particular benefit before the possibility of obtaining it through free-riding 
arose. Had they never approached him, his suffering would still have given him strong reasons to 
try to accomplish their goal, perhaps in cooperation with others. Others’ expectation that he would 
sign onto their project seems entirely justified—at least on the assumption that the odds of finding 
a cure never seemed hopeless. So the wrongfulness of failing to compensate for substantial 
unsolicited benefits could be based on the reasons that the beneficiary antecedently had to pursue 
the benefit through his own efforts.  
But this possibility does not have broad implications for intellectual property ownership, I 
think, because it will be rare to find individuals with decisive reasons to act with the aim of 
developing particular intellectual goods. Ordinarily, the nature of the good or the path to its 
                                            
140 This example is inspired by Garrett Cullity’s “Recalcitrant Fisherman” example, and I think my explanation of 
Pain in the Neck also explains what is intuitively objectionable about the behavior of Cullity’s imagined fisherman. See 
Garrett Cullity, Moral Free Riding, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 11 (1995). 
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creation will be too uncertain at the outset to provide decisive reasons to those who eventually 
benefit from it. The one range of potential exceptions would be cases—often categorized as “unfair 
competition” under the law—where one actor has a clear goal, such as publishing the day’s news, 
and stands by and lets his rival, who has the very same goal, do all the work necessary for achieving 
it, only to copy the rival’s product at the point it proves profitable.141 But the wrongfulness of this 
sort of behavior depends on the particular circumstances of the duty-holder and so stands far 
removed from the standard incidents of intellectual property, which impose obligations on virtually 
every non-owner regardless of his or her individual characteristics. 
Once again, Locke does not furnish us with any explicit discussion of these issues. Locke 
does say, in apparently sweeping terms, that individuals have “no right to” “the benefit of another’s 
Pains.”142 In my view, he must mean this statement as the claim that individuals do not have a right 
that somebody else work for their benefit rather than the claim that it is wrongful for anybody to 
benefit freely from the work of another. His discussion of waste includes mention of cases where 
one can permissibly benefit from the work of another person and owe them nothing for it.143 And 
Locke also argues that one laborer’s appropriation of some piece of land benefits the rest of 
humanity because the laborer can make do with much less developed land than he would have 
                                            
141 Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
142 LOCKE, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 34, at 291.  
143 See id. bk. 2, § 38, at 295 (“[I]f either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the Ground, or the Fruit of his 
planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to 
be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any other.”). 
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needed of the undeveloped commons,144 but Locke does not suggest that everybody else ought to 
reward the laborer for this benefit.145 Therefore it is difficult to read Locke as committed to a 
general obligation to compensate for unsolicited benefits. And if my discussion in this section is 
sound, then Locke is right not to have such a commitment. 
 
* * * 
In this chapter, I have argued that Locke’s labor theory of property does not furnish a 
natural rights–type justification for the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership, 
especially within the domain of copyright and patent law. As I have presented it, Locke’s theory 
focuses on protecting a laborer from those who would interfere with his or her attempts to advance 
a legitimate interest in material gain. Copyright and patent ownership do much more than provide 
protection from this sort of interference. Central cases of trademark law, however, can be justified 
on these non-interference grounds. But individuals’ interests in material gain are not the only 
interests implicated by intellectual property ownership, as we shall see in the following chapter, and 
so it is too early to conclude our discussion of natural rights–type justifications for intellectual 
property.  
                                            
144 Id. bk. 2, § 37, at 294 (“[H]e, that incloses Land and has a greater plenty of the conveniencys of life from ten 
acres, than he could have from an hundred left to Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind.”). 
145 Locke does say, however, that in Spain the productivity of the person who develops formerly unused land is so 
great that other “Inhabitants think themselves beholden to him,” but he does not say the Spaniards’ way of thinking is 
correct. Id. bk. 2, § 36, at 293.  
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3. NATURAL RIGHTS II:  
INTERESTS IN CONTROL 
The origin of ownership is difficult to comprehend. 
- Immanuel Kant1 
Kant, unlike Locke, unmistakably advanced an argument for copyright law, or at least part 
of it, though he did not employ the language of property or ownership. He argued that in the right 
circumstances, unauthorized reproduction of another’s writing wrongs that person. In this chapter, 
I will examine Kant’s discussion of copyright and argue that it justifies a rather limited amount of 
copyright protection, as well as some of trademark law. Before taking up Kant’s intellectual 
property discussion, however, I will examine his account of physical property ownership as recently 
interpreted by Arthur Ripstein. On Ripstein’s interpretation, Kant’s account of physical property 
ownership seems like it could readily be extended to justify intellectual property ownership. But I 
will contend that we should reject the view that Ripstein calls Kant’s and not think it furnishes a 
natural rights–type justification for intellectual property ownership.  
Kant’s discussions of intellectual property and property expand our understanding of 
ownership in an important way. They show how ownership can serve important interests that are 
not simply reducible to Lockean interests in material gain. I am classifying these as interests in 
control, although much of the challenge ahead lies in specifying the kinds of control that are of 
                                            
1 B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, The Natural Law Duty to Recognize Private Property Ownership: Kant’s 
Theory of Property in his Doctrine of Right, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 218, 218 (2006) (translating IMMANUEL KANT, 
Naturrecht Feyerabend, 27 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 1319, 1343 (1979)). 
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greatest interest to individuals. In my view, aspects of property and intellectual property ownership 
serve our interests in having control over what we do, since being able to use physical objects and 
ideas and information as we please increases our opportunities to pursue a wide variety of goals. 
Part of having control over what we do, moreover, is having a reputation that accurately reflects the 
what we have chosen to do in the public’s view, and having an accurate reputation of this sort can 
reasonably be valued apart from its ability to bring us material gain. Ripstein likewise emphasizes 
our interests in controlling what we do—although he might object to thinking about these issues 
in terms of “interests”2—but in addition he thinks we have quite strong interests in controlling how 
our property is used that outstrip our interests in being able to pursue our goals. In the next section, 
I will question whether we indeed have such a strong interest in controlling our property.  
 
3.1 KANTIAN PROPERTY 
Kant’s principal discussion of property rights occurs in The Metaphysics of Morals—
specifically in the work’s first half, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, known as the 
Rechtslehre or “Doctrine of Right” for short,3 where he presents his theory of private and public 
law. The Rechtslehre is not Western philosophy’s most approachable text, and it is no surprise to 
anyone who has attempted to understand it that the Rechtslehre has been the subject of numerous 
scholarly interpretations. Rather than attempt to add to this literature, I will focus on Ripstein’s 
                                            
2 See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 34 (2009) 
(explaining how his understanding of Kantian freedom does not invoke a general interest in being able to set and 
pursue one’s own purposes). 
3 Alternatively, this work is occasionally called Metaphysical Elements of Justice or Metaphysical Principles of Justice. 
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particular interpretation, which is both accessible and relevant to the subject of intellectual 
property. Setting aside the question of whether Ripstein’s interpretation is faithful to Kant, I will 
argue that it supports several of the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership if it is 
defensible on its own merits. But I will further argue that on the merits one ought not to accept it 
as a plausible account of physical property ownership. In the end, then, Ripstein’s version of Kant 
does not provide a plausible natural rights–type justification for the standard incidents of 
intellectual property. 
Like the Rechtslehre itself, Ripstein’s discussion begins with the definition of right action 
found in Kant’s “Universal Principle of Right”: “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”4 To present Kant’s argument 
on behalf of property rights,5 Ripstein makes use of an implication of the Universal Principle of 
Right, which is that hinder another person’s action when that action is compatible with 
everybody’s freedom wrongs that person.6 Because a person can use external objects—that is, things 
                                            
4 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:230 (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 387 
(Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
5 On Kant’s account, property rights are, as Ripstein emphasizes, just a special case of rights to “external objects of 
choice, that is, those things other than your own person that you can use in setting and pursuing your purposes.” 
RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 57. Unlike the nonacquired right one has with respect to one’s own person, rights to 
external objects of choice are acquired. Other examples of Kantian acquired rights include contractual rights and rights 
parents have over their children. Although parts of Kant’s argument and Ripstein’s interpretation of it are generalizable 
insofar as they apply to any acquired rights, I will discuss the particularized version that applies to property. 
6 KANT, supra note 4, 6:230–231, at 387 (“If then my action or my condition generally can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in it does me wrong; for this hindrance 
(resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in accordance with a universal law.”). 
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apart from his own person—to set and pursue his purposes,7 the Universal Principle of Right 
entails that he is entitled to do so if (and only if) his use of those external objects can coexist with 
the freedom of everybody in accordance with a universal law.8 The key question, then, is whether 
one person’s ownership of external objects, in pursuit of her own purposes, is compatible with 
everybody’s freedom. Ripstein argues that it can be:  
No other person is wronged by another’s having an object subject to his or her 
choice. The freedom of others would only be compromised if one person’s having a 
proprietary . . . right deprived some other person of something he or she already 
had. . . . So any restrictions on the possibility of a person having objects as her own 
would restrict one person’s purposiveness for the sake of something other than 
freedom . . . . That is, they would limit freedom on the basis of something other 
than its own conditions.9 
In claiming that appropriation does not deprive anyone of what she already had, Ripstein seems to 
be invoking Kant’s assumption of common possession—that is, that the whole world is initially 
possessed by everyone in common.10 Like Locke, Kant’s starting point is a world in which no one 
yet has any claim to the exclusive use of particular resources. And so from the common possession 
assumption and the Universal Principle of Right, Ripstein reads Kant to infer that some form of 
private ownership must be recognized because it expands human freedom without violating 
                                            
7 According to Ripstein, “Whether and which things other than your person can be used to set and pursue 
purposes is, at least in part, contingent on the particular features of finite purposive beings.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 
58. 
8 See id. at 62. 
9 Id. at 63–64; see also id. at 62 (“Kant argues that the exercise of acquired rights is consistent with the freedom of 
others, because it never deprives another person of something that person already has.”). 
10 KANT, supra note 4, 6:261, at 413. 
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anyone’s freedom: property ownership enables individuals to set and pursue their own purposes 
using external objects in a manner consistent with everyone’s purposiveness.11  
This argument seeks to justify property ownership in the abstract, but without yet revealing 
how someone acquires property in the first place or what specific rights property ownership 
includes. On the subject of acquiring property, Ripstein says that Kant’s account of acquisition is 
“boring because the only factual precondition of rightful acquisition of an unowned object is 
empirical [i.e. physical] possession of that object,”12 which Ripstein understands as including 
communication of a public sign that the person taking possession is doing so in order to have the 
object as his or her own property.13 Ripstein contrasts this account of acquisition with Locke’s, 
which Ripstein unfortunately assumes requires either toil or some improvement of the object being 
acquired.14 The non-“factual” precondition of Kantian acquisition is what Ripstein calls “a broader 
                                            
11 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 58. 
12 Id. at 104. 
13 See id. at 104–05. 
14 Id. at 98–101. Ripstein seems to me to exaggerate the opposition between Kant and Locke here. He is right 
that Kant explicitly criticizes one version of a labor theory of property that sees toil as the basis for rightful acquisition:  
The first working, enclosing, or, in general, transforming of a piece of land can furnish no title of 
acquisition to it; that is, possession of an accident can provide no basis for rightful possession of the 
substance. What is mine or yours must instead be derived from ownership of the substance in 
accordance with this rule (accessorium sequitur suum principale), and whoever expends his labor on 
land that was not already his has lost his pains and toil to who was first.  
KANT, supra note 4, 6:268–69, at 419–20. But I am not convinced that what Kant says here is incompatible with 
Locke’s own labor theory. Recall, from Chapter 2, that Locke’s conception of labor is simply intentional action aimed 
at deriving any of the necessities or conveniences of life, and hence does not require toil on the part of the laborer. I 
am not even convinced that Kant is responding directly to Locke, whose political philosophy was mostly ignored in 
18th century Continental Europe. See, e.g., Klaus P. Fischer, John Locke in the German Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 
36 J. HIST. IDEAS 431, 441 (1975). Rather, I suspect that Kant is endorsing and elaborating on Hume’s criticism of an 
implausible toil-account of acquisition. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. II, § 3, at 505 
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context of public right.”15 Through my acquisition of an external object, Ripstein claims, I impose 
new duties (not to use what I have acquired) on the rest of the world “only if my choice is 
exercised in light of an (ideally) publicly conferred power to appropriate.”16 The public authority 
confers this power to acquire property “in the name of everyone”17 but is not traceable to any 
historic conferral of consent, or hypothetical consent based on what any prudent person would 
agree to.18 The ultimate result, on Ripstein’s view, is that there is no duty not to interfere with 
others’ acquisitions unless everyone, through an omnilateral will, authorizes unilateral 
appropriation of unowned objects.19  
Once an authoritative private property system exists, the next question is about the scope of 
the rights and duties it recognizes. According to Ripstein, property rights protect an owner from 
                                                                                                                                             
n.1 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740). As Hume notes, a labor 
theory of property that does not focus on toil is not very remote from a possession theory. Id. 
15 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 97. 
16 Id. at 154. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 155–56. 
19 Id. at 157–60; see also id. at 26 (“In a state of nature, a person does others no wrong by taking from them . . . .”). 
This aspect of Ripstein’s interpretation seems in some tension with what Kant says, for Kant certainly believes in 
acquisition in anticipation of the civil condition: “[S]omething external can be originally acquired only in conformity 
with the idea of a civil condition, that is, with a view to it and to its being brought about, but prior to its realization 
(for otherwise acquisition would be derived).” KANT, supra note 4, 6:264, at 416. As far as I can see, Kant argues that 
individuals have both a duty to enter into a civil condition with others and some sort of duty not to interfere with the 
acquisitions of those who have acquired external objects and are ready to enter into a civil condition. See id. 6:256–57, 
at 410; 6:312–13, at 456; cf. B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A 
COMMENTARY 118 (2010) (discussing a pre–civil condition duty not “to prevent another person from acquiring an 
unowned and unused object, not because the first person wants to acquire it as his own, but because he wants to 
prevent the second person, or anyone else, from acquiring the object as her own.”). But this is a difficult interpretive 
question.  
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two sorts of actions that interfere with her freedom: first, other people may not deprive a property 
owner of her ability to set and pursue her own purposes using what she owns—for example, by 
taking or damaging her property; second, others may not use private property that is not theirs to 
set and pursue their own purposes without the owner’s consent.20 Both of these rights protect the 
owner’s control of her property, although in different ways. The first right comes quite close to the 
Lockean protection against interference with labor, although having control over one’s property 
serves interests beyond material gain—or, as Locke would say, beyond obtaining the necessities and 
conveniences of life—such as interests in personal privacy. The second right gives owners a much 
greater degree of control over what they own, for it prohibits any non-owner from using property 
to pursue his own ends regardless of the effect on the owner’s pursuit of the ends she sets for herself.  
Thus, for Ripstein, property rights go significantly further than rights against interference, 
as several of his examples illustrate: 
Suppose that I break into your home and eat dinner at your table while you are out. 
(I bring my own food, and clean up after myself.) . . . I use your property in pursuit 
of my ends, an end that you do not share. In so doing, I wrong you. . . . [T]he 
wrong in question . . . is depriving you of your freedom to be the one who sets the 
ends that you will pursue, or that will be pursued with your goods. I enlist you or 
your means in support of ends you do not share. . . . 21 
[I]f I manage to enlist you in support of my projects without your consent, I must 
surrender to you any gains I make as a result. I must do so because the use I made 
of your right to set your own ends must be treated as an embodiment of your 
freedom, and so given back to you. So, for example, if you invite tourists to explore 
                                            
20 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 67. 
21 Id. at 70; cf. Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 218 (2006) (giving an 
example of a harmless trespasser who takes an unauthorized nap in a homeowner’s bed). 
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the caves under your land, and lead them underground to the caves under mine, 
you must disgorge any gain you received from the use of my caves, even if I could 
not have capitalized on them on my own . . . . 22 
On the Lockean account I defended in the previous chapter, neither example involves wrongdoing 
(except perhaps if positive law says otherwise) because the non-owner is not interfering with the 
owner’s labor in either case. The way these two examples are presented, the owner’s ability to use 
her property in pursuit of whatever ends she has set for herself is not actually impeded. In the first 
example, though, there is a non-negligible risk of interference, since if the owner changes her mind 
and returns home to a messy dining room, she may not be able to use what she owns as she would 
like. But Ripstein does not seem to rest his case on the possibility of harm. On his reading of Kant, 
trespasses are wrongs in the same way as unauthorized touchings of another individual’s body are 
wrongs, regardless of the harm they might threaten: 
Suppose that you are opposed to the fluoridation of teeth on what you believe to be 
health-related grounds. You are mistaken about this, but committed to 
campaigning against fluoridation. As your dentist, I use the opportunity created by 
filling one of your (many) cavities to surreptitiously fluoridate your teeth, pleased to 
have advanced the cause of dental health, and privately taking delight in doing so on 
you, the vocal opponent of fluoridation. In this example, I don’t harm you, and 
there is even a sense in which I benefit you. I still wrong you because I draw you 
into a purpose that you did not choose. You remain free to use your powers to set 
and pursue other purposes. But part of being free to use your powers to set and 
pursue your own purposes is having a veto on the purposes you will pursue. . . . 
When I usurp your powers, I violate your independence precisely because I deprive 
you of that veto.23 
                                            
22 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 82–83. 
23 Id. at 44; accord Ripstein, supra note 21, at 234–35. 
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When someone makes unauthorized use of another person’s body or property, Ripstein views the 
conduct as wrongful simply because it violates the wronged party’s independence and sovereignty.24 
That is, it prevents the wronged party from being her own master by forcing her to pursue ends 
that she has not chosen.25  
Let us set aside, for a moment, whether Ripstein’s treatment of these examples is 
convincing and consider the implications for intellectual property rights. A huge number of 
intellectual property infringement cases—and all the central ones—can be characterized as using 
another person’s “goods,” “means,” or “powers” for ends she did not authorize, and hence would 
seem to be presumptively wrongful on Ripstein’s account. If I put your logo on my wares to 
convince consumers that I am you, I am quite obviously using your trademark for purposes you do 
not share.26 Likewise if I take your invention and, without your permission, make my own versions 
of it to share with others or to keep for myself or if I adapt your painting into a three-dimensional 
sculpture, which you might not like. The first three standard incidents of intellectual property 
ownership—the excluding privileges to embody, develop, and distribute—all clearly protect against 
using intellectual property for purposes its owners do not share.27 And the fourth standard 
                                            
24 See, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47, 68. 
25 See, e.g., id. at 22, 45, 70, 77.  
26 Note that beyond this sort of trademark infringement, which is grounded in consumer confusion about the 
source of a product, a Ripsteinian case for trademark ownership would also condemn so-called sponsorship confusion. 
Thus, if I name my Little League team after a professional baseball team, I have used the latter’s name for ends it has 
not authorized and thus have wronged it, even if no one would believe that my team was made up of members of its 
professional namesake.  
27 U.S. law, however, does not exactly embody this idealized picture of full intellectual property ownership, for it 
limits owners’ legal ability to block specific unauthorized uses of their intellectual property, for instance, through 
doctrines of exhaustion and fair use. 
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incident—powers to license and assign—can be seen as acknowledging consent’s ability, on 
Ripstein’s view, to make the use of another’s means permissible.28 Thus Ripstein’s reading of Kant 
seems to suggest that intellectual property rights are justified, prima facie, on the very same moral 
grounds as physical property rights.29 
Ripstein might object, however, to my assumption that trademarks, copyrights, and patents 
are, like land and chattels, the kind of things that can be the subject of justified ownership. After 
all and as Ripstein notes, Kant does not use the “property” label in his own discussion of 
intellectual property rights.30 Yet I do not believe Ripstein is able to disavow his account’s apparent 
implications for intellectual property so easily. For the very same argument he gave to justify 
ownership of physical objects31 applies equally well in the case of intellectual property. Here is how 
that argument would go: 
P1. To hinder another person’s action when that action is compatible with 
everybody’s freedom is to wrong that person. (from Universal Principle of Right)  
P2. A person is entitled to use a copyrighted work, patented invention, or 
trademarked logo of his own making to set and pursue his purposes if (and only if) 
his use of those things can coexist with the freedom of everybody in accordance 
with a universal law. (from P1) 
                                            
28 See, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 70. 
29 Robert Merges has himself argued that Kant’s theory of property rights extends to intellectual goods. See 
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 75–78 (2011). It is clear that Merges’s understanding of 
Kant’s property theory is not the same as Ripstein’s, but I will not address Merges’s discussion here.  
30 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 95 n.13. 
31 See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
 83 
P3. An action can coexist with everybody’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law if it does not deprive another person of something she already had.  
P4. A person who uses a copyrighted work, patented invention, or trademarked 
logo of his own making to set and pursue his purposes does not deprive another 
person of something she already had.  
C1. Therefore use of a copyrighted work, patented invention, or trademarked logo 
of one’s own making to set and pursue one’s purposes can coexist with everybody’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law. (from P3, P4) 
C2. Therefore a person is entitled to use a copyrighted work, patented invention, or 
trademarked logo of his own making to set and pursue his purposes. (from P2, C1) 
The upshot of this argument would be that the sorts of things an intellectual property owner owns 
can be among a person’s means, in Ripstein’s sense, and so using them without that person’s 
consent would wrongfully violate his or her sovereignty. Ripstein is explicitly committed to all of 
these premises except P4, but it is hard to believe that P4 would be objectionable if Ripstein’s 
version—which holds that having tangible objects subject to one’s choice does not in itself deprive 
anyone of something they had—is not.32 So, by Ripstein’s own lights, private ownership of 
intellectual goods would seem justified because it extends external freedom in a manner consistent 
with everyone else’s external freedom. It must be possible, therefore, for intellectual property to be 
among the means that an individual rightfully uses to set and pursue her ends. As much as with 
                                            
32 On the other hand, if Ripstein’s version of P4 is just an alternative way of assuming common initial possession 
of the earth’s resources, one might doubt that Ripstein would accept the intellectual property version of P4 that I am 
using here. For, as the last chapter noted, it seems odd to say that a copyrighted work is initially possessed by everyone 
in common. But much of the work Kant’s common possession assumption does in Ripstein’s argument is to explain 
why the person who first acquires some object has not wronged anyone else: no one has a claim to the exclusive use of 
that object at the outset. See also Christine M. Korsgaard, Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 629, 646 (2013) (advancing a similar interpretation of Kant’s common possession assumption). If this claim is 
true in the physical property context, it seems a fortiori true with respect to intellectual property. Surely no one has a 
better claim to exclusive use of a book, invention, or logo than its creator. 
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any of her other means, then, no one else is permitted to use her intellectual property for ends she 
has not set for herself. And just as with physical property, this restriction holds regardless of 
whether others could use that intellectual property in ways that do not conflict with the owner’s 
use of it. 
 It remains to be seen, however, whether Ripstein’s two preconditions of rightful ownership 
of specific intellectual goods are met. Recall that for Ripstein, “empirical possession” of an object is 
the only factual precondition for taking ownership of it.33 Now, while it is true that one cannot 
physically possess something as intangible as intellectual property, Ripstein identifies empirical 
possession as the factual precondition of rightful acquisition simply because that is the manner in 
which one brings unowned physical objects under one’s control. Ripstein himself says that the 
essential fact here is simply that the object be brought “under [the owner’s] control, so that she 
can now decide how to use it.”34 And it would seem that the person who creates an invention or 
copyrightable text does have it under her control, at least at the moment of creation. So the first 
precondition is satisfied in the case of intellectual property. It is less clear, perhaps, that the duties 
generated under a system of intellectual property ownership are necessarily authorized by an 
omnilateral will. On Ripstein’s conception, the omnilateral authorization of acquisition in the case 
of regular, non-intellectual property is not optional or otherwise contingent: the omnilateral will 
                                            
33 See supra note 12–13 and accompanying text. 
34 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 104. 
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must authorize acquisition, lest it limit human purposiveness.35 Yet Ripstein does believe that the 
necessary sort of omnilateral authorization can include some restrictions on privatization—by 
dedicating certain resources as inherently public property, for instance, or conditioning acquisition 
on certain recordkeeping procedures—although he does not specify what principles determine 
which restrictions are possible beyond noting that they must be compatible “with each person’s 
entitlement to have external objects of choice as his or her own.”36 And it is possible that the 
omnilateral authorization to appropriate is limited to physical resources because physical resources 
are special in some way.37 It might be possible to preclude a Ripsteinian justification of intellectual 
property on the basis of what the omnilateral will authorizes, but Ripstein does not tell us how to 
do that. 
 Let us then proceed on the assumption that Ripstein’s principles would, if sound, furnish a 
natural rights–based justification for the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership. I do 
not believe Ripstein’s principles are sound, even as they are meant to apply in the case of regular 
tangible property. He does seem to me correct in saying that it is wrong to perform medical 
                                            
35 Id. at 155 (“[A]uthorizing acquisition is not a discretionary purpose that a public authority might decide about 
based on some assessment of the desirable consequences or balance of benefits and burdens that will result. A public 
authority could not be entitled to prohibit all acquisition . . . .”). 
36 Id. 
37 As Kant tells it, the omnilateral authorization occurs because we possess the earth in common and seek to use it 
for our own purposes but cannot do so without coming into conflict with one another. See KANT, supra note 4, 6:267, 
at 418; see also Byrd & Hruschka, supra note 1, at 220–21 (“We are part of an original community of the land and the 
things upon it in virtue of our being together with everyone else on a limited sphere from which we cannot escape and 
must not be forcibly removed. . . . The a priori necessarily united will of all recognizes and secures individual property 
ownership rights to avoid conflict in the use of external objects of choice.”). One might sensibly question whether 
conflict in the use of objects of intellectual property is similarly unavoidable. If Ripstein wanted to distinguish 
intellectual property from physical property, it seems to me that this is the most promising place to do draw the 
distinction. 
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procedures without informed consent because the patient has a right to be sovereign over his or 
her own body.38 But that does not mean that unauthorized use of someone’s physical property 
contravenes his or her sovereignty in a parallel way. For although a person’s possessions are like his 
or her body inasmuch as they furnish means for pursuing his or her ends in this world, our 
interests in having control over our own bodies seem quite different from our interests in 
controlling our possessions. As Larissa Katz notes, the trespasser who harmlessly uses my 
belongings does indeed subject them to his choice. “But in so doing,” she asks, “does he subject me 
to his choice in the same way that the doctor, in using his patient’s body without her consent, 
subjects her to his choice?”39 Katz does not explicitly answer this question, although she seems 
doubtful.40 I think the answer is clear. Someone who uses another’s property without authorization 
does not subject the owner to his choice, at least not for that reason alone. He may do so, for 
instance, if his trespass inhibits the owner’s actions or uncovers some private facts that the owner 
wished to keep hidden. But not every unauthorized use of another’s property is “forcing a person to 
act for an end that she does not share.”41 To say that someone who, without my permission, uses 
my dining room in order to take a meal somehow forces me to promote her nourishment is to 
assign me too little control over my actions. Similarly, the carjacker who subsequently runs off with 
                                            
38 This conclusion is even more plausible in the example, which Ripstein occasionally wields against harm-based 
views of wronging, of someone who rapes a completely unconscious victim knowing that the victim will never learn of 
the crime nor suffer any harm. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 92 n.9. 
39 Larissa Katz, Ownership and Social Solidarity: A Kantian Alternative, 17 LEGAL THEORY 119, 138 (2011). 
40 Id. at 139. 
41 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 70. 
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my vehicle to rob a bank does not seem to implicate me in the bank robbery in the way he would if 
he coerced me, at gunpoint, to be his driver. I indeed can act through my possessions, but others 
cannot make my possessions act on my behalf for the sake of ends I have not chosen.  
 Moreover, even when an owner has affirmatively decided that his property must not be 
used in a particular way, that does not seem to settle the question whether others are permitted to 
go against the owner’s decision.42 Imagine an architect-sculptor who first thinks to decorate the 
capital of a structural column with acanthus leaves and uses his design in his own home. Because 
he does not want anyone else to copy his design or even to admire it without giving him 
something valuable in return, he decides not to incorporate his Corinthian column on his 
residence’s exterior, where it would be in others’ plain view, but only behind opaque walls beyond 
the permitted access of non-owners. In this manner he sets and defends his agenda or ends—not 
only for his home or for the physical columns that embody his design, but for the design itself. 
Suppose further that while this individual is traveling overseas, a natural disaster strikes near his 
home and brings down several walls, exposing his undamaged columns to the public eye. Would 
those who knew of the architect-sculptor’s aims be obligated not to let their gaze linger on the 
                                            
42 One admittedly extreme example supporting this claim is Joel Feinberg’s famous example of the mountain hiker 
who breaks into an unoccupied privately owned cabin to take refuge in a life-threatening snowstorm. See Joel Feinberg, 
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93, 102 (1978). As Feinberg rightly 
observes, this action, which would otherwise constitute trespass, is wholly justified. And U.S. tort law agrees. See, e.g., 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). The hiker’s 
action would undoubtedly still be permissible even if the cabin owner had expressly denied permission to anyone 
seeking use of the unoccupied cabin in an emergency, for example, by posting a sign saying as much. Cf. Gerald Gaus, 
Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 93, 102–03 (David Estlund ed., 2012) (imagining 
that the cabin owner had posted a sign saying, “Can you use this cabin in case of emergency? No!”). In this sort of case, 
the fact that the non-owner is disregarding the owner’s decision makes no difference to the permissibility of the non-
owner’s actions.  
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columns in deference to the owner’s agenda and ends? I do not see why they would be, unless the 
owner had some special sort of privacy interest in his artwork. And maybe Ripstein would agree. 
After all, he states that no one can have a right under a universal law that others not look at her 
“because embodied and motile persons can only avoid bumping into each other by looking where 
they are going, and so sometimes at each other.”43 It is not clear, however, what would stand in the 
way of a universal law prohibiting others from peering inside one’s vacant home. Therefore this line 
of response might not account for the permissibility of my imagined unauthorized Corinthian 
column viewing. Elsewhere, Ripstein assumes that it would be permissible for a hypothetical 
passerby to take visual delight in the beautiful flowers a homeowner had planted without having to 
seek the latter’s permission.44 Doing so would presumably be making use of the homeowner’s 
property for ends he had not authorized45—we may even imagine that he has posted a sign 
directing those who stop to stare at his flowers to place a quarter in a collection box. Ripstein does 
not explain why he thinks looking at a homeowner’s flowers is permissible, but perhaps it is 
enough that the passerby is on a public road or sidewalk, where one presumes the passerby is 
permitted to be.46 If that is what renders the unauthorized use of the gardener’s handiwork 
                                            
43 RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 46. 
44 Ripstein, supra note 21, at 221.  
45 If it seems like too much of a stretch to describe this act as “making use of” the flowers, imagine that the 
passerby snaps a digital photo of one of the flowers and sets the image as her computer wallpaper. 
46 My evidence for this interpretation includes another example Ripstein sometimes uses: it would be permissible, 
he says, for one neighbor to grow mushrooms in shade cast by another neighbor’s fence. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 
79, 102. Here too it looks like the first neighbor is making use of the other’s property for unauthorized ends, but one 
suspects that Ripstein does not condemn this unauthorized use as impermissible because it occurs on the first 
neighbor’s own property. The verdict of permissibility seems quite right, but it raises further questions about Ripstein’s 
account. What principles of Kantian external freedom, for instance, establish that the caves under one’s land are part of 
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permissible, however, then it would seem equally to permit not only gazing upon the architect-
sculptor’s Corinthian columns but also embodying their design in one’s own columns or developing 
the design further into a Corinthian-Ionic composite column. And so the Ripsteinian justification 
for intellectual property ownership’s standard incidents would have a major loophole.  
 These points all lead me to conclude that intellectual property’s standard incidents are not 
justified along the same lines as Ripstein argues that regular property rights are. His general claim 
that unauthorized use of someone’s property wrongfully usurps her powers by forcing her to pursue 
ends she had not set for herself, and thereby undermines her ability to be her own master, strikes 
me as implausible. And if we accepted it without further qualification, we would be left with very 
strong property rights and results that are hard to accept—such as the result that unauthorized 
viewing of a neighbor’s property is impermissible—and that even Ripstein appears unwilling to 
accept. If we qualify the view to avoid these severe results, we weaken the account’s ability to 
ground strong intellectual property rights. However we proceed, Ripstein’s Kantianism does not 
provide a convincing natural rights–type justification for the standard incidents of intellectual 
property ownership.  
 
3.2 KANTIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Kant’s discussion of intellectual property rights is very different from Ripstein’s discussion 
of physical property rights. For Kant, intellectual property rights derive not from a broad right to 
                                                                                                                                             
one’s property even if one cannot access them, see id. at 83, while the territory covered by a horticulturally valuable 
shadow cast by one’s fence is not?  
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control how one’s external means are used, but from a much narrower right to be the only person 
who speaks in one’s name. Indeed, what Kant says about some specific examples might even be 
thought to imply that he does not believe that the broader Ripsteinian right applies to intellectual 
goods. For instance, he claims that someone who makes an unauthorized abridgement or 
translation of a book—someone who could well be using the book to pursue ends the author has 
not herself set, especially if the abridgement or translation is unfaithful to the author’s 
intentions—does nothing wrong provided he indicates that the author is not responsible for the 
modifications.47 And Kant even claims that reproducing physical works of art requires no 
permission whatever.48 But whatever the implications of these claims for Ripstein’s argument, 
Kant’s remarks on intellectual property deserve close attention on their own terms.  
The basics of that argument can be found in the Rechtslehre—though in the part of it that 
addresses contracts, or transferring “what belongs to another,” rather than the part that addresses 
property rights themselves.49 That is because the right to speak in one’s own name, on which 
Kant’s account of copyright is based, is conceived of as the right a person has to appoint agents to 
carry out his affairs and the concomitant right that others not pass themselves off as his appointed 
agent when in fact he has not appointed them such.50 An author, through the books she writes, 
speaks to the public in her own name, and the publisher of her work is merely her agent, a 
                                            
47 See Immanuel Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books 8:86–87 (1785), reprinted in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 23, 35. 
48 Id. 8:85–86, at 34. 
49 KANT, supra note 4, 6:286, at 434. 
50 Cf. id. 6:285–86, at 433 (discussing agency contracts and mandates generally). 
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medium through which she speaks.51 Thus any publisher, on Kant’s view, speaks in the name of 
the author whose work he publishes and not in his own name, whether or not he is authorized.52 
But, Kant claims, one cannot be entitled to speak in another’s name as though one were her duly 
empowered agent if one does not have authorization or a “mandate” from her, and so unauthorized 
publication of books is impermissible.53 As it happens, Kant articulated this line of thought in 
more detail in an essay that appeared twelve years before the Rechtslehre, entitled On the 
Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books.54 And we can better understand Kant’s 
Rechtslehre argument if we turn to that essay.  
Kant’s views about copyright are presented through two syllogisms in the essay. The first is 
a positive argument for the impermissibility of unauthorized publication, similar to the brief 
Rechtslehre version that we just saw; the second is a negative argument critiquing a possible case for 
unauthorized publication’s permissibility. The first syllogism’s major premise is that anyone “who 
carries on another’s affairs in his name but against his will” must compensate him for any losses 
and hand over to him or his designated agent all profits.55 And its minor premise is that 
unauthorized publishers do carry on the author’s affair in his name but against his will.56 The 
                                            
51 Id. 6:289, at 437. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. Kant also says that the unauthorized publisher steals profits from the legitimate publisher who has been 
authorized by the author to speak in her name. Id. 
54 Kant, supra note 47. 
55 Id. 8:79–80, at 29. 
56 Id. 8:80, at 29. 
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second syllogism responds to a potential objection: perhaps the author who willingly sells copies of 
his book to the public, transferring ownership of a tangible thing (namely each individual copy), 
has given the legitimate owners of those copies a property-based entitlement to use them as they 
please, including by duplicating them.57 Kant’s major premise in response is that ownership of 
tangible property, by itself, never generates a “positive right” obligating somebody else to do 
something for the owner.58 His minor premise here is that the copy-owner’s entitlement to publish 
newly duplicated copies would be a positive right against the author, and so he concludes that 
copy-ownership as such does not implicitly confer on the copy-owner an entitlement to reproduce 
the work it embodies.59 
These arguments do rather seem to support the standard incident of intellectual property 
ownership that I have been calling the excluding privilege to embody, at least for intellectual goods 
that have the form of copyrightable speech. Kant seems to be saying that unauthorized 
embodiment of a book appears to carry on the author’s affairs in his name without his leave to do 
so and even, perhaps, against his will. And it is no defense that the person making the 
unauthorized embodiment owned another embodiment of the book that served as his model. 
These are the conclusions one reaches on a superficial reading of what Kant says.60 But I think this 
                                            
57 See id. 8:82, at 31–32. 
58 Id. 8:83, at 32. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW & PHIL. 1, 31–33 (2012); Neil 
Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright 
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17–18 (1994); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of 
Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1076–77 (2008). Treiger-Bar-Am, however, argues 
that Kant’s reasoning actually extends beyond its face value to justify an excluding privilege to embody other artistic 
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interpretation is too quick and ultimately ought to be rejected. Consider some of the problems 
Kant would face if this were indeed his view.  
Kant’s first major premise seems essentially correct: someone who falsely pretends to be the 
representative of someone must hand over the gains he receives or compensate for any harm he 
inflicts either on the person whose representative he falsely pretends to be or on that person’s true 
representative.61 But the accompanying minor premise is open to dispute, at least on the reading 
we are considering. It seems to be no necessary feature of unauthorized embodiment of a 
copyrighted text work that the person who is engaged in the unauthorized copying is pretending to 
be the true author’s chosen representative. Rebecca Tushnet has identified numerous examples of 
unauthorized copyists whose deliberate copying of another’s words says something in their own 
voices as well: the dissenting Supreme Court Justice who voices his opposition to constitutional 
protection for flag burning by reproducing a Civil War–era poem in its entirety;62 the person who 
reproduces a newspaper article as a way of drawing another’s attention to information she finds 
significant;63 and the individual who demonstrates commitment to a group or ideal by reciting the 
                                                                                                                                             
works besides speech. See Treiger-Bar-Am, supra, at 1085. She mainly defends this position (1) by claiming that the 
creation of non-verbal artwork can also constitute an act of expression between the creator and the public, and (2) by 
pointing out that advances in technology have made it easy today to create non-transformative, near-exact 
reproductions of non-verbal artwork whereas in Kant’s time such reproduction was only possible for the printed works 
that attract Kant’s attention. Id. at 1086–90.  
61 I deliberately set aside the question of whether we should think he owes this payment to the author, his true 
representative, or both. 
62 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 
YALE L.J. 535, 573 (2004) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424–25 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). 
63 See id. at 578. 
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specific words of an official pledge or oath.64 The Supreme Court has told us, in vaguely Kantian 
language, “The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—
one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.”65 But, as Tushnet points out, that statement cannot possibly be true, for the New York 
Times rightly receives constitutional protection of its own when it chooses to print an independent 
author’s editorial or government-written reports that cause political embarrassment.66 So if Kant’s 
defense of copyright excludes the possibility of copying someone else’s speech and delivering it in 
one’s own voice, we ought not to accept it.  
But we need not read Kant in any such way. For him, a publisher is someone who prints 
another’s speech while effectively saying something like the following to the public:  
Through me a writer will by means of letters have you informed of this or that, 
instruct you, and so forth. I am not responsible for anything, not even for the 
freedom which the author assumes to speak publicly through me: I am only the 
medium by which it reaches you.67 
On Kant’s conception, publishers as such are thought to conform to a model exemplified by 
Amazon Kindle’s e-book direct publication service: anyone can publish their speeches through 
Amazon, which plays no role in selection or promotion.68 This model excludes many of the most 
                                            
64 See id. at 578–79. 
65 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
66 See Tushnet, supra note 62, at 563–64. 
67 Kant, supra note 47, 8:81, at 30. 
68 Even this example is imperfect, for Amazon does prohibit certain types of content, ranging from offensive or 
sexually explicit material to anything that “provides a poor customer experience.” Kindle Direct Publishing Content 
Guidelines, AMAZON.COM, https://kdp.amazon.com/help?topicId=A2TOZW0SV7IR1U (last visited April 6, 2014). 
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prominent entities that we think of as publishers today, whose prominence partly depends on their 
perceived ability to identify promising works and who take responsibility, to some degree, for what 
they print. Many copyists say something other than what Kant’s publishers are saying—such as 
that the author’s work is interesting, important, or of a high quality. They seem to be untouched 
by Kant’s first syllogism because they are not falsely presenting themselves as the author’s 
representative. 
Turn now to his second syllogism, which responds to the unauthorized publisher’s 
hypothetical defense of his actions. Here again, the major premise seems fairly plausible, so I will 
assume it is true that ownership of tangible property cannot generate positive rights against others. 
But, here again, the minor premise is questionable if understood too broadly. It is far from clear 
that embodying another’s speech without permission unavoidably invokes any positive right against 
him or her. Kant’s explanation for his minor premise asserts that a right to publish duplications of 
the physical copy the publisher rightfully owns would be  
not merely a right of the publisher to defend himself against [the author] in regard 
to using his property as he pleases, but to compel [the author] to acknowledge as 
his own and be responsible for a certain affair that the publisher carries on in [the 
author’s] name.69 
Because the unauthorized publisher cannot truthfully avoid attributing the reproduced book to its 
true author, the unauthorized publication is (at least to some degree) carried on in the author’s 
name and the author will be responsible for it.  
                                            
69 Kant, supra note 47, 8:84, at 32–33; see also id. 8:83, at 32 (“[M]y right to carry on some affair in another name 
is a positive right against a person, that is, to compel the author of this affair to perform something, namely to look 
after whatever he has had done through me or to which he has bound himself through me.” (emphasis added)). 
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It is no doubt reasonable for an author to object if others’ actions result in his being held 
responsible for speech he has not chosen to deliver: think of the complaint that an academic 
author would have if a paper marked “DRAFT—Not for Circulation” were to be published on 
another’s highly visible website without her consent, or that any author would have were her work 
quoted inaccurately. But once an author has chosen to deliver his speech to the general public and 
authorized its general distribution by someone, she has already accepted responsibility for the 
speech. Provided that the unauthorized copyist produces copies that are completely faithful to the 
contents of the original, those copies do not force the author to be responsible for or to 
acknowledge as his own any new affair.70 Kant may wish to distinguish the affair of delivering the 
speech contained in book X from the affair of delivering the speech contained in book X through 
                                            
70 One person who might deny this claim is Abraham Drassinower, whose theory of copyright takes many cues 
from Kant but is not presented as an exegesis of Kant’s own theory. Unlike Kant, Drassinower does not stress the 
responsibility that unauthorized publication perhaps inappropriately forces on the author, but rather focuses on an 
objectionable sort of speech compulsion: 
[T]he intuition that unauthorized publication of unpublished works is wrongful is equally applicable 
to the unauthorized publication of published works. What is wrong with each and both is that they 
amount to forcing another to speak. Unauthorized publication is compelled speech. The fact that an 
author has already spoken does not mean that we are thereby entitled to force him to speak again. A 
ventriloquist is not any less a ventriloquist because he compels me to say what I have already said. 
That his belly happens to speak through my mouth exactly what I have already spoken—or what I 
would have spoken—does not make me any less of a puppet. On the contrary, the injury is even 
greater where he uses my very own speech to treat me like one. 
Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 203, 218–219 (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012). Kant’s position clearly is that books embody a 
speech the author is delivering to the public and that she may prevent others from having her speak publicly if she has 
not consented to the speech. Kant, supra note 47, 8:86 n., at 35. But Drassinower appears to go further, characterizing 
each act of printing is a distinct act of speaking by the author. This characterization seems to be what underlies his 
ventriloquism analogy, and it has the metaphysically counterintuitive implication that each person who transcribes and 
publishes remarks delivered in public makes it the case that the speaker has just delivered the remarks again. For this 
reason, I do not find Drassinower’s argument persuasive. Nor do I see any textual evidence that Kant endorses it. (As 
an aside, I would have thought it obviously much less of an injury to force someone to speak his own words than to 
force him to speak the words of somebody else.) 
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publisher P. It might be that the public holds authors responsible for not just their speeches but 
also for the medium through which they deliver those speeches. As I agreed above while discussing 
Kant’s first major premise, falsely representing oneself as another’s authorized agent can wrong that 
person. But perhaps an unauthorized copyist could avoid committing such a wrong by means of a 
(truthful) disclaimer that the speech itself was the author’s while the choice of copyist was not. 
Indeed, simply by presenting herself as the source of an “unauthorized edition,” such a copyist 
could avoid this kind of wrongdoing and protect herself against any allegation that her copying an 
already-published book was asserting a positive right against its author.  
So in reading Kant’s two syllogisms, we must be careful not to attribute to him a rather 
weak pair of arguments for the excluding privilege to embody copyrightable speeches. But there is 
reason to believe he is not actually committed to the weak versions of these arguments. In 
introductory remarks that precede his discussion of unauthorized publication in the Rechtslehre, 
Kant expresses an intention to avoid concepts that are “entirely empirical and, even in terms of 
their possibility, have no proper place in a metaphysical doctrine of right, in which division must be 
made in accordance with a priori principles.”71 He also promises that his ensuing discussion will 
show that the concept of a book “can still be resolved into pure intellectual relations.”72 Not 
surprisingly, then, that discussion leaves out several features of his early essay, which apparently did 
not share the more metaphysical ambitions of The Metaphysics of Morals,73 and these are the very 
                                            
71 KANT, supra note 4, 6:286, at 434. 
72 Id. 
73 Indeed, the aim of Kant’s essay seems at least partly to be articulating a basis for bringing copyright claims to 
court under already applicable laws. See Kant, supra note 47, 8:87, at 35 (“If the idea of publication of a book as such, 
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features that seem most empirically contingent. Take, for example, Kant’s claim in the essay that 
unauthorized publication is not merely without the author’s permission but also “against his will.”74 
Kant’s argument on behalf of this claim depends on the assumption that having two publishers—
one authorized, the other not—would make the enterprise of printing the book economically 
impracticable.75 Not only is this assumption empirically contingent—and hence absent from the 
Rechtslehre—it is doubtful today. Compared to the eighteenth century, when printing an edition of 
a book required laboriously typesetting the whole manuscript by hand,76 the fixed costs of printing 
a book are now a small fraction of what they once were. And we in fact do occasionally see non-
exclusive publishing agreements. So it seems that Kant’s arguments in the On the Wrongfulness 
essay depend on certain contingent facts that are not necessarily present in every case of 
unauthorized embodiment of a copyrightable text.  
Also notably absent in the Rechtslehre discussion is the earlier essay’s second syllogism, with 
its questionable claims about the unauthorized publisher’s assertion of a positive right. If, as I 
                                                                                                                                             
on which this is based, were firmly grasped and (as I flatter myself it could be) elaborated with the requisite eloquence 
of Roman legal scholarship, complaints against unauthorized publishers could indeed be taken to court without it 
being necessary first to wait for a new law.”); cf. KANT, supra note 4, 6:205–06, at 365 (noting that, unless great care is 
shown, it can be challenging “to distinguish what is metaphysics . . . from what is empirical application of rights”). 
74 Kant, supra note 47, 8:81, at 31. 
75 Id. (“[T]he work of one of them would have to make that of the other unprofitable and injurious to each of 
them; thus it would not be possible for an author to make a contract with one publisher with the reservation that he 
might allow someone besides to publish his work.”); see also id. 8:85, at 34 (grounding a publisher’s “exclusive right to 
publish” a work in the fact that “others’ engaging in his affair would make it practically impossible for him to carry it 
on.”). 
76 See generally Rob Banham, The Industrialization of the Book 1800–1970, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF 
THE BOOK 273, 281–83 (Simon Eliot & Jonathan Rose eds., 2007) (providing an overview of the nineteenth-century 
inventions that enabled mechanized typesetting). 
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would suggest, this absence is explained by Kant’s acknowledgement that not all unauthorized 
copying compels the author to take new responsibility for something, then we should interpret 
that syllogism as refuting the unauthorized publisher’s purported right only to the extent that he or 
she is a publisher who would compel authors to take new responsibility for something.  
Likewise, the manner in which the first syllogism survives in the Rechtslehre also gives us 
reason to question how broadly it was meant in the On the Wrongfulness essay. The nonempirical 
part of the syllogism that survives untouched in the Rechtslehre is the first premise’s claim that it is 
wrongful to impersonate another’s authorized agent (and the claims about what remedies are 
appropriate for such wrongdoing). In the Rechtslehre, the second premise survives as a matter of 
stipulation: at the outset, Kant simply says “One who, through a writing, discourses publicly in 
another’s (the author’s) name is a publisher.”77 Perhaps copyists in Kant’s time typically conformed 
to this definition, but in light of the cases we considered above, the definition seems dramatically 
under-inclusive today. It seems likely then, that Kant’s conception of a publisher is different from 
our everyday conception. I would therefore read Kant’s Rechtslehre argument as asserting that, to 
the extent that one falls within Kant’s particular definition of a publisher—by passing oneself off as 
the author’s authorized agent—publishing without the author’s authority is wrongful. So 
interpreted, the argument is quite plausible but far less ambitious than a defense of the excluding 
privilege to embody copyrightable texts.  
It is hard to be certain, though, that this interpretation accurately reflects Kant’s own 
views. The best textual evidence that he meant to establish something closer to an excluding 
                                            
77 KANT, supra note 5, 6:289, at 437. 
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privilege to embody appears at the end of the On the Wrongfulness essay, where he is defending 
unauthorized reproduction of visual works of art, such as drawings, engravings, and sculptures. 
While distinguishing such (permissible) reproduction from the (impermissible) reproduction of 
books, he writes: 
But another’s writing is the speech of a person (opera), and one who publishes it can 
speak to the public only in the name of this other and can say no more of himself 
than that the author through him (Impensis Bibliopolae) delivers the following 
speech to the public. For it is a contradiction to deliver in one’s own name a speech 
that, by one’s own announcement and in keeping with the public’s demand, is to be 
the speech of another.78 
Kant is apparently suggesting here that it would be self-contradictory to disseminate another 
person’s work in order to say something of one’s own while honestly acknowledging that the 
speech is that other person’s. This claim does not reappear in the Rechtslehre, but nothing suggests 
that Kant came to repudiate it. Here again, though, he seems to be basing his claim on a particular 
conception of publication—where publishers are necessarily understood as authors’ appointed 
agents—rather than on duplication or copying as such. And whatever features are contained within 
this conception of publication, copying as such does not seem to entail the contradiction Kant is 
identifying. For while it would be contradictory for a copyist to say simultaneously that he was the 
author of certain speech and that another person wrote the very same speech first, copyists seem 
able to give voice to another’s speech in their own name without asserting the two incompatible 
claims. So, for instance, the person who transcribes the words of a poem, with proper attribution 
to its author, and gives the copy to another person can reveal that he did not write the poem while 
                                            
78 Kant, supra note 47, 8:86, at 34. 
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also indicating that he is sharing the poem because it expresses his thoughts or feelings better than 
his own words could. Such speech is his in one sense but not his in another.79 Even in this passage, 
then, Kant need not be read as denying the possibility of unauthorized verbatim copying performed 
partly in the copyist’s own name.  
In any case, Kant’s view contains two key lessons for our understanding of natural rights of 
intellectual property. First, his arguments, taken together, provide a firm footing for a right of 
attribution. As we have seen, Kant identifies the general wrongfulness of attributing to authors 
actions they did not perform. Not only is it wrong for an unauthorized publisher to pretend that an 
author has appointed her his agent; it is also wrong for the person who abridges, translates, or 
otherwise alters a text without authorization to mislead others into thinking that the author has 
made or approved those modifications.80 In other words, it is wrong to attribute actions to a person 
when he or she did not perform them. Although Kant did not discuss the problem of knock-off 
goods, which might not have been a big problem in Kant’s day, his account clearly indicates that it 
would be wrong to use another’s trademark on counterfeit goods in a way that suggests that they 
are the genuine article.  
But Kant also suggests at one point that it would be wrong to attribute actions to oneself 
when they were actually performed by another.81 Kant does not elaborate, but it is not hard to 
build an argument for this second claim based on the rest of Kant’s discussion. That whole 
                                            
79 Cf. id. 8:86 n., at 35 (explaining how the author of a book and someone who lawfully owns a copy of it “can 
both, with equal right, say of the same book, ‘it is my book,’ but in different senses”). 
80 Id. 8:86–87, at 35. 
81 KANT, supra note 5, 6:289, at 437 (saying that a publisher cannot “pass himself off as the author”). 
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discussion emphasizes our interest in having control over what we do and in having a public 
reputation that accurately reflects what we have chosen to do. Someone who attempts to claim 
credit for another’s work denies that person the reputation she deserves no less than the person 
who attributes actions to another that she did not perform. Either sort of action would violate an 
intellectual property owner’s right of attribution. 
Given his apparent commitment to a right of attribution, it is not surprising that Kant is 
often viewed as an early defender of what is called droit moral in copyright law,82 which 
encompasses, to varying degrees around the world, creators’ rights to be identified as the creators of 
their works and to object to unauthorized alterations of their works that would injure their 
reputations.83 There is some controversy over the justifiability of the right of attribution and 
(especially) the right of creators to preserve the integrity of their work as they see it,84 but Kant’s 
own proposal should not be controversial because it protects creators’ reputational interests without 
placing a significant burden on others.85 It is no great loss for anyone if those who had no role in 
                                            
82 See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, The Moral Rights of Creators of Artistic and Literary Works, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 330, 341 
(2005); Netanel, supra note 60, at 20–21. 
83 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, as amended on Sept. 28, 
1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. In France, droit moral is quite broad and encompasses further 
rights, including the right to modify or withdraw works from the public and the right to decide whether and when to 
release works to the public. See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of 
Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 17–37 (1980) (discussing droit de 
divulgation, droit de retrait ou de repentir, droit à la paternité, droit au respect de l’oeuvre in French law). In the United 
States, federal law only recognizes the rights of attribution and integrity, and only for works of visual art. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106A, 113(d) (2006); see also Brian Angelo Lee, Making Sense of “Moral Rights” in Intellectual Property, 84 TEMP. L. 
REV. 71, 79–80 (2011) (identifying state statutes that protect visual artists’ droit moral).  
84 See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265, 267 n.16 (2009); Stephen L. Carter, 
Owning What Doesn’t Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 100–01 (1990).  
85 Furthermore, it also protects audiences and society as a whole from being misled about the identity of whoever 
actually deserves responsibility for the actions. 
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creating a work or who have not been appointed another’s agent are prohibited from pretending 
otherwise.86 And the only Kant-endorsed right that could be called a right of integrity does 
nothing more than protect the artist’s reputation; it does not stand in the way of subsequent 
alterations so long as they are not falsely attributed to the author.87 Some might claim that this 
version of droit moral affords insufficient protection.88 For my part, however, I think it affords just 
about the right level of protection when extended beyond authors of written works to creative 
people in general, although I will not defend that position here. 
A second right follows from Kant’s concern, in the On the Wrongfulness essay, that authors 
not be forced to acknowledge speech as their own and accept responsibility for it if they have not 
yet judged themselves ready to do so. This might be called a right of release. It would give creators 
of artistic expression some measure of control over the initial disclosure of their creations to the 
public. Although in some countries such a right exists and is viewed as part of droit moral,89 the 
right can also be found in legal systems that have not embraced droit moral. For example, well 
before the recognition of droit moral in American law, the doctrine known as common law 
                                            
86 Recall that a Kantian right of attribution only imposes duties on verbatim copyists; those who edit or otherwise 
alter a work are not supposed to suggest that the original author is also responsible for the changes. Setting aside 
Kant’s views, however, I am inclined to think there is a rather gray area in which modifiers have some duty to indicate 
their indebtedness to the original creator of a work they are relying on, without attributing responsibility for the 
changes, if that can be done without much difficulty. 
87 Cf. Beitz, supra note 82, at 349 (“[A]s a general matter, the interests adversely affected by [alienable] Moral 
Rights seem to be few, assuming anyway that the system could be structured so as to minimize the potential for 
inhibiting future creativity.”). 
88 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffett, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1046–48 (1976) 
(advocating a relatively broad right of integrity, at least for works of visual art, that would limit owners’ ability to make 
modifications without the artist’s consent). 
89 See supra note 83. 
 104 
copyright prohibited the publication of an author’s work before he or she consented to its public 
dissemination.90 Given that anyone who spreads sufficiently unaltered versions of artistic expression 
would be obligated to give credit to the material’s actual creator, violating the right of release 
would necessitate the creator’s assumption of responsibility for work even if she felt unprepared to 
assume that responsibility. In principle, there are other sorts of intellectual goods beside the 
copyrightable sort—what I am calling creative expression—unauthorized release of which would 
require attribution and thus reflect (whether well or poorly) on the resource’s creator.91 If someone 
publicized another’s non-copyrightable idea for a project while giving proper attribution, the 
latter’s reputation might be affected, especially if others find that project laughable. And it would 
not be a tremendous consolation to such a person if the release of her work were to be 
accompanied by a disclaimer stating that she had not consented to the promulgation of the idea, 
because the disclaimer would still not change the fact that the idea was hers despite her lack of 
voluntary public commitment to it. Wherever this sort of dynamic is present, Kant’s arguments 
seem to me to suggest that unauthorized release would be at least presumptively wrongful.92 Note, 
                                            
90 See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 
659 (1834)). Of course, statutory protection for copyrights makes this common law copyright essentially superfluous 
today. Somewhat confusingly, “common law copyright” also occasionally refers to the (historically discredited) theory 
that the common law, prior to any copyright statute, recognized robust rights of copyright ownership. See generally 
Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 
29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1129–33 (1983).  
91 Cf. Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 251–52 (1991) (orienting trade secrecy law around a “right to control the initial disclosure of 
one’s ideas,” id. at 251).   
92 I say “presumptively” because it is easy to imagine cases where the public has a very compelling interest in 
knowing about an idea that could justify concluding that the source of the idea has no right against its dissemination. 
Think of the political candidate who has expressed ideas only in private that have a strong bearing on how voters 
should cast their ballots. Further, there are many historical examples of artists who upon their deaths demand the 
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however, as I have argued above,93 that faithfully duplicating already published ideas or artistic 
expression would not impose any new responsibility on the author and therefore would be 
permissible. It would also be completely permissible to develop another’s idea or statements beyond 
the point at which attribution ceases to be required. But neither the right of release nor the right 
of attribution approaches the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership very closely, and 
so Kant’s arguments, if I have interpreted them correctly, do not justify what we normally think of 
as intellectual property rights. 
 
* * * 
Kant’s views about property and intellectual property offer a valuable supplement to the 
Lockean arguments we considered in the previous chapter. Locke’s primary concern, as we saw, is 
with the individual’s interest in having material benefits that are necessary for life or that make life 
more comfortable. Kant’s discussions focus rather on the importance of having control over our 
own actions. I disagreed with Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of physical property, 
according to which our ability to control what we do seemed to require that we have a very broad 
measure of control over anything that others do with our possessions. I claimed that Ripstein was 
overestimating our reasons to care about having control over uses of our property that do not 
interfere with our ends. But after turning to intellectual property, I agreed with Kant that our 
                                                                                                                                             
destruction of their unpublished works. These cases raise difficult questions about proper respect for wishes of the dead 
that complicate the basic point I want to make here. 
93 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
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interests in controlling what we do extends to having a reputation that faithfully matches what we 
have chosen to do. This interest, I claimed, justifies intellectual property rights of attribution and 
release.  
In practice, these rights might closely resemble the Lockean natural intellectual property 
rights that I identified in the previous chapter. We have already seen how a right of attribution 
supports trademark’s condemnation of knock-off goods, which would also be condemned under 
the theory of Lockean trademark that I advanced in the previous chapter. The difference, though, 
is that for Locke the interest that grounds the right against interfering uses of a trademarked logo 
is the trademark owner’s interest in material gain, in gaining the necessities and conveniences of 
life. Having a good reputation can indeed promote our interests in material gain, but Kant seems 
to think that we also have non-instrumental reputational interests that derive from our interests in 
controlling what we do. Similarly, a right of release might, at least in certain circumstances, be 
justified as a protection against interference with labor. A few novelists famously experimented, 
while writing iconic works, with different plot elements before settling on the final version.94 If 
someone had acquired one of the early drafts of A Farewell to Arms in which Hemingway allowed a 
certain character to survive95 and then published it as A Farewell to Arms before Hemingway could 
release the bleaker version that is familiar to us, he might fairly have complained that the 
unauthorized publication of a novel with a different ending kept him from creating A Farewell to 
                                            
94 See, e.g., 3 JOHN FORSTER, THE LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS 335 (1874) (discussing a late change to the ending 
of Great Expectations). 
95 See ERNEST HEMINGWAY, A FAREWELL TO ARMS xviii, 305–06 (Séan Hemingway ed., Scribner 2012). 
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Arms as he conceived of it. Perhaps such an author has reason to care about being free to create one 
version rather than another because the first will bring greater commercial success. But I see no 
reason to insist that all arguments on behalf of a right to release are based on interests in material 
gain. Someone might object to unauthorized release of a text he has written on the basis of other 
interests, such as an interest in quality control—that is, in making sure the final version of what he 
is producing is as good as possible, for its own sake. Even the author who planned to remain 
anonymous and thus had no reputational worries might have an interest in ensuring that her work 
was not released to the public before it was in adequate shape. And of course when certain texts are 
distributed without authorization, privacy is a significant concern.  
So although there may be significant overlap between Kantian and Lockean natural rights 
of intellectual property ownership, we should not assume a perfect overlap.96 My claim in this 
dissertation is that we need a good understanding of all the interests that intellectual property 
rights affect in order to determine whether those rights are justified. Over the last two chapters, I 
have identified a few interests of creators that one might have thought were likely to furnish a 
natural rights–type justification for the standard incidents of intellectual property ownership, and 
argued that they in fact justify only a small subset of intellectual property laws. But I have not yet 
discussed another vitally important category of interest that is profoundly affected by intellectual 
property—namely, interests shared widely throughout society. 
                                            
96 Here is just one example of potential divergence: Sponsorship confusion, as I argued in the last chapter, seems 
to be one area of trademark law that Lockean principles fail to justify. Yet Kantian principles that denounce attributing 
to another actions she did not perform would seem to condemn at least some defendants whose trademark use conveys 
that the trademark owner has given her endorsement. Of course, the challenge is to develop legal doctrine that does 
not too readily find a likelihood of sponsorship confusion and that thus avoids placing too heavy a burden on those 
who make innocent use of another’s marks. 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
BASED ON SOCIETY’S INTERESTS 
We need not consult Plato or Aristotle. 
- Jeremy Bentham1 
For my part, I almost always think Plato and Aristotle are worth consulting when they have 
something to say. And I think they have something to say here, even though our topic is 
intellectual property and they lived many centuries before anyone had given the subject much 
thought. One of their famous disagreements anticipated an important alternative to natural rights 
thinking about physical property ownership, and it will help us better understand the justifications 
of its incorporeal cousin. This ancient alternative would justify private property ownership not on 
the ground that anyone has a pre-legal claim to dominion over some particular object, but on the 
ground that the institution of private property functions well from society’s perspective, at least 
compared to salient alternatives. In endorsing private property over communal ownership, Plato’s 
preferred arrangement, Aristotle stressed its unworkability: “that which is common to the greatest 
number,” he observed, “has the least care bestowed upon it.”2 And it seems quite sensible for 
lawmakers to care about how well valuable objects are used. In fact, Aristotle’s concern about 
socially harmful misuse of common property prefigured what would later be a theme of Bentham 
                                            
1 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 4 (Étienne Dumont & Charles Milner Atkinson eds. & trans., 
1914) (1802). 
2 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 2, ch. 3, 1261b33–38, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 
2002 (Jonathan Barnes ed., B. Jowett trans., 1984). 
 109 
and his utilitarian successors. Bentham thought unrestricted hunting on unowned lands went 
against society’s interests by jeopardizing the sustainability of the animal population.3 Henry 
Sidgwick raised a similar worry about common stocks of fish: fishermen are apt to overfish out of a 
narrow concern for their own gain if the law permits it.4 Modern economists have also studied 
these problems and identified private property as a possible solution, observing alongside Aristotle 
that owning a resource makes one less likely to waste its value.5 Private property can thus be 
defended as one socially useful strategy for avoiding “the tragedy of the commons.”6  
This functionalist praise of private property’s ability to discourage socially harmful behavior 
has an equally important corollary highlighting its ability to encourage socially beneficial behavior. 
There was no hope of human industry (or much else) in Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature because 
industry’s fruits could never be secure enough without law.7 David Hume thought that rules 
promoting stability in private possessions were “absolutely necessary to human society.”8 Bentham 
                                            
3 BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 218. 
4 HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 3, ch. 2, § 5, at 410 (3d ed. 1901) (1883); see 
also JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 5, ch. 11, § 12, at 966 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) 
(1848) (discussing how self-interested actors will rush to appropriate more unclaimed land than they can productively 
use if they fear that others will do likewise). 
5 See Peder Andersen, “On Rent of Fishing Grounds”: A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 Article, with an 
Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 391, 392–93 (1983) (translating Jens Warming, Om Grundrente af Fiskegrunde, 49 
NATIONALØKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1911)); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: 
The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954). 
6 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
7 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13, [62], at 84 (A. R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651). 
8 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. 2, § 3, at 501 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740). 
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of course knew Hobbes’s and Hume’s work and followed them on this point: “It is the law alone 
which makes it possible for me to forget the insecurity of my natural condition, and emboldens 
me, with reasonable hope of a harvest as yet far distant, to enclose a plot of land and give myself up 
to the toil of cultivation.”9 Because property could not exist without law, according to Bentham, 
neither could security, abundance, or any assurance of subsistence.10 
Several functionalist considerations thus speak in favor of private property institutions. The 
aim of this chapter is not to dwell on them, but to consider how analogous considerations might 
be used to support intellectual property. More abstractly, my aim here is to examine the proper 
place of functionalism in the design of intellectual property institutions. I will propose that 
designers of those institutions should be more like Aristotle than Bentham: keenly aware of the 
utility of their designs, but not utilitarians. Of course, Bentham’s disregard for Plato and Aristotle 
was actually rooted not in doubts about their ability to make perceptive observations about the 
functioning of social institutions, but in a rejection of their criteria for evaluating those 
institutions. The touchstone of Benthamite happiness is the everyday concept of pleasure, not 
some virtue-dependent concept of eudaimonia.11 (And yet Bentham flirted with the idea of calling 
himself a “eudaimonologian” rather than a “utilitarian,”12 narrowly avoiding a branding misstep that 
might have dramatically altered the course of modern moral philosophy.) But obviously, Bentham 
                                            
9 BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 146. 
10 Id. at 142, 145. 
11 See id. at 3–4. 
12 John Bowring, History of the Greatest-Happiness Principle, in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, DEONTOLOGY 286, 320 (John 
Bowring ed., 1834). 
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and his fellow utilitarians do not reserve harsh judgment for pre-Epicurean Greeks; they lavish it 
on anyone who resists utilitarianism for whatever reason. Although I will be challenging 
utilitarianism here, I will not be advocating any specific nonutilitarian theory. Rather, I will 
advocate examining how well social institutions function without assuming that nonutilitarian 
normative considerations are irrelevant. 
Before proceeding, let us characterize institutional utilitarianism as the view that designers of 
legal institutions should be guided only by the effects of their decisions on total (or average) levels 
of individual well-being across some population.13 Although there are a few different ways to 
characterize well-being, as we will see, for now it can be understood roughly as a measure of how 
well an individual’s life is going for her. In the next few sections, I will argue that the prospect of 
designing intellectual property institutions undercuts institutional utilitarianism’s appeal in a 
special way by exposing how unlikely utilitarianism is to deliver determinate judgments about how 
social institutions should be designed. Then, I will use a few examples from intellectual property 
law to sketch a nonutilitarian approach to institutional design—an approach that is highly sensitive 
to an institution’s overall effects but open to other normative considerations as well. And finally, I 
will explain how institutions designed to promote society’s interests can nonetheless give rise to 
individual rights. 
 
                                            
13 For classic and contemporary endorsements of institutional utilitarianism, see, respectively, JEREMY BENTHAM, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 1, § 1, at 1 n.1 (Clarendon Press 1907) 
(1823); and LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE xvii (2002). 
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4.1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FUNCTIONALISM AND UTILITARIANISM 
It is easy to identify a valuable function that intellectual property institutions could 
perform. Society has an extremely strong interest in the existence of the sorts of things that 
intellectual property owners own—expressive works, useful information, and so forth. Not only 
does any given individual have an interest in having access to such things for her own use, but she 
also has an interest in such things’ existence apart from the possibility that she herself will ever use 
them, since others might use them in ways that benefit her. Unfortunately, effort is typically 
necessary before such things are available and suitable for use, and yet the person who expends such 
effort will find it difficult to exclude anybody else from the thing she works to produce unless she 
wants to exclude everybody from it. Information and artistic expression can easily spread 
throughout groups of people regardless of the laborer’s wishes, especially given the right 
technology. The laborer may therefore fail to recoup her fixed costs: once the information or 
expression she produces, or an object embodying it, is sold to a few people, many others may be 
able to acquire the fruits of her labor from one of the early purchasers without further 
compensating her for her investment. Free-riders can even compete with her at a great advantage. 
Consider the person who reverse-engineers Thomas Edison’s light bulb design without having to 
spend countless hours testing different filament materials, or who sells flawless copies of symphony 
recordings without having to hire an orchestra to record them. If the technology needed for 
copying exists and the law does not intervene, there will be less investment in producing the sorts 
of things that can be the subject of intellectual property ownership. For although some individuals 
may be willing to do the work for little or no pay, many will not. And so copyright and patent law 
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may seem justified for their ability “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” as the 
U.S. Constitution puts it.14  
These observations are plainly analogous to part of the functionalist case for regular 
property that we saw in this chapter’s introduction—namely, the part stressing property law’s 
ability to protect investment and thereby increase prosperity overall. And indeed, that is exactly 
how Bentham justified patents. He approved of patent laws for the very same reason he approved of 
property laws: both encourage socially beneficial behavior through the promise of security.15 This is 
the incentive function of intellectual property. 
Bentham went on, however, to claim that patent law “costs nothing,”16 and this claim is 
dubious. Bentham’s analysis of intellectual property’s effects was incomplete. Recall that, for 
                                            
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The functionalist case for trademark is slightly different. Compared to encouraging 
knowledge, art, and invention, encouraging the production and development of brand names, corporate logos, and 
advertising slogans does not seem so clearly in society’s interest. But even these can be called intellectual goods because 
they possess (at least) second-order value as means of facilitating communication by those who sell products with first-
order value to prospective consumers. It is easier for the car purchaser who knows what she wants to obtain it by 
specifying the make and model rather than by listing its unique characteristics. Trademarks make it easier for 
consumers to search for goods with consistent features. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987). 
15 Bentham wrote:  
With respect to a great number of inventions in the arts, an exclusive privilege is absolutely 
necessary, in order that what is sown may be reaped. In new inventions, protection against imitators 
is not less necessary than in established manufactures protection against thieves. He who has no 
hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which one man has invented, all 
the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be 
driven out of the market by his rival, who finding himself, without any expense, in possession of a 
discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, would be able to deprive him of all 
his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price. 
JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 30, 71 (John 
Bowring ed. 1839); see also MILL, supra note 4, bk. 5, ch. 10, § 4, at 932–33. 
16 BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 71. 
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physical property, private ownership not only encourages productive use but also discourages 
wasteful misuse. With information and creative expression, however, there is no tragedy of the 
commons as there is with common pools of fish,17 for using such goods typically does not deplete 
the supply available to others. If intellectual property performs its incentive function, it actually 
increases the total supply of usable things. Yet intellectual property ownership performs its 
incentive function only by giving owners power to regulate others’ access and thus restricting 
society’s use of the intellectual property. This feature of intellectual property affects social welfare 
in a different way, and not for the better. Instead of preventing overfishing, it is possible that 
intellectual property causes the functional equivalent of underfishing.18 
The standard incidents of intellectual property ownership that enable an owner to restrict 
others’ access to her intellectual property permit her to charge abnormally high prices for that 
access. More specifically, intellectual property’s exclusive rights enable monopoly pricing by 
curtailing the production of substitute goods. The following (stylized) graph illustrates the social 
harm of such pricing: 
                                            
17 As Sidgwick and many others have observed. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS ch. 10, § 5, at 
157 (2d ed. 1897). 
18 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 839, 873 (1990). 
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In an ideally competitive market, the price of goods equals the marginal cost of production—the 
price of producing the next individual one. And when a good’s price equals its marginal cost (P), 
social welfare is maximized and the optimal quantity of the good (Q) is produced and enjoyed; 
whoever derives a benefit from the good that equals or exceeds its cost obtains it. But under 
monopoly pricing, the lack of normal competition allows the monopolist to charge a higher price 
(Pm), greater than the good’s marginal cost, which maximizes the monopolist’s profits (shaded 
rectangle MP).19 In so doing, they not only gain at consumers’ expense (though this is not 
necessarily bad from a social welfare perspective), they also end up producing a lower-than-socially-
optimal quantity of goods (Qm). Now someone who values a particular good more than it costs to 
                                            
19 For ease of presentation, I assume that the marginal cost and average total cost are equal whatever quantity of 
goods is supplied. 
Figure 1 
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produce but less than the monopolist charges will not obtain it, resulting in a social loss (shaded 
triangle SL).20  
The cost of intellectual property is actually even higher. For the problem is not simply that 
a mass of individual consumers who value a good more than P but less than Pm will derive less 
personal satisfaction than is warranted given the good’s cost. Rather, since tomorrow’s 
breakthroughs builds on today’s, there is an additional risk that intellectual property laws will 
prohibitively increase the costs of those who would have used such goods to produce further 
innovations that would have increased social welfare. If after the commercialization and patenting 
of the internal combustion engine, every one sold by the patentee was priced above marginal cost, 
some tinkerers and aspiring inventors may not have sought access to the engines at the higher 
price, and society may have lost out on some new machines that would have been invented (or 
invented sooner) if they had had that access. Moreover, intellectual property ownership directly 
discourages follow-on innovation through the standard incident I have called the excluding 
privilege to develop. Copyright law expressly prohibits preparing new works, such as translations 
and other adaptions, that derive from a copyrighted work; under this rule, one could not develop a 
copyrighted novel into a screenplay, for instance, without permission from the copyright holder.21 
Patent law prohibits unauthorized development of patented intellectual goods less directly, but in 
certain circumstances it allows patentees to obtain patents blocking not-yet-commercialized 
                                            
20 I am also assuming away the possibility of price discrimination. 
21 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2006).  
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improvements of their inventions.22 Although it is possible copyright owners or patentees might 
license subsequent developments or improvements that rely on their earlier work, it is also possible 
they will not do so. They might disapprove of the changes or seek to suppress the competition. 
Whatever their purposes, there is no guarantee that they will be guided by society’s interests rather 
than their own. 
Of course these concerns do not amount to a conclusive case against intellectual property, 
at least if it truly performs its incentive function. Although monopoly pricing results in suboptimal 
production of goods, it could be worse yet to have no intellectual property whatever. For then the 
valuable intellectual resource might never have been created or developed, and something is better 
than nothing. Surely Bentham himself would have made this argument had he been pressed to 
defend his assertion that the exclusivity created by patent law is costless. He knew very well that 
monopolies cause problems, but he still defended monopoly-like legal entitlements, including 
patents, out of the belief that they produce greater good overall.23 Sidgwick explicitly mentioned 
concerns that intellectual property might restrict others’ ability to improve or develop the 
protected intellectual good and suggested that the laws be designed carefully.24 According to 
functionalism, then, a principal task for policymakers is to design intellectual property institutions 
so that their benefits are many and their costs few. At a minimum, intellectual property protection 
                                            
22 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 
1000–07 (1996).  
23 See JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF USURY, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 1, 28–
29. 
24 SIDGWICK, supra note 17, ch. 19, § 3, at 342. 
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seems unwise when little or no special incentive is necessary to encourage the development and 
commercialization of the good. Some scholars question whether copyright is necessary for academic 
authors, who may have adequate motivation to publish without it.25 But even if we limit 
intellectual property to the cases where some special incentive is needed, many questions remain, 
such as how broad intellectual property coverage should be and how long it should last.26 
There is now a large literature on precisely such questions, but no firm consensus. Or, if 
there is a consensus, it is a disappointing one. Many economics-and-empirics scholars have come 
to believe, with Ronald Cass and Keith Hylton, that “little empirical evidence exists to shed light 
on the issues central to the design of intellectual property rights.”27 Robert Merges goes even 
further, saying that because he has “become convinced that with our current tools we will never 
identify the ‘optimal number’ of patented, copyrighted, and trademarked works,” he finds it 
important to seek non-functionalist guidance.28 Although we differ over what conclusions should 
be drawn from non-functionalist considerations, I agree with Merges that we ought to consider 
them. Indeed, I would go so far as to claim that sometimes policy ought to be determined 
                                            
25 E.g., Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301, 304 (2010) 
(arguing that it is likely socially undesirable to grant copyrights to academic authors—who are motivated by a desire for 
readership—at least to the extent that the universities and grantors who fund them would be willing to defray the 
costs of publishing). 
26 Alternatively, a policymaker could attempt to secure the benefits using some sort of incentive that would avoid 
monopoly pricing altogether—for instance, a direct subsidy or prize system—though these systems have their own 
costs. 
27 RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 45 
(2013); accord William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
OF PROPERTY 168, 181 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
28 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011). 
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exclusively by non-functionalist principles. For instance, one can speculate that a lot of wealth 
would be generated if intellectual property creators had full freedom to alienate the right of 
attribution that in the last chapter I claimed they ought to have. Even if it turned out that the 
average or total well-being within a society would be increased by a law that permitted individuals 
to buy the right to claim falsely that they created work they did not in fact create, that would not 
establish, in my view, that we ought to adopt such a law. But it is not clear that all intellectual 
property scholars agree, for it is routinely said that the most popular approach to intellectual 
property is utilitarianism.29 And as I understand utilitarianism, it rules out any normative criteria 
other than overall levels of well-being, including concern that some action promoting overall well-
being would do so by means of a lie. Now perhaps those who think of themselves as intellectual 
property utilitarians really just endorse functionalist thinking about the subject, and are no more 
utilitarian than Aristotle. They might agree with me that a law facilitating dishonesty would not be 
justified just because it improved overall well-being a little bit. Some legal scholars, however, 
clearly do endorse institutional utilitarianism in the sense I have described, and maintain that it is 
categorically inappropriate to base social institutions on anything other than the expected effects 
on overall well-being.  
The most prominent examples are Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. They start with an 
uncontroversial premise—namely that effect on individuals’ well-being is a very important factor 
for evaluating the design and functioning of social institutions—and proceed to argue that 
                                            
29 E.g., Fisher, supra note 27, at 169; see also, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–51 (2012) (“The Supreme Court, Congress, and many legal scholars consider utilitarianism the 
dominant purpose of American copyright and patent law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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institutional design should not look to any other normative factors because in so doing it 
compromises the institution’s ability to achieve positive effects on individuals’ well-being.30 Of 
course, this would be no argument at all if it only pointed out that pursuing other aims might be 
expected to result in lower amounts of overall well-being than would the single-minded pursuit of 
individuals’ well-being. Anyone who understands what institutional utilitarianism amounts to and 
rejects it foresees this possibility and is willing to tolerate it. Kaplow and Shavell, however, make a 
seemingly more ambitious claim. Not only, they argue, might resorting to nonwelfarist 
considerations decrease the well-being of certain individuals in the population we care about or 
even decrease the total amount or average level of well-being in the population; they claim that 
using nonwelfarist criteria may actually decrease the well-being of every single person within the 
population.31  
This conclusion may startle even someone who is inclined to reject institutional 
utilitarianism. It is one thing not to care about individuals’ well-being exclusively, but something 
else to be willing to overlook it entirely. But Kaplow and Shavell’s claim is less startling that it first 
appears. In fact, it proves true by definition.32 Despite some language that might naturally be read 
to suggest the contrary,33 they are not claiming that there is a significant probability that 
                                            
30 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 52. 
31 Id. at 52–54 & n.75. 
32 Even Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that their claim is “virtually a tautology.” Id. at 58. I do not think they 
need the “virtually.” 
33 See, e.g., id. at 7 (“[P]ursuing notions of fairness is necessarily at the expense of individuals’ well-being . . . .”); 
id. at 53 (“[C]onsistently adhering to any notion of fairness will sometimes entail favoring regimes under which every 
person is made worse off.”).  
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nonutilitarianism will actually decrease everyone’s well-being. All they are saying is that someone 
who wants policy decisions influenced by some nonwelfarist consideration—that is, who wants 
policy not to be determined solely on the basis of expected effects on individuals’ well-being34—can 
be made to confront conceivable cases in which the policy they think ought to be adopted makes 
every individual worse off.35 And adhering to nonutilitarianism in those possible cases would violate 
a widely accepted version of the Pareto principle that requires adopting any policy that makes every 
person better off. And so if one accepts this Pareto principle, one must reject nonutilitarianism, 
lest one be caught defending inconsistent principles.36  
Kaplow and Shavell seem to believe that anyone who is presented with this incompatibility 
between nonutilitarianism and this Pareto principle will reject the former, but in my view rejecting 
the Pareto principle has greater appeal.37 In its place, the nonutilitarian can affirm a qualified 
version of the Pareto principle that avoids the incompatibility: if it is only prima facie true, or true 
ceteris paribus, that any policy making everyone better off should be adopted, then there is no 
conflict for the nonutilitarian who refuses to make everyone better off when doing so would violate 
her nonutilitarian commitments. And presumably many real-life nonutilitarians actually hold some 
                                            
34 Id. at 39. 
35 Id. at 53 n.75. 
36 Id. at 56. 
37 In his earlier work on this topic, by contrast, Amartya Sen took seriously the possibility of rejecting the weak 
Pareto principle in order to preserve a form of liberalism. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 152, 157 (1970); see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 54 n.75.  
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such conception of the Pareto principle, fully in keeping with their nonutilitarianism.38 By way of 
example, nonutilitarians who think it is always impermissible to lie may also think that, other 
things equal, one ought to make others better off. But if they are presented with a case in which 
lying would make everyone better off—including, let us assume, the liar herself, who derives 
enormous happiness from the thought of taking one for the team—these nonutilitarians would 
surely insist that lying in this case is impermissible. Ultimately, all Kaplow and Shavell show is that 
in deciding whether to be a utilitarian, one must choose between following an absolutist Pareto 
principle and following some nonwelfarist principle.  
But just as one cannot responsibly make such a choice without specifying which 
nonwelfarist principle is under consideration, one cannot responsibly make the choice without 
giving more content to the notion of well-being that the absolutist Pareto principle threatens to 
employ. Although Kaplow and Shavell take themselves to be offering an argument whose success 
does not depend on the appeal of their particular conception of well-being,39 the argument still 
depends on some conception of well-being having sufficient appeal to the nonutilitarian, who will 
not find Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments troubling unless, when she contemplates the possibility of 
Pareto violations, she ceases to want to opt for her preferred nonwelfarist criterion over the 
welfarist criterion.40  
                                            
38 Similarly, nonutilitarians might want to reject an unqualified “strong” Pareto principle requiring any policy that 
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off.  
39 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 52 n.73 (claiming that their “argument is applicable even if one 
adopts a conception of well-being different from the welfare economic conception” that they endorse). 
40 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 979, 991 (2003). 
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Kaplow and Shavell’s main argument is thus unlikely to convert us diehard nonbelievers to 
institutional utilitarianism, but I wonder about its appeal even to those who already find themselves 
on the road to conversion. Someone attracted to an absolutist Pareto principle should still not 
assent to utilitarianism on the basis of what Kaplow and Shavell say because their claims run 
together two conceptions of nonutilitarianism: one which would base policy decisions on 
nonutilitarian criteria regardless of the effects on individuals’ well-being41 and one which would 
base a policy decision on a nonutilitarian criterion only in certain situations.42 Their claim that 
nonutilitarianism countenances conceivable violations of an absolutist Pareto principle is only true 
for the first conception of nonutilitarianism, but they seem to believe that it holds for the second 
as well.43 Yet the two conceptions of nonutilitarianism come apart. Someone might be a 
nonutilitarian and yet only act on nonwelfarist considerations when the effects on well-being fall 
within acceptable limits.  
Thus some conceivable versions of so-called threshold deontology seem to avoid Kaplow 
and Shavell’s concerns. For instance, someone might support basing policy on nonwelfarist criteria 
but only when doing so would not make everyone worse off. Kaplow and Shavell’s Pareto-based 
                                            
41 E.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 6 (focusing on “principles employed to assess the desirability of 
legal rules without regard to the effects of the rules on individuals’ well-being”). 
42 E.g., id. at 52 (focusing on methods of assessment that do not “depend exclusively on the effects of legal rules 
on individuals’ well-being”). 
43 See id. at 56 (“[I]f one adheres to the view that it cannot be normatively good to make everyone worse off, then 
logical consistency requires that one can give no weight in normative analysis to notions of fairness because doing so 
entails the contrary proposition . . . .”). 
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argument for institutional utilitarianism does not touch this nonutilitarian proposal.44 They would 
say, of course, this theory seems awfully ad hoc and probably not defensible in the end.45 And they 
may be right about this, but perhaps other species of nonutilitarianism fare better. Consider the 
view that policymakers should rely on some criterion other than well-being just in case the policy 
under consideration would not decrease overall well-being relative to its leading competitors.46 This 
species of nonutilitarianism—which gives lexical priority to the effects on overall well-being—
seems less contrived than the previous one, although perhaps it cannot be cogently defended, 
either. But if it could be defended, should we take it seriously as a possible alternative to 
nonutilitarianism? It might seem virtually indistinguishable from institutional utilitarianism, for 
one suspects that any two intellectual property proposals are unlikely to have exactly the same 
effects on overall well-being. How often will two policies be such that neither promotes overall 
well-being better than the other?  
In the next section, I argue that by contemplating the design of intellectual property 
institutions, we will see that this sort of occurrence may be more common than one initially 
thinks. This fact is worth appreciating, not simply because it might furnish another reason for 
                                            
44 This form of nonutilitarianism would be compatible with the Pareto principle because (to put the point in 
somewhat technical language) it specifies a “social welfare function” that is not continuous in any good. Cf. Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 
281, 284 (2001) (assuming that the nonutilitarian’s social welfare function exhibits continuity for at least one good—to 
wit, any good the possession of some amount more of which would increase the possessor’s well-being).  
45 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 55 n.76. 
46 Howard Chang stresses this possibility in his critique of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument. See Howard F. Chang, 
A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 225 (2000). In recent 
work, Jeanne Fromer comes close to endorsing this approach to intellectual property law. See Fromer, supra note 29, at 
1748. 
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resisting Kaplow and Shavell’s specific argument for institutional utilitarianism. Rather, it is 
important to establish that real-world decisions might not have determinate effects on overall well-
being one way or the other because doing so undermines what I suspect is one significant source of 
institutional utilitarianism’s appeal. By exclusively focusing on overall levels of individuals’ well-
being, institutional utilitarianism seems to promise a coherent and comprehensive account 
detailing exactly which social policies ought to be selected using a single criterion with some 
intuitive normative importance. Utilitarians often take their theory to furnish more determinate 
guidance than alternatives.47 If this promise of determinacy is indeed part of their theory’s appeal,48 
institutional utilitarians should feel anxious about the prospect of designing intellectual property 
laws. The institutional designer who attempts to get along without any criteria besides well-being 
cannot get as far as utilitarians seem generally to expect, and the difficulty is not merely that we do 
not yet have all the empirical evidence we need. 
 
4.2 UTILITARIANISM’S LIMITED UTILITY 
Institutional utilitarianism has long had to face the challenge of making interpersonal 
trade-offs when policies benefit some individuals but harm others, for the theory needs some way 
                                            
47 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 470 (criticizing nonutilitarians for not “stat[ing] the principles 
they are defending with some degree of precision and in a manner that is reasonably complete”); HENRY SIDGWICK, 
THE METHOD OF ETHICS bk. 4, ch. 3, § 1, at 425 (7th ed. 1907) (claiming that utilitarianism has an advantage over the 
“Morality of Common Sense” because it can deliver more precise guidance). 
48 I agree with Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams that “completeness is often seen as a merit, and it is a 
characteristic that utilitarianism pretends to enjoy.” Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to 
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 17 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). This chapter attempts to 
substantiate their charge that utilitarianism’s completeness “pretension is not altogether well grounded.” Id. 
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of assessing the overall effects of an policy on a multitude of individuals affected in different ways. 
My concern in this section is different. I want to set aside doubts about aggregation and 
interpersonal comparison and simply take for granted that if the utilitarian knew whether each 
individual would be better off under policy A or under policy B, she could then determine which 
policy would make the population better off overall. Even taking that for granted, though, 
utilitarianism faces further difficulty because one cannot simply assume that, for any two 
intellectual property institutional alternatives, one will be better from the standpoint of a 
representative individual’s well-being than the other. To be sure, some imaginable pairs of possible 
intellectual property laws will be such that one alternative is easily judged better, and the other 
worse, from an individual’s standpoint. But the utilitarian should not assume that every pair of 
possible intellectual property laws can be ranked in this way. And if that is so, reflecting on 
intellectual property utilitarianism reveals that utilitarianism’s apparent comprehensiveness—its 
seemingly unending ability to deliver verdicts about what to do solely on the basis of well-being—
is illusory. So even if utilitarians can identify a normatively appealing conception of individual well-
being, and even if they figure out a way to use it to draw interpersonal comparisons, they still 
cannot truthfully claim that any two policies can be ranked in terms of their effect on it. Indeed, 
the challenge for those who think policy should be based exclusively on welfarist criteria is not 
merely that we do not yet have conclusive information about which intellectual property 
institutions promote the most well-being. Rather, it is that conclusive information of this sort 
might be unattainable in principle because whether one option makes a person better off than 
another option may be indeterminate. 
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As we saw in the last section, the effects of intellectual property law on any individual’s 
well-being are complex. But as a general matter an individual is often better off when some 
invention or copyrightable expressive work exists than when it does not, because he (and others) 
can only put things that exist to good use. We saw that inventions or expressive works that exist 
must furthermore be accessible to be of value to anyone, but I will assume that whatever laws we 
might enact would make the goods that result accessible to the same non-negligible degree. Even if 
the goods that result from two alternative intellectual property proposals are equally accessible, I 
argue there is a very realistic possibility that neither proposal will be better than the other on 
account of the value of the particular objects resulting from each. To keep things simple, in 
defending this claim I will focus only on copyright proposals and the expressive works whose 
production they encourage. 
Imagine, then, we have two copyright laws before us that could be enacted to provide 
incentives for creativity. Enacting the first option would result in a particular bundle (A) of 
expressive works—perhaps a novel, a film, and two different musical compositions: 
A = {a, b, c, d} 
Enacting the second option would result in a different bundle (B)—the same novel, the same film, 
and two different sculptures: 
B = {a, b, e, f} 
In most cases, we will be unable to determine which option makes an individual better off without 
determining whether the existence of the A-bundle or the existence of the B-bundle would make 
her better off. Again, if a work does not exist, no one has an opportunity to benefit from it.  
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But can we tell which bundle makes a typical individual better off? That depends on how 
exactly the existence of expressive works affects a person’s well-being, and that in turn depends on 
what exactly well-being amounts to. This issue, of course, has long been a matter of controversy 
between utilitarians and between them and their opponents. As I noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Bentham thought well-being consisted in having pleasurable experiences of varying 
intensity; he also refused to draw any distinction-of-kind between pleasure and benefit, advantage, 
good, happiness, or even the absence of pain.49 This welfare monism led him to suppose that one 
could in theory calculate the utility an individual would derive from a particular action by 
quantifying and adding up the amounts of pleasure he or she would eventually get as a result.50 On 
this view of well-being, it is simply detectable—either by the person feeling it or, as we might 
suppose today, by some sort of skilled neuroscientist. If this is what well-being is like, then perhaps 
utilitarians are right to believe we can calculate and compare any two copyright policies’ effects on 
one individual’s well-being. Suppose we can measure the amounts of pleasure-based utility (u) that 
the individual gets from using or consuming the goods in the A- and B-bundles: 
                                            
49 See BENTHAM, supra note 13, ch. 1, § 3, at 2. 
50 Id. ch. 4, § 5, at 30–31; see also RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 255–57 
(1979). 
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 A-Bundle Utilities B-Bundle Utilities 
 u(a) = 2 u(a) = 2 
 u(b) = 1 u(b) = 1 
 u(c) = 5 u(e) = 2 
 u(d) = 1 u(f) = 2 
With such information, the comparison is easy: since u(A) = 9 and u(B) = 7, the individual will 
derive more utility if the option producing the A-bundle is selected. If well-being can be detected 
and added up in this way, my doubts about measuring a policy’s effects on one individual’s well-
being may be easily overcome.  
But it is awfully hard to believe that this is what well-being is like. Even granting the 
doubtful claim that the quality of our felt experiences is the exclusive measure of what makes our 
lives go well, there is another problem with the Benthamite conception of well-being more 
pertinent to the issue we are considering. When one reflects upon the variety of pleasures to be 
found in this world, it is hard to conclude that a single feeling is common to all of them but 
lacking whenever we feel pain. Now perhaps this fact of phenomenology should convince us to take 
a different, arguably more Aristotelian approach to pleasure—viewing pleasure not as a distinctive 
feeling that we sometimes have, but rather as a sort of positive evaluative response to some of the 
feelings that we have.51 But my aim is not to defend some controversial position on the nature of 
pleasure, a complex question to be sure. Rather, I mean only to suggest that even hedonistic 
                                            
51 See, e.g., Christine M. Korsgaard, The Relational Nature of the Good, in 8 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 1, 
16–19 (Russ Shafer-Landau ed., 2013); cf. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175a23–1176a29, 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1857–59 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson 
trans., 1984) (arguing that the pleasures accompanying different kinds of activity are themselves different in kind). 
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utilitarians should acknowledge the heterogeneity of pleasurable feelings and the doubt it casts on 
the prospects of directly measuring quantities of pleasure.  
For their part, Bentham’s fellow utilitarians were ready to acknowledge about as much. 
They thought the measurement of well-being was not so much a matter of straightforward 
detection as it was a matter for considered reflection. Sidgwick, for example, conceded that having 
a feeling of pleasure is not akin to tasting something sweet. Pleasurable feelings seem a much more 
heterogeneous lot. He therefore proposed thinking of a person’s good in terms of “desirable 
consciousness.”52 John Stuart Mill had noted the heterogeneity of pleasurable feelings even earlier 
when he noted that different types of activities are accompanied by different kinds of pleasurable 
feelings. He made this observation while venturing the controversial claim that certain kinds of 
pleasant feelings contribute more than others to an individual’s well-being—in virtue of their 
quality rather than just their intensity or other quantifiable attributes.53 Both of these utilitarians 
resisted the Benthamite thought that pleasure is a distinctive feeling with quantifiable intensity. 
Although Sidgwick and Mill agreed that figuring out what makes someone better off 
requires a dose of reflection, they favored engaging in such reflection from somewhat different 
perspectives. Mill favored a more objective perspective, such as that of someone who has 
experienced all sorts of pleasures and so has insight into their true value.54 Sidgwick resisted this 
                                            
52 SIDGWICK, supra note 47, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 2, at 127 (7th ed. 1907); id. bk. 3, ch. 14, §§ 3–5, at 395–407.  
53 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 2, at 11–17 (13th ed. 1906). 
54 MILL, supra note 53, at 12–17. David Brink goes so far as to argue that Mill is not really a hedonist at all: his 
concern was with the objective goodness of activities rather than the pleasurableness of mental states. David O. Brink, 
Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67, 72–76 (1992). 
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approach, worrying that the experienced observer might be too much unlike the person whose 
well-being is at issue to reach an accurate judgment of the latter’s propensity to take pleasure in 
different experiences.55 And so he advocated a much more subjective perspective for measuring the 
desirableness of a state of consciousness.56 But regardless of which perspective—subjective or 
objective—one favors for estimating effects on well-being, I think there are many scenarios within 
the copyright context where neither of two available options seems overall more conducive to one’s 
well-being than the other. 
Compare prime examples of their respective art-forms: a brilliant composer’s magnum opus, 
a first-rate sculptor’s masterwork, a visionary film director’s highest achievement, and so forth. 
Whatever particular examples qualify as your own personal favorites, could you rank them precisely 
according to the total amount of pleasurable feelings that use of them brings you? I certainly feel 
unable to do so in my own case. And it does not seem any easier to rank such works’ effects on an 
individual’s well-being using an objective measure of their quality. Perhaps the most discerning and 
trustworthy high-brow art critic would judge neither Mozart’s music nor Michelangelo’s sculpture 
simply better than the other at improving a person’s life.57 Neither are superlative artists the only 
ones whose work seems hard to rank in this way. It can likewise be hard to make precise 
comparisons of two things that give only moderately high amounts of pleasure—like a well-crafted 
                                            
55 SIDGWICK, supra note 47, bk. 2, ch. 3, § 7, at 148; see also id. bk. 1, ch. 7, § 2, at 94–95; id. bk. 2, ch. 1, § 1 at 
121. 
56 Some hedonists would say that Sidgwick did not go far enough in the direction of subjectivity because one can 
find something desirable without desiring it. Roger Crisp therefore proposes evaluating experiences in terms of how 
enjoyable they are. ROGER CRISP, REASONS AND THE GOOD 103–11 (2006). 
57 Cf. Ruth Chang, The Possibility of Parity, 112 ETHICS 659, 659 (2002). 
 132 
piece of long-form journalism and a National League baseball broadcast—as well as two things that 
each give only modest amounts of pleasure—like a humdrum magazine story and an American 
League baseball broadcast. The same could be said of unpleasant copyrightable works.  
Difficulties like these have often been discussed under the rubric of incommensurability. At 
times, philosophers have distinguished incommensurability, incomparability, rough equality, and 
parity,58 but such distinctions are of little importance here. The essential point is that the 
heterogeneity of the pleasurable feelings that alternative sets of copyrightable works would produce 
(or the heterogeneity of some other valuable feature that might be a basis for comparison) not 
infrequently makes it hard to believe one bundle better overall than an alternative. But such 
alternatives are not really equally good, either, because very slight improvements to one of them 
might still fail to establish its superiority.59 In this way, incommensurable alternatives are unlike 
two five-dollar bills.  
But if two alternatives are of incommensurable value—or, symbolically, if u(x1) ≈ u(x2)—
then it is extremely difficult to compare aggregates of those alternatives and their kin because the 
incommensurability relation does not follow the same rules as equality, being less, and being 
greater. Recall bundles A = {a, b, c, d} and B = {a, b, e, f}. Let us suppose that an individual derives 
incommensurable utilities from the use of c and e, and incommensurable utilities from the use of d 
and f. In other words, let us suppose u(c) ≈ u(e) and u(d) ≈ u(f). From these facts, as well as the fact 
                                            
58 See, e.g., Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 
2, 4–5 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).  
59 For an early appearance of this now-familiar argument, see Ronald B. de Sousa, The Good and the True, 83 
MIND 534, 544–45 (1974). 
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that a and b are found in each bundle, we might conclude u(A) ≈ u(B).60 Consider now a third 
possible bundle, C = {a, b, g, h}, such that u(e) ≈ u(g) and u(f) ≈ u(h). Suppose that this means that 
u(B) ≈ u(C). Because the incommensurability relation is intransitive, it does not follow, from u(A) ≈ 
u(B) and u(B) ≈ u(C), that u(A) ≈ u(C). It could be true, for example, that u(A) > u(C). To see this 
possibility, imagine that c and d are terrific compositions by Johann Sebastian Bach, that e and f are 
terrific sculptures, and that g and h are terrific compositions by Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, which 
though terrific are slightly less so than his father’s. The first bundle might outrank the third, then, 
even though both are incommensurable with the second. In this way incommensurability raises 
serious questions about the possibility of adding up amounts of utility derived from consuming 
individual goods in order to compare alternative bundles of such goods. At a minimum, if 
individual copyrightable goods regularly contribute incommensurable amounts to an individual’s 
well-being, we should allow for the possibility that bundles of copyrighted goods routinely 
contribute incommensurable amounts to an individual’s well-being. We cannot simply assume that, 
between practically any two proposed copyright policies, any individual would be made better off 
under one or the other or equally well off under either. The alternatives could easily be 
incommensurable or on a par instead. 
Many utilitarians, however, deny that incommensurability poses a genuine threat. Perhaps, 
they concede, utility cannot be quantified through either direct detection or thoughtful reflection, 
                                            
60 This conclusion is too quick, though, if we do not assume the utility from each of these goods is independent of 
which other goods are included in the bundle. It would be better to allow for the possibility that one good’s presence 
might alter the utility derived from other goods—as when, for example, one’s enjoyment of a novel is increased (or 
diminished) by a film adaptation. But this source of complexity, which I set aside, simply reinforces my doubts about 
the possibility of adding up amounts of utility provided by individual copyrightable works. 
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but it is enough for utilitarianism’s purposes that individuals can still make a selection between any 
two options—even seemingly incommensurable ones. For such ability to choose indicates the 
chosen option appeared at least as good as the other, from the chooser’s own subjective perspective. 
And then there will exist an ordinal ranking of all possible options in terms of what the individual 
would choose, and such a ranking would indicate, for any two possibilities, that the individual 
preferred one to the other or was indifferent between them. Moreover, under certain assumptions, 
we can even derive the strength of the individual’s preferences using an ordinal ranking of this 
sort.61 Institutional utilitarianism’s completeness, even in the face of supposed incommensurability, 
may depend on nothing more than the assurance that choice is always possible.62 
This response fits well with a certain non-hedonist view of well-being, according to which 
an individual’s well-being basically consists in getting what she desires rather than what feels good. 
Some are attracted to this conception of well-being over hedonism for free-standing reasons. 
Compared to hedonism, the preference-satisfaction conception of well-being easily allows us to 
account for the value outside of felt experience and so allows us to deny, for instance, that 
extremely pleasant delusions necessarily increase well-being.63 Of course, the preference-satisfaction 
conception is itself controversial, but let us set aside the (admittedly critical) question of whether 
                                            
61 John Harsanyi proposed one very well known derivation that built off earlier work by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern. John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 
63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). 
62 For a clear statement of this line of thinking, see Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and 
the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1423–26 (1998). 
63 See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 9–10 (1986) (discussing Robert Nozick’s experience machine and a few 
more realistic examples). 
 135 
preference satisfaction provides a plausible criterion for well-being. After all, even if well-being as 
such does not consist in getting what one wants, it could still be the case that getting what one 
wants is a serviceable proxy for well-being. Or it could be that specific social institutions ought to 
be designed to provide people with they want.64 In a democracy, for instance, it seems that voting 
procedures should be designed to ensure citizens get the result most of them want. Arguably, 
copyright should also be designed to encourage production of works that cater to citizens’ 
preferences. Whether or not that is right, though, I will assume it is for argument’s sake. Even so, 
an institutional utilitarianism built around preference satisfaction cannot avoid incommensurability 
worries. However plausible the preference-satisfaction conception of well-being may be, the 
institutional utilitarian is not entitled to the assumption that most any two copyright options can 
be differentiated according to which contributes more to an individual’s well-being.  
In a way, the promise of complete ordinal rankings seems to handle incommensurability by 
stipulating it away. Insofar as it is the incommensurability relation’s intransitivity that generates 
worries, preference-satisfaction accounts of well-being apparently avoid trouble by excluding the 
possibility of intransitive preferences: the “at least as preferable as” relation—customarily 
symbolized as x1 ≿ x2—is assumed to be transitive because the individual is assumed to be rational. 
There are good reasons for this assumption. An individual who chose on the basis of an intransitive 
incommensurability relation might end up worse off by his own lights. Suppose, to return to our 
earlier example, that he traded his J.S. Bach recording for a roughly equally good sculptural replica, 
and then proceeded to trade his sculptural replica for a roughly equally good C.P.E. Bach 
                                            
64 See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 116–18 (1998).  
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recording. Because (we are assuming) the recording of the son’s composition stands somewhat 
inferior to the recording of the father’s, this individual would end up worse off than he started. 
The transitivity assumption seems, at least at first glance, a nice idealization. 
But the preference-satisfaction idealizations do not stop there. No one thinks that merely 
selecting one thing rather than another indicates anything about the selector’s well-being. The 
game-show contestant who thinks it wise to choose “what’s behind door number two” does not 
even slightly suggest that the prize behind door number one delivers less utility. On the other 
hand, if she knew something about the characteristics of the supposedly secret prizes, we might 
assume otherwise. For reasons like these the preference-satisfaction conception of well-being is 
built around informed preferences. This idealization is itself quite plausible and perhaps even 
indispensible for the preference-satisfaction conception’s appeal.  
Nevertheless, the assumption of adequate information raises a perplexing issue for us. In 
the intellectual property context, it is often useful information—such as knowing how to keep 
tomato plants alive in northern New England—whose contribution to well-being we seek to 
measure. And that raises a puzzle for the view that well-being should be measured by the choices 
an informed individual would make: How can such a person determine how much she desires 
information without possessing it already? Surely some conceivable ways of keeping tomato plants 
alive in a cool, overcast climate will hold greater appeal than others. And until the individual knows 
the details, her preferences will not be fully informed. But then the individual cannot make an 
informed choice to get that information instead of some alternative good without already 
possessing the information. On the informed preference-satisfaction conception of well-being, 
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where the desirable thing is information, there simply is no fact about how much it contributes to 
an individual’s well-being in advance of that individual’s possession of the good.65  
This problem does not seem as acute with tangible goods. Someone can more easily 
determine how much she would like to own a certain automobile in advance of having done so. 
Are copyrightable works more like information or automobiles? Much seems to depend on how 
specifically the copyrightable works are described to the person needing to make a selection. 
Imagine, for example, a choice between a musical composition and a book. Certainly this 
description of the alternative provides inadequate information for anyone who generally likes both 
music and reading. If it is further revealed that the composition is Beethoven’s heretofore 
undiscovered Tenth Symphony, and the book is an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation written by 
someone obscure, that might be information enough for many people. Then again, it might not 
be. The individual who has actually experienced both works might decide the symphony was 
uncharacteristically bad and lost to history for good reason, while the dissertation exceeded initial 
expectations and proved brilliant. Having only a little bit of information about the options can lead 
an individual to make poor choices, even from her own subjective perspective, and this challenge 
seems to arise fairly often for artistic goods. How could one rank two different haikus without 
reading them? But if copyrightable works must be consumed, and so must exist, before an 
individual forms informed preferences yielding a complete ordering of the works produced under 
                                            
65 This observation is closely related to what Kenneth Arrow’s “fundamental paradox in the determination of 
demand for information”: information’s “value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then 
he has in effect acquired it without cost.” KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention (1962), reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 152 (1971). 
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alternative copyright policies, then ex ante there is no ideal copyright policy bringing the optimal 
set of works into existence. Even for one individual, there can be no complete ordinal ranking of 
works that might be created, but have not been yet.  
It might be supposed that even under uncertainty, individuals could manage well enough 
ranking options according to expected utility—an ex ante estimate of how much utility they will 
likely produce. Unfortunately even determinations of expected utility require subjective probability 
estimates, though, and it is not clear individuals would always possess subjective probability 
estimates that would help establish expected utilities from not-yet-existing intellectual goods. 
Predicting the quality of an aesthetic experience is extremely hard if one has not yet had it. Good 
art, for example, can affect the way one thinks or feels in unexpected ways. And in general the 
more innovative the potential intellectual good, the more likely the uncertainty is unquantifiable ex 
ante.66 In short, informed preferences do not promise fully determinate guidance for intellectual 
property policymakers, simply because the policymakers’ actions are conceptually prior to the 
typical individual’s informed preferences. 
Perhaps a response to this difficulty lies in further idealization. It is widely acknowledged 
that informed preferences are not exactly the right indicators of individual well-being because the 
individual as he actually is might not have the same preferences as his fully informed self. There 
may be some hard truths, for instance, that the individual would prefer not to learn in the first 
place. And so the real-world individual might not be best off if he gets exactly the things his 
                                            
66 See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921) (distinguishing between 
measurable “risk” and unmeasurable “uncertainty”).  
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idealized counterpart wants.67 What the preference-satisfaction conception of well-being really 
needs, then, is the ordering that the fully informed version of the individual forms on behalf of the 
real-world version, taking into account only the real-world version’s attitudes and characteristics. 
Perhaps a similar refinement might restore the possibility of preference-based ex ante standards for 
intellectual property policymaking. Perhaps the idealized version of the individual—who not only 
understands his real-world counterpart perfectly but also has experience with the entire universe of 
possible intellectual goods—could devise a complete ordering that reflected the real-world version’s 
preferences. To be sure, this idealized ranking might not ever be known by real-world policymakers 
who need its guidance, and epistemically inaccessible complete rankings might not hold much 
appeal for someone who thought institutional utilitarianism attractive partly because of its apparent 
guarantee of determinate guidance. Whatever the epistemic barriers, though, the institutional 
utilitarian might still insist that this sort of idealized ranking in principle permits the comparison of 
any two intellectual property policies in terms of their effects on an individual’s well-being.  
I do not believe, however, that even this otherworldly version of the preference-satisfaction 
conception of well-being succeeds. The difficulty is that preferences are shaped to a considerable 
degree by the policies that precede them. Consider an example from U.S. copyright law, which as 
we have seen prohibits the unauthorized creation of new works that transform or are otherwise 
derived from preexisting copyrighted works.68 Copyright’s “derivative works” right prohibits, 
among many other things, unlicensed cinematic adaptations of copyrighted novels, as well as 
                                            
67 See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 63, at 11. 
68 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2006). 
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unlicensed film sequels. It seems quite possible and perhaps even likely that this law affects 
individuals’ tastes for the hugely successful movie franchises built around Harry Potter, James 
Bond, Marvel and D.C. comic superheroes, and J.R.R. Tolkien’s Middle Earth. Perhaps films from 
franchises like these would be less popular if just anyone could create his or her own adaptations of 
the relevant characters and stories. Or, to the contrary, perhaps a relaxation in copyright law would 
result in an outpouring of new creativity in this area and the relevant characters and stories would 
become more popular. I do not know exactly how preferences would be affected by a change in 
copyright law’s derivative works right, but I suspect some change would occur. If so, then how the 
law handles the issue of derivative works at time t1 affects individuals’ preferences later at t2. 
Suppose that at t2, an individual’s ranking of two copyright bundles is A ≿ B if the law has created 
a derivative works right at t1, but B ≿ A otherwise. In such circumstances, how can the 
institutional designer possibly base a decision on the derivative works right on the individual’s 
preferences for the movies and other works in bundles A and B? Those preferences depend on the 
institutional designer’s decision, and so cannot even in principle provide a basis for that decision.69  
If the preference-satisfaction conception of well-being has a way of handling this problem, I 
do not know what it is.70 The possibility of an omniscient observer with unlimited epistemic access 
                                            
69 Cass Sunstein has previously made this point in the context of environmental regulation, but I think the point 
is even more forceful in the intellectual property context. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental 
Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 234–35 (1993). I also think it applies to hedonist theories—including Roger Crisp’s, 
which would have individuals rank experiences in terms of how enjoyable they are—since the quality of one’s 
experiences may be affected by public policy. See CRISP, supra note 56, at 110. 
70 Some economists do acknowledge that preferences should sometimes be treated as endogenous variables. See, 
e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 20–22 (1996); KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 413–18. But I 
have found no explanation of how it is even theoretically possible to base a policy decision on preferences when the 
relevant preferences are shaped by the policy decision. 
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to the individual’s personal characteristics and the entire universe of possible intellectual goods is 
no help to us here. For now the idealized version must make a comparison between two potential 
versions of his real-world self, who have different preferences. This comparison seems more 
interpersonal than intrapersonal,71 unless the individual happens to have higher-order preferences 
at t1 that favor having, at t2, one set of first-order preferences rather than the other. Higher-order 
preferences, however, seem to fall within the province of reflective deliberation, and worries about 
incommensurability might resurface when the individual considers being the type of person who 
will later tend to prefer franchise films or, rather, the type of person who will later prefer self-
contained ones. But we can even set that issue aside because there is simply no guarantee that at t1 
the individual has developed a forward-looking, higher-order preference: perhaps she is a toddler at 
t1, when we are designing our copyright laws. I suppose the defender of the preference-based 
theory of well-being might insist that an idealized version of this toddler would be able to 
determine whether the real-life toddler would prefer to have pro- or anti-franchise preferences 
later in life. But such insistence may not be justified. Nor is it obvious what it would mean then to 
claim we were still talking about an actual person’s preferences.  
For these reasons, institutional utilitarians are not entitled to the assumption that any two 
intellectual property policies can be ordered according to the goodness of their effects on a single 
individual’s well-being. There could easily be significant indeterminacy in our rankings of the 
effects of intellectual goods’ existence on an individual’s well-being, regardless of whether our 
                                            
71 For doubts about the possibility of interpersonal well-being comparisons using only the criterion of preference 
satisfaction, see John Broome, Can There Be a Preference-Based Utilitarianism?, in JUSTICE, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 
AND UTILITARIANISM: THEMES FROM HARSANYI AND RAWLS 221, 232–37 (Marc Fleurbaey et al. eds., 2008). 
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conception of well-being is based on informed preference–satisfaction, hedonism, or some more 
objective standard. Now throughout this section, I have been considering the simple case of just 
one individual’s well-being, and of course institutional utilitarianism is concerned with levels of 
well-being throughout a much larger population of many individuals. But this simplification does 
not, so far as I can see, change the conclusion, unless the utilitarian can establish that aggregating 
individual utility functions into a social welfare function would erase the indeterminacy found 
within the former. If my doubts are well-founded, it is entirely possible that one proposed 
intellectual property policy is neither better nor worse than another proposal in virtue of their 
respective effects on overall well-being. Whatever else one might say about it, institutional 
utilitarianism should not be thought appealing because it promises some definite right answer to 
any policy question. That promise is empty. 
 
4.3 JUSTIFYING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
One may remain reluctant to give up on the idea that practically any two options can be 
ranked, one over the other, on the ground that such a ranking seems crucial for justified choice. 
Thus Donald Regan argues that, regardless of how things appear to us, there could not be full-
fledged incommensurability or rough equality between possible courses of action: 
Choice is based on reasons. Choice between two specific goods must be based on 
reason to prefer one of the goods to the other. Where there is no adequate reason 
for preference, there can be no real choice. A decision to go one way rather than the 
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other will be something that happened to the agent rather than something she 
did.72 
On this suggestion, unless the agent has reason to choose option 1 rather than option 2, she cannot 
fully identify with her choice of option 1 as a rational being. Although Regan’s concern is 
intelligibility rather than justifiability, one might suppose that an action’s unintelligibility to the 
person who engaged in it would raise doubts about its justifiability. I will contest both claims in 
this section, first by defending action’s intelligibility in the absence of decisive reasons for the 
chosen alternative and then by sketching a picture of justification within the context of intellectual 
property institutions.  
Consider a mundane example of an ordinarily intelligible action: cutting a round cake. A 
person could perform this action in a great many ways. This is true even if we set aside alternative 
times, venues, and tools for the cake-cutting, and focus on procedure alone. The cake-cutter could 
choose between a theoretically infinite number of radii for making the first cut, or could make 
diametric cuts as one might do when cutting a pizza, or could make vertical and horizontal cuts in a 
grid-like pattern. Assuming the cake-cutter follows standard practice and makes a radial cut, he 
could then proceed in a clockwise or counter-clockwise fashion, by turning his knife or the plate, 
creating large or small slices or some of each, leaving the cut pieces in place or removing them as 
he goes, and so on. The possibilities are endless, but somehow he muddles through. What should 
we make of this? 
                                            
72 Donald Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND 
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 58, at 129, 144. 
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One thing we ought not to conclude is that the cake-cutter must feel alienated from what 
he has just done unless he had reason to prefer his chosen procedure to every one of the countless 
alternatives. In the typical case, all that he needs to understand are reasons that support his choice 
to cut the cake—such as would be provided if the cake had to be eaten by several people. He does 
not need to understand reasons for cutting the cake exactly one way rather than another, although 
he may understand reasons against cutting the cake in some particular ways. If this interpretation 
of the example is correct, it suggests that action-explanations need not be contrastive in a 
fundamental way. To make an action intelligible to oneself, it is very often enough to answer the 
question “Why φ?” without necessarily being able to answer such questions as “Why φ-rather-
than-χ?” and “Why φ-rather-than-ψ?” and so on. Thus the self-aware Buridanian ass should not be 
in any way mystified if instead of perishing from starvation he opts for one of the equally attractive 
hay options. The ass can perfectly well explain why he moved toward and consumed the pile of hay 
and nothing more needs explaining.73 The ass need no more be able to explain why he selected 
that pile of hay rather than the other (given that they appear equally choice-worthy to him) than 
the cake-cutter must be able to explain why he made his cuts counter-clockwise rather than 
clockwise. These examples might seem fairly insignificant in the grand scheme of things, but the 
basic point remains even if we move on to more weighty decisions between incommensurable 
                                            
73 Joseph Raz argues, I think correctly, that “the most typical exercise or manifestation of the will is in choosing 
among options that reason merely renders eligible.” Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 58, at 110, 111. But he seems to 
think something else is needed to explain why the agent chooses one option and not another: reason, he says, merely 
“sets a range of eligible options before agents, who choose among them as they feel inclined, who do what they want to do or 
what they feel like doing.” Id. at 127 (emphasis added). I would resist the suggestion that something non-rational is 
needed to make the agent’s choice intelligible. (And I am also unsure about Raz’s claim that “the will plays a role in 
human agency separate from that of reason.” Id.). 
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options—such as a choice between multiple attractive careers. And so it is entirely possible to agree 
with Regan that, for creatures like us, intelligible choice is essentially connected to reasons, and yet 
disagree with him that it is essentially connected to comparative reasons. The second claim requires 
a further step—such as positing choice-between as the basic species of choice—and it is not clear we 
should take it.  
In my view, matters are much the same with justifiability. If there are reasons for 
performing an action, we should not presume it is something less than justified until we can show 
that it is more justified than alternatives. Yet many accounts of what makes an action justified—
including the maximization approach favored by some consequentialists—seem to conceive of 
deliberation as a competitive tournament, the ultimate aim of which is to crown a single winner.74 
To be sure, plenty of actions are supported by reasons and nevertheless unjustified. It may be 
impermissible to pursue an admittedly worthy goal in a way that requires depriving some person of 
something he urgently needs and could easily be provided, or that treats him as a mere means, or 
that gratuitously inflicts large amounts of pain on him. In some cases, it is even the nature of the 
available alternatives that disqualifies one option from serious consideration: one should not pick 
an option that is inferior to another option in every significant respect; perhaps one should not 
pick an option that, though good, will lead to much worse consequences than another good 
                                            
74 Satisficing consequentialism, by contrast, permits any choice among options that have “good enough” 
consequences, which allows for the possibility of many justified choices. One of the main problems of satisficing 
consequentialism, however, is that it permits choosing an inferior (but still good enough) option when a superior (also 
good enough) option could easily be chosen instead. I would suggest preserving satisficing consequentialism’s rejection 
of the winner-take-all model of deliberation while accepting widespread incommensurability and abandoning 
consequentialism.  
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option. And when one acts akratically—for example, by choosing to perform an action that one 
believes one has conclusive reason not to perform—the decision may be not only unjustifiable but 
also less than fully intelligible. Yet none of these observations undermines my claim here. They 
merely suggest that practical deliberation characteristically narrows down the range of choice-
worthy alternatives in a variety of ways. But that the deliberating agent can and should eliminate 
many options from consideration does not entail that ideally she would eliminate all the options 
except one, as the winner-take-all model of deliberation would seem to imply.  
We should approach the task of justifying social institutions, including intellectual property 
law, with the same mindset. When some ask whether our intellectual property law is justified, they 
seem to be asking whether it is as good as it could be. The result is likely to be unsatisfying if for 
no other reason than we do not possess the ability to identify the characteristics of the optimal 
intellectual property law. But if we understand the issue of justification differently, in the way I 
have been proposing, we need not be troubled by either this uncertainty or by the possibility I 
stressed in the last section—that there may not be such a thing as the optimal intellectual property 
law. To justify the basic features of copyright and patent laws, for example, it would be at least 
presumptively enough to establish that providing the relevant incentives to produce the relevant 
sorts of intellectual goods furthers the interests of many.75 Of course, it might be possible to 
establish that failing to offer some sort of special incentive for developing intellectual goods would 
have intolerable consequences. In that case, the absence of intellectual property law or some 
                                            
75 If the laws treated anyone objectionably, however, a presumptive justification would not be enough. 
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functional substitute would be unjustified. But I do not believe justifying intellectual property law 
requires showing that failing to provide special incentives is objectionable.  
Even if the basics of copyright and patent law are justified on grounds that the utilitarian 
would find palatable, though, that does not mean that every detail must be justified on such 
grounds. Take, for an example, one particular doctrine of copyright law, known as “fair use,” which 
is a defense against an accusation of infringement available in certain circumstances to someone 
who has copied a portion of a copyrighted work without authorization.76 Unauthorized copying of 
copyrighted material is most likely to be privileged as fair use when it puts the material to a new 
purpose, such as by parodying it, providing commentary, or critiquing it.77 If, as I assume, there are 
very good reasons to allow a parodist or commentator or critic to be able to use another’s work for 
free and without having to obtain permission, and no compelling reasons for a contrary rule, this 
doctrine is easily justified. Indeed, having something like a fair use doctrine seems obligatory, given 
the rest of copyright law, because a rule requiring critics or parodists to obtain permission before 
reproducing parts of works they are criticizing or parodying would be insufficiently attentive to 
their and the rest of society’s interests in free expression. But my main point here is that whether 
or not fair use doctrine is a necessary part of any justifiable copyright law, we need not settle the 
issue as an institutional utilitarian would. We need not, for instance, seek to determine whether 
the social value of the negative commentary the doctrine induces and avoidance of various 
transaction costs will increase overall well-being enough to offset the decrease in well-being that 
                                            
76 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
77 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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would arise if individuals were dissuaded from producing new copyrightable works for fear of 
unbridled negative commentary. 
One last illustration of the approach I am recommending can be found in a recent dispute 
over the patentability of human DNA.78 It has long been the rule that someone who discovers a 
law or product of nature, or a mathematical truth, cannot obtain a patent over that discovery as 
such, but can only claim patent protection for new, useful, and nonobvious applications of it.79 The 
utilitarian analysis of this subject matter restriction would measure the social benefits of 
incentivizing the research by means of intellectual property rights against the social costs of 
limiting access to basic mathematical and scientific truths. While there are clearly good reasons to 
incentivize genetic research, it is at least arguable that there are decisive reasons against a proposal 
that granted someone exclusive rights to various uses of genetic information contained within 
another person’s own body. One may think that individuals have a compelling enough interest in 
being free to examine and to authorize others (such as doctors) to examine the properties of their 
own bodies that no broad prohibition on that sort of examination could ever be justified—for such 
reasons, some might even suppose we have rights over our genetic materials that a gene patent 
would violate. Or, more modestly, one might simply think that these interests, when combined 
with alternative adequate means of incentivizing genetic research—such as direct grants—are 
together enough to eliminate gene patents from consideration. As with the preceding example, I 
                                            
78 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
79 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012). 
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mention this aspect of intellectual property law not to stake a firm position but to illustrate how a 
nonutilitarian approach to intellectual property’s justifications might proceed.  
 
4.4 FUNCTIONALIST JUSTIFICATION AND PRIVATE LEGAL RIGHTS 
In this chapter I have been arguing for a functionalist justification of intellectual property 
law, particularly copyright and patent, based on society’s interest in the availability of copyrightable 
expressive works and patentable inventions. But if the central features of intellectual property law 
are justified because of this sort of diffuse, society-wide interest rather than the interests of the 
intellectual property owners, it is not clear how the law could generate rights that are held by 
intellectual property owners against those who are obligated. 
Like “interests,” the word “rights” has several familiar uses, and this fact makes it somewhat 
tricky to use the word well in philosophical discussions. For my purposes, it is helpful to 
distinguish between thick and thin conceptions of rights. As Joel Feinberg stressed, rights can 
justify a special sort of insistence: people seeking favorable treatment have “sturdy objects to ‘stand 
upon’” if they can insist they have a right to be treated in the sought-after way.80 For other authors, 
such as Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick, rights speak in favor of the relevant acts (or 
omissions) with a distinctive forcefulness and cannot be overridden on certain grounds.81 And then 
there is perhaps a special category of rights that have fundamental importance in life as we know it 
                                            
80 Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252 (1970). 
81 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi–xv (1978) (endorsing a conception of rights as 
trumps, based on equal concern and respect); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974) 
(endorsing a side-constraints conception of rights, based on the inviolability of persons). 
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and are held universally throughout our species. The notion of “human rights” is, alongside 
Dworkin’s notion of rights as “trumps,” Nozick’s notion of rights as “side constraints,” and 
Feinberg’s notion of rights as “moral furniture,” an example of what I am calling a thick conception 
of rights. All these notions make rights out to have considerable practical implications in virtue of 
their substantive content.  
According to a thin conception of rights, by contrast, a right need not have such 
implications. The paradigm here is Wesley Hohfeld’s conception of rights “in the strictest sense,” 
which are often called claim-rights.82 These rights have only two modest implications: (1) one or 
more persons is under a duty to engage in or abstain from certain conduct; and (2) engaging in or 
abstaining from the specified conduct is owed by the duty-holder(s) to the right-holder(s). 
Hohfeld famously defined claim-rights in terms of correlative duties toward the right-holder:  
Rights Defined in Terms of Duties: R has a right against D that D φ if and only if D 
has a duty toward R to φ.83 
This definition does not imply anything about the strength or importance of the duty-holder’s 
obligation to the right-holder or about what the obligation allows the right-holder to do. For all 
the definition says, the duty might be overridden by countervailing considerations or, even if not 
overridden, still rather unimportant in the grand scheme of things. Indeed, the duty could 
potentially have so little importance that the right-holder would be acting oddly, perhaps even 
inappropriately, if she were to insist that the duty-holder fulfill it. For this reason, it might strike 
                                            
82 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36 
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
83 See id. at 38. 
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us as strange to describe all claim-rights as rights simpliciter, especially in view of the frequency 
with which thick conceptions of rights make appearances in everyday speech. Nonetheless my 
concern here is with this thin conception of rights, and whenever I speak of rights in what follows, 
I am referring to Hohfeld’s term of art and nothing more. What I am interested in exploring is not 
how intellectual property laws generate rights with serious heft, but rather how they generate 
rights at all.  
 Another way of raising the issue is to ask whether copyright and patent law deserve to be 
classified as part of private law if they are principally justified by the functionalist considerations I 
defended earlier in this chapter. The distinction between private and public law dates back a long 
time—at least to ancient Rome.84 It is perhaps hinted at even earlier, in Aristotle’s contrast 
between corrective justice and distributive justice.85 Private law, according to what I will call the 
classical understanding, is centrally concerned with the duties that private actors have toward one 
another—and correlatively, the rights private actors have against one another—whereas the focus 
of public law is on the duties and rights of the state or community as a whole.86 On this traditional 
view, the fields of contract, tort, property, and unjust enrichment are core examples of private law 
subjects, while constitutional, administrative, tax, and criminal law make up the bulk of public law. 
If we want to move beyond a list of standard examples, though, it is crucial to explore the concept 
                                            
84 See, e.g., BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 2 (1962). Of course, the duties in each area of 
the law are also supplemented by related Hohfeldian powers and immunities. 
85 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5, chs. 3–4, 1131a10–1132b20, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1785–87 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson trans., 1984). 
86 See, e.g., 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 785–86 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); THOMAS 
ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 127–28 (12th ed. 1916). 
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of directed duties further. In order to understand what makes private law what it is, we need to 
understand what makes a duty such that one private actor has it toward another private actor rather 
than toward the state or the community as a whole or nobody in particular. 
In relatively recent times, the connection between private law and a specific sort of directed 
duty/correlative right was drawn in the famous tort case, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.87 The 
dispute began when an employee of the defendant railroad company attempted to help a hurrying 
man onto a moving train and in the process knocked a package out of the man’s hands. The 
package fell between the train and platform, and its combustible contents eventually exploded with 
enough force to topple a penny scale onto Helen Palsgraf, the plaintiff.88 The employee’s actions, 
according to the court, amounted at most to negligent treatment of the man, not Ms. Palsgraf 
herself, even though those actions caused her injuries. Writing for a narrow majority on New York 
state’s highest court, Judge Cardozo explained that a plaintiff suing for negligence “must show . . . 
‘a wrong’ to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor 
conduct ‘wrongful’ because unsocial, but not ‘a wrong’ to any one.”89 Thus, the negligence tort 
requires that the plaintiff show not merely that the defendant did wrong; she must show that the 
defendant wronged her. Or, in duty terminology,90 the negligence plaintiff must prove not simply a 
                                            
87 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 100. 
90 In my view, which I think is consistent with Palsgraf, relational wrongs are simply infringements of a right. 
Using Hohfeld’s correlativity thesis, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, relational wrongs can also be defined in 
terms of breaches of directed duties:  
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breach of some legal duty by the defendant, but rather a breach of a directed duty to the plaintiff 
herself.91 Whether or not the railroad company had breached its duties, Palsgraf could not prevail 
because it had not breached any duty that it had toward her. This case is sometimes read in support 
of the doctrine that tort plaintiffs only have standing to sue a defendant who has breached a duty 
toward them specifically.92 But more generally, the case shows how tort law’s focus is on duties 
that are directed to particular right-holders.  
 In this respect, tort law is like other areas of private law but quite unlike criminal law, as 
the Palsgraf court itself hinted.93 To be sure, many crimes are committed through acts that breach 
the agent’s duties to a particular person. Criminal violence, for example, often wrongs discrete 
victims. But even where there is this overlap—as with the laws of civil and criminal trespass, 
conversion and theft, and false imprisonment—torts and crimes come apart, with the result that 
the crime can be prosecuted by the state even though no tort action is ever brought by the 
wronged private party, and vice versa. And it is no essential feature of crimes that they violated 
duties directed to particular people. So-called victimless crimes are denominated as such because 
they are thought not to wrong any particular person. Standard examples from this controversial 
                                                                                                                                             
Relational Wrongs Defined in Terms of Rights: D would wrong R by φ-ing if and only if R has a right 
against D that D not φ. 
Relational Wrongs Defined in Terms of Duties: D would wrong R by φ-ing if and only if D is under a 
duty to R not to φ. 
91 See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (saying that the victim “sues for breach of a duty owing to himself”). 
92 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1768–69 
(2012). 
93 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. 
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category are laws against certain types of gambling, drug use, or sexual activity. Less peripheral are 
crimes that apparently wrong the state as such or the community as a whole—for instance, laws 
against treason, tax fraud or evasion, and littering on public property. There may in fact be some 
dispute about whether the duties of criminal law are directed duties at all. Instead of specifying 
conduct that the duty-holder owes to the state or community, some have suggested criminal law 
duties are “merely monadic”—mandating behavior that is not really owed to anyone.94 Whatever 
the merits of this suggestion, it is clear that in directing the conduct of private individuals, criminal 
law and private law diverge in their degree of concern with directed duties to particular private 
persons: such duties are private law’s central concern, but not criminal law’s.  
 This understanding of private law, which is really just the classical understanding, has 
become the dominant view among legal philosophers.95 But it is hardly the only possibility. One 
could, like certain devotees of law and economics, understand private law simply as the domain 
within which private individuals bring civil claims.96 This alternative understanding, however, 
would say that the private individual who brings a civil lawsuit to press a matter of public concern 
is operating squarely within the bounds of private law. In the United States, to take an example, an 
                                            
94 Michael Thompson, What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES 
FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 333, 344 (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., 2004); see also Stephen Darwall, 
Bipolar Obligation, in 7 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 333, 347 (Russ Shafer-Landau ed., 2012) (“The criminal law 
is to the moral law as the law of torts is to the di[k]a[io]logical order of bipolar moral obligations.”).  
95 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 123 (rev. ed. 2012); Jules L. Coleman, Doing away 
with Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1149, 1157 (2008); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and 
Responsibility in the Law of Torts, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 261 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 
2012); Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1964 n.21 (2007). 
96 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 5 (2004) (claiming that specific 
“areas of the law are said to be private because they are enforced by the bringing of suits by private parties”). 
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ordinary citizen may bring a civil suit to enforce certain federal environmental standards.97 Yet 
someone who brings a “citizen suit” is not seeking redress for substandard conduct toward herself in 
particular. She is, rather, deputized to act in the public interest as a “private attorney general.”98 
The same is true even if she is offered financial incentives to bring her suit. For instance, federal 
law authorizes private persons to bring qui tam99 civil actions against those who commit fraud in 
their financial dealings with the federal government, promising such persons a share of the spoils if 
the suits they initiate succeed.100 If these citizen suits do not seem to belong within the category of 
private law, then private law should not be defined simply as law enforced by private parties.  
Some legal theorists, however, have no problem doing violence to ordinary conceptions of 
private law because they find the concept itself pernicious. Many self-styled “realists” claim private 
law is simply “public law in disguise” and say no one should think otherwise.101 To a large degree, 
they are worried that approaching private law without public interests in constant view will 
encourage excessive individualism—possibly including absolutist commitments to private property 
                                            
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) (permitting citizen-suit enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s emission 
standards). 
98 Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (1943) (Frank, J.) (coining the phrase). 
99 This phrase is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur.” E.g., Vt. Agency of Nat’l 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). The Latin may be translated, “who pursues this 
action for our Lord King as much as for himself.” 
100 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (permitting enforcement of the False Claims Act through qui tam actions). 
101 Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (pts. 1 & 2), 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 257 (1959–1960); see also G. 
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 150 (expanded ed. 2003) (describing the “antidoctrinal connotations” of the 
claim that tort law is public law). 
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rights and contractual freedom.102 In Leon Green’s formulation, the law ought to reflect the fact 
that “‘We the People’ are a party to every lawsuit and it is our interest that weighs most heavily in 
its determination.”103 It is deeply undesirable, the legal realist line of argument goes, to have an 
area of law that professes to focus on private rights instead of broader social concerns.104 Any 
theoretical account of private law that takes its alleged privateness seriously is likely to produce 
substantively bad law. Now I think this shot at private law is a misfire: tying private law to duties 
owed toward particular private persons does not obviously limit its substance, and does not limit it 
to some form of libertarian individualism.105 Still, there are good reasons not to ignore the realist’s 
worries entirely, because private law theorists who adopt the classical understanding of their subject 
have not satisfactorily explained the relationship between that understanding and private law’s 
substantive content.  
A couple prominent private law spokesmen, moreover, have implied that the correlativity of 
private law’s directed duties and rights actually does rule out basing private law’s doctrines on 
certain normative considerations. Ernest Weinrib claims that tort law cannot be sensitive to 
                                            
102 Cf. John Henry Merryman, The Public Law–Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. 
L. 3, 13 (1968) (describing various ways that political ideology might affect a legal theorist’s attitude toward private 
law). 
103 Green, supra note 101, at 1. The legal realist critique of private law occasionally combines normative and 
descriptive elements: judges of disputes between private parties should focus on the public’s interests in the outcome, 
and cannot do otherwise. See id. at 2. I will be focusing on the normative element, which is easier to comprehend, in 
the hope that my response to it will also indirectly respond to the descriptive element of the realist critique by making 
clearer the relationship between public interests and private rights. 
104 For a recent, rhetoric-laced articulation of the realist argument, see Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 
38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 495 (2011). 
105 Cf. Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT L., no. 2, June 2007, at 11 (explaining that 
libertarianism is not the only alternative to the legal realist claim that private law is public law in disguise). 
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society’s interests in affording compensation to the blamelessly injured and deterring those who 
would put others at risk. He believes these interests are at odds not only with each other but also 
with tort law’s overarching concern with the bipolar relationship between duty-holder and right-
holder. And so if compensation and deterrence were both among tort law’s goals, tort law would be 
incoherent and unjustifiable.106 Likewise, Weinrib says, “facilitation of commercial activity, not 
being a correlatively structured consideration (as corrective justice requires), is a poor justification 
for property and contract.”107 In a similar vein, Arthur Ripstein claims that when courts consider 
social goals instead of exclusively focusing on the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, they 
engage in reasoning that is “defective” according to private law’s internal standards.108 Thus these 
authors suggest that basing private law on certain kinds of normative considerations, especially the 
interests of society as a whole, is inappropriate if private law’s core concern is with the duties that 
private persons owe one another.109 Weinrib in fact makes an even stronger claim about the 
relationship between the bipolar or correlative form of private law norms and their substantive 
content: private law is necessarily Kantian in its substance.110 Recall from Chapter 3 that in Kant’s 
legal philosophy, actions are evaluated only in terms of their compatibility with everybody’s 
                                            
106 See WEINRIB, supra note 95, at 38–42. This seems to me to be what Weinrib is saying, anyway.  
107 Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 191, 202 (2011). 
108 Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 176–77 
(2011). 
109 Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Personal Inviolability and “Private Law,” 1 J. TORT L., no. 2, June 2007, at 4 (noting 
that the Ripstein/Weinrib account of private law has no room for “enterprise liability with its emphasis on systemic 
risk engendered by large scale social activities”). 
110 See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 95, at xvii (claiming that any coherent conception of private law liability 
presupposes “the Kantian ideas of agency, freedom, and rights”). 
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freedom.111 If the classical understanding of private law really is committed to a Kantian normative 
framework, the implications for private law’s substance could be radical. 
But Weinrib and Ripstein’s claims are controversial, even among those who firmly agree 
with them that private law is centrally concerned with duties private persons owe to one another. 
Irrespective of their more controversial claims, it is fair to say too much mystery surrounds the 
relationship between the form and substance of private law’s rights and duties. Anyone who would 
defend classical accounts of private law should be able to explain the conception of directed duty 
around which the account is built. Since at least Justice Holmes, a common legal realist complaint 
has been that the use of moralized concepts within discussions of the law breeds great confusion.112 
In order to stem such complaints, those of us who do rely on such concepts should make clear that 
at least we know how we are using them.  
 I raise these abstract jurisprudential issues because our present subject matter makes them 
particularly pressing. Intuitively, intellectual property law seems clearly to belong with the 
exemplars of private law—especially property and tort—rather than with public law subjects.113 
The individual who brings an intellectual property infringement lawsuit is apparently seeking 
redress for violation of her own right. She does not seem to be merely enforcing compliance with 
the law in the shoes of some public official, nor even suing for the sovereign as much as for herself. 
                                            
111 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:230–31 (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
353, 387 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
112 See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (1897). 
113 There are, of course, intellectual property crimes, but these comprise only a fraction of intellectual property law 
as a whole. 
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But if the intellectual property claimant is not principally acting as the state’s deputy as a private 
attorney general or qui tam litigant,114 we should be able to explain why that is so. To that end, the 
remainder of this section considers three possible explanations and concludes that none is quite 
successful. It is, in fact, surprisingly difficult to explain why copyright and patent duties are duties 
toward the persons who are said to be intellectual property owners. 
First, one might turn decisively in the direction of morality and suppose that the 
directedness of legal duties arises because those duties correspond to independently existing 
directed moral duties. In recent years, a number of moral philosophers have supposed that it is a 
very basic normative fact about some (but perhaps not all) of our moral duties that they are 
directed toward particular persons.115 The private law theorist might call attention to private law 
duties’ routine correspondence to moral duties that are themselves directed duties and that would 
exist whether or not the private law duty did. Consider a simple example. If, regardless of what 
positive law says, D morally owes it to R not to injure R in a range of circumstances, then there is 
an easy explanation of why D’s legal duty not to injure R in more or less the same range of 
circumstances would be a directed duty. The legal duty’s directedness would derive from the 
directedness of the moral duty that it lines up with. The obvious limitation of this approach is that 
it presupposes there is a corresponding directed moral duty in the first place. But the second and 
third chapters of this dissertation were devoted to showing that core areas of copyright and patent 
                                            
114 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
115 I have in mind especially Thompson, supra note 94, at 338–40; and Darwall, supra note 94, at 337–39. Another 
possible example can be found in F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 239 (2007). Ripstein also seems attracted to this 
picture of directed duties. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 379 (2009). 
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law do not simply codify independently existing moral duties. In this respect, I argued, copyright 
and patent are rather unlike trademark. So while this correspondence solution might explain why 
central disputes within trademark law involve directed duties, it would not explain why copyright 
and patent belong to private law. And for all we know, there could be other legal duties that 
intuitively fall within private law but do not closely track independently existing directed moral 
duties. 
 A second possible strategy would be to look to a general theory of rights for insight. There 
are a handful of such theories on offer in the literature,116 which has been growing ever since 
H.L.A. Hart’s famous criticisms of the “benefit” theory of rights that is attributed to Jeremy 
Bentham.117 According to the benefit theory, a person has a right when she is the intended 
beneficiary of another person’s duty. Hart noted that simply being the intended beneficiary of 
someone’s duty is insufficient for having a right against that person. To prove his point, he used an 
example in which a promise is made in order to benefit a third party.118 According to Hart, if I 
promise another person that I will look after his mother while he is traveling, it is he who has the 
right against me, not his mother. And that is true even though she is the intended beneficiary of 
                                            
116 For a helpful, up-to-date overview, see Rowan Cruft, Introduction to Symposium: Rights and the Direction of 
Duties, 123 ETHICS 195, 196–98 (2013). 
117 Bentham does not directly advance the benefit theory of rights in any one place, but Hart and others have 
found the theory scattered throughout various passages in Bentham’s work. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal 
Rights, in 2 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171, 176–78 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); David Lyons, Rights, 
Claimants, and Beneficiaries, 6 AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 173 & n.1 (1969). 
118 H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 180–81 (1955); see also Hart, supra note 117, at 
195. 
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the duty that my promise creates.119 So the identity of the right-holder must depend on something 
other than the intended receipt of benefits.120 Much of the resulting debate has centered on 
identifying exactly what makes it the case that somebody has a right. Rights theory may therefore 
be able to explain why intellectual property seems to involve directed duties. Let us then consider 
the two most prominent contenders.  
Joseph Raz’s “interest” theory of rights is much in the spirit of Bentham’s benefit theory 
but seems to avoid the third-party beneficiary counterexample. According to Raz, someone who is 
capable of having rights in general has a particular right if and only if she has an interest that 
provides a sufficient reason for holding another person to be under a duty.121 On the interest 
theory, then, the right-holder’s interest grounds or justifies the right.122 In the third-party 
beneficiary case, the interest that grounds the promissory duty is not the mother’s interest in being 
looked after. By hypothesis, that interest would not justify any such duty on its own. To the 
contrary, the duty is justified by some interest of the son—an interest in being able to make 
arrangements for the future with confidence, perhaps. So understood, the interest theory avoids 
                                            
119 To make this example work, it helps to make a few extra assumptions: first, that I have not, even implicitly, 
made the promise to the mother as well; and second, that my making the promise to her son did not induce her and 
her son to abandon making alternative arrangements for her care.  
120 Even Matthew Kramer, who defends a modified version of the benefit theory, does not claim that being an 
intended beneficiary is sufficient for having a right. See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Some Doubts About Alternatives to the 
Interest Theory of Rights, 123 ETHICS 245, 247 (2013). 
121 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986). Note that Raz defines “interest” narrowly so as to 
include only aspects of the would-be right-holder’s well-being. 
122 In his initial presentation of the interest theory, Raz seeks to preserve the ambiguity in the phrase “holding 
[another person] to be under a duty,” which may mean something like either “judging a person to have a duty” or 
“imposing duties on him.” Id. at 172. I will focus on the latter possibility, which Raz seems entirely comfortable with 
in his later discussion. See Joseph Raz, Rights and Individual Well-Being, 5 RATIO JURIS 127 (1992). 
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the third-party beneficiary problem, but is incapable of explaining copyright and patent rights. For 
the interests of intellectual property owners are not sufficient to ground most of the duties 
imposed by copyright and patent law. Those duties are instead grounded by the interests of the 
general public, as I described earlier in this chapter.  
Yet Raz offers a second version of his interest theory that enables some rights to be justified 
primarily by the interests of persons who are not the right-holders. He thinks many free speech 
rights, for example, might be largely grounded by the public’s interests.123 Consider a journalist’s 
right not to be punished by her government for refusing to reveal her sources. The journalist’s own 
interest in not being coercively pressured into revealing her sources might pale in comparison to 
the government’s interests. Raz suggests that the journalist’s interest justifies her robust free 
speech right only because it has extra instrumental value that derives from its relation to the 
public’s very strong interest in a free press: through protecting the journalist’s personal interest, the 
state thereby serves that interest of the general public.124 Whether or not this move is 
satisfactory,125 it would explain copyright and patent rights only at the cost of delivering the wrong 
results in the private attorney general example. In such a case, the particular plaintiff presumably 
has some interest in the defendant’s compliance with the particular environmental standards, but 
not enough of one to justify the standards all on its own. Nevertheless, through protecting the 
plaintiff’s interest, the law serves everybody’s interest in environmental protection. Thus the 
                                            
123 See RAZ, supra note 121, at 179. 
124 See id. at 179–80, 247–49; Raz, supra note 122, at 134, 137–38. 
125 For worries, see KAMM, supra note 115, at 245–46. 
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plaintiff’s interest seems to warrant the defendant’s legal duty by virtue of its relation to others’ 
interests, in the way that Raz envisions. But the defendant who fails to comply with the standards 
seems in the first instance to be wronging the whole community, and wronging this particular 
plaintiff only derivatively—that is, insofar as the plaintiff is a member of that community. And if 
that is correct, the second version of Raz’s interest theory does not identify right-holders 
accurately. 
According to Hart’s own “will” or “choice” theory of rights, by contrast, R has a right 
against D just in case R’s choice to demand or waive D’s duty determines whether D in fact has 
that duty.126 This proposal fares better with the private attorney general example, since although 
the private attorney general can demand compliance by bringing his lawsuit, he is powerless to 
waive the defendant’s statutory duties. The will theory also seems helpful in the intellectual 
property context because intellectual property owners characteristically have the power to grant 
licenses, which make it legally permissible to engage in conduct that would otherwise constitute 
infringement. Critics of the will theory often deny that having the power to waive someone’s duty 
is a necessary condition for having the correlative right since some rights might be inalienable and 
correlative to duties that cannot be waived by anyone.127 For my purposes, it is more important to 
recognize that having that power is certainly not a sufficient condition for having the right. 
Imagine someone who enters into a contract with some small corporation. It may be the case that a 
                                            
126 See, e.g., Hart supra note 117, at 191–92.  
127 See, e.g., D.N. MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 189, 195–99 (P.M.S. 
Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
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particular officer of the corporation has the power to relieve the promisor of his contractual 
obligation, and maybe also the power to sue if the promisor breaches. But even if the officer has 
the power to sue, it is clear that she does so only to vindicate the corporation’s right. The 
contractual obligation is still owed to the corporation as a whole, not to the officer, even though 
she has this power. If this example or a similar one128 works, the will theory of rights does not 
solve our problem here. 
Let us then examine a third strategy for identifying directed legal duties that takes a step 
back from rights and other highly moralized concepts. John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, who 
have done more than anyone else to defend the connection between directed duties and private law, 
say that legal directives are “relational” when they “enjoin people not to treat others in certain ways” 
or “require them to treat others in certain ways.”129 Perhaps a directed legal duty is just a legal duty 
that requires or forbids certain sorts of treatment of others. More formally, we might distinguish 
between monadic actions, which can be described without making reference to a second party, and 
dyadic actions, which cannot. For instance, although one can speak or move all by oneself, one 
cannot defame or batter without implicating another person. Non-tortiously, solo dance is a 
possibility, but it takes two to tango. Although Goldberg and Zipursky do not explicitly propose 
that we understand directed legal duties in terms of the logical form of the relevant actions, doing 
so fits well with the contrast they draw between “simple legal directives” that take the form “For all 
                                            
128 For an alternative, consider an example from Frances Kamm (with credit to Peter Graham), who imagines a 
judge with the power to relieve someone of his duty to another person. KAMM, supra note 115, at 243. 
129 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945 (2010). 
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x, x shall not A” and “relational directives” that take the form “For all x and all y, x shall not do A 
to y.”130 It seems plausible to characterize the unauthorized reproduction or development of 
copyrighted or patented works as dyadic actions—on account of the copyright or patent owner 
whose authority the infringer lacks—and so this third approach might appear at first blush to 
explain why copyright and patent belong within private law. 
As an account of directed legal duties, however, this proposal is over-inclusive. Some 
violations of relational legal directives cannot plausibly be described as violations of duties owed to 
particular individuals. Consider laws against the unauthorized practice of law. The actions these 
laws prohibit are dyadic: given that it is generally permissible to represent oneself, describing the 
conduct that is forbidden cannot be done without making reference to a second person—the 
client—who receives the impermissible representation or advice. Yet I think it would be 
counterintuitive to suppose some non-lawyer who violates such a law without any dishonesty, 
perhaps even to the overall benefit of the second party, has violated a duty toward him or her. If 
that is so, then for a legal duty to be a directed duty, it is not sufficient that it have the logical form 
of a relational legal directive. 
Perhaps the relational legal directive account can be salvaged by adding a further condition, 
perhaps one that takes it cue from the interest theory of rights. For instance, suppose that violating 
the relational directive risks harm to the second party. It may indeed be odd to think that someone 
who provides highly competent legal advice, while openly acknowledging she is not authorized to 
                                            
130 Id.; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 95, at 260–61 (describing simple legal directives as “enjoin[ing] 
conduct without reference to persons other than the target(s) of the directive”).  
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practice law, violates any duty owed the client. But if the legal advice proves beneficial only because 
the unauthorized practitioner gets lucky, we might think otherwise on account of the significant 
risk.  
It seems to me that this restriction still does not help the proposed account avoid over-
inclusiveness. Imagine that legislators in a society without poverty prohibit taking bets on sporting 
events because they think that gambling is a vice and that targeting bookies is a good way of 
lessening it. Although accepting a bet is a dyadic action that subjects the second party to 
foreseeable risk, it is still hard to see how the unlawful action violates a duty to the bettor, at least 
in some easily imagined cases. The same would hold true even if she actually loses the bet. Unless 
the bookkeeper actually mistreats bettors in some way—for example by being dishonest or 
manipulative—she does not seem to violate any duty to them, regardless of the legal duties she 
violates. This example suggests to me that the prospects for a non-moralized account of directed 
legal duties are rather bleak. Whether a duty is toward some particular individual feels like a 
fundamentally moral question. 
Consider, alternatively, some hybrid of the relational legal directive account and Hart’s will 
theory of rights. Perhaps a legal right exists whenever the law both tells the duty-holder not to 
treat another person in a particular way and authorizes that other person to bring a civil lawsuit 
against the duty-holder if he or she violates the duty. Such an account may survive the 
counterexamples I have been putting forward, but it would make legal rights and moral rights quite 
different phenomena. Generally it seems an open question whether having a moral right entails 
having a Hohfeldian power to obtain legal redress from someone who violates it. In the next 
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section, I will propose an alternative account of legal rights that does not depend on the existence 
of a power to enforce them. 
 
4.5 DERIVING RIGHTS FROM INSTITUTIONS 
The last section worried that functionalist justifications for intellectual property seem to 
underwrite laws of the wrong kind. That is, if intellectual property law is actually grounded by the 
interests of society as a whole, it looks more like public-minded regulation enforced by well-
incentivized private litigants than a private law body of right/duty correlatives. Yet this worry raises 
a broader question, which is not just a subject for legal theorists, about the relationship between 
interpersonal morality and social institutions: How can certain behavior demanded by a social 
institution be owed to a particular person when that person’s interests and claims do not provide 
sufficient reason for the institution’s demand? The aim of the present section is to take a step back 
from the law to answer this broader question.  
The question was raised several decades ago as a concern about Rawls’s account of the 
obligation to keep promises. Rawls says that the general principle of fairness (or “fair play”) can 
explain why it is impermissible to break a promise. According to the principle of fairness, someone 
who has voluntarily accepted benefits from a just institution must support the institution in the 
manner specified by its rules.131 In freely making a promise, Rawls claims, the promisor 
intentionally makes use of the social institution of promising—presumably pursuing some sort of 
present or future benefit and having previously benefited from others’ promise-keeping. So, 
                                            
131 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 18, at 96 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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assuming that the institution of promising is a just one, any promisor who voluntarily accepts 
benefits from it is obligated to follow its rule that promises must be kept (unless special excusing 
conditions are met).132 But if fairness to the institution’s supporters is what grounds promissory 
obligation, fulfilling our promises seems to be something that we owe to everybody who uses and 
supports the promising institution that has benefited us and that continues to benefit society as a 
whole. As Rawls himself says when introducing the principle of fairness, obligations that derive 
from it are normally owed to all “those who are cooperating together to maintain the arrangement 
in question.”133 The duty to fulfill our promises, however, seems a clear-cut example of a directed 
duty, where the particular person to whom we owe fulfillment is the promisee, the person to 
whom the promise was made.134 So even assuming that Rawls’s fairness-based account of 
promissory obligation is true as far as it goes, it does not seem to be a complete account because it 
leaves unexplained the fact that promises create duties toward promisees in particular.  
This concern seems justified, and in my view would still be justified if, in order to deter 
socially harmful promise-breaking, the institution gave promisees financial incentives to seek 
redress from anyone who broke a promise to them. But we should not be too quick to draw 
sweeping conclusions from this sort of worry. In particular, we should not conclude that whenever 
the specific content of an institution’s rules is based on something other than individuals’ interests 
or claims, the rules do not set out directed duties toward those individuals. The wrongness of such 
                                            
132 Id. § 52, at 304–05. 
133 Id. § 18, at 97. 
134 This concern about Rawls’s account is pressed by A.I. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 89–90 (1977) and 
SCANLON, supra note 64, at 316.  
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a conclusion can be seen by extending a line of thought Rawls advanced in his early work on social 
practices.  
While exploring the possibility that utilitarianism might provide a more appealing 
justification for social practices (such as punishing criminals) than for particular actions falling 
under such a practice (such as punishing a particular criminal), Rawls proposed what he called the 
practice conception of rules.135 Under the practice conception, rules demanding certain behavior 
are not simply reports of what behavior has worked well in the past but, on the contrary, are 
“logically prior” to the behavior they demand in an important way. Rawls writes: 
given any rule which specifies a form of action (a move), a particular action which 
would be taken as falling under this rule given that there is the practice would not 
be described as that sort of action unless there was the practice. In the case of actions 
specified by practices it is logically impossible to perform them outside the stage-
setting provided by those practices, for unless there is the practice, and unless the 
requisite properties are fulfilled, whatever one does, whatever movements one 
makes, will fail to count as a form of action which the practice specifies. What one 
does will be described in some other way.136 
Rawls offered a few baseball examples to illustrate this idea. Without the game of baseball and its 
rules, a person could run ninety feet in a straight line but could not steal a base, and a person could 
unsuccessfully try three times to club a ball thrown toward her but could not strike out. The 
institution of baseball plays an indispensible part in making those physical movements the sort of 
actions they are.137 
                                            
135 John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 24 (1955). 
136 Id. at 25. 
137 Id.; see also John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” from “Is,” 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 54 (1964) (“A man hits a home 
run only given the institution of baseball; without the institution he only hits a sphere with a stick.”). 
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We might therefore follow John Searle in distinguishing between the regulative and 
constitutive aspects of rules: rules are regulative when they state that certain activity is permitted (or 
not), and rules are constitutive when they state that certain activity that falls under an 
institutionalized practice counts as a specific type of action.138 An example of a regulative rule in 
baseball would be the prohibition against running the bases in a clockwise direction in order to 
confuse the defending team.139 An example of a constitutive rule would be the provisions 
explaining that running the bases counter-clockwise constitutes running them in the forward 
direction, or the provisions explaining what it is to steal a base.140 As Searle noted, many rules 
constitute and regulate.141 For example, in its normal formulation, the rule against reverse base-
running has constitutive and regulative dimensions because the regulated behavior—running the 
bases in the reverse order—cannot be described in a way that avoids reference to the game of 
baseball. Many rules can be accurately formulated in multiple ways, some of which emphasize their 
regulative dimension alone (“Such-and-such-movement with such-and-such motives is 
forbidden”), and some of which bring out a constitutive dimension as well (“Such-and-such-
movement with such-and-such motives constitutes reverse base-running, which is forbidden”). 
                                            
138 See, e.g., Searle, supra note 137, at 55. 
139 OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 7.08(i), at 67 (2013), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2013/ 
official_baseball_rules.pdf; see also LAWRENCE S. RITTER, THE GLORY OF THEIR TIMES 43–45 (new enlarged ed. 1984) 
(recounting Germany Schaefer’s early-twentieth-century decision to steal first base from second to induce a throw from 
the catcher so that his teammate on third could then steal home). 
140 See OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, supra note 139, 7.02, 10.07, at 60, 96–98. 
141 In light of the fact that some rules both constitute and regulate, we may observe that the claim that an 
institution generates a duty to φ could imply either (1) that if the institution did not exist, the duty-holder would be 
permitted not to φ (but perhaps would φ anyway) or (2) that if the institution did not exist, it would not be possible 
for the duty-holder to φ because the institution is prior to φ-ing in the way Rawls and Searle discuss. 
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One further distinction is essential for our discussion. Canonical formulations of some 
constitutive rules make them out to be internally constitutive: they state conditions under which a 
certain activity falling under an institutionalized practice counts as a specific type of action that exists 
only within the institution. Actions governed by internally constitutive rules are posterior to the 
institution in the way that stealing a base, striking out, and hitting a home run are posterior to the 
game of baseball. But not every act that falls under a practice falls under it exclusively. Many 
actions that are regulated and partially constituted by social institutions can also be accurately 
described as actions that would have been possible even without the institution. And so a rule that 
has an externally constitutive formulation states conditions under which a certain activity falling 
under an institutionalized practice counts as a specific type of action that can exist outside the 
institution, even if the institution does not. Hence actions governed by externally constitutive rules 
need not stand posterior to the institution. Like the line between constitutive and regulative rules, 
the line between internally and externally constitutive rules can be crossed by changes in 
formulation: it is possible to formulate some rules as either internally or externally constitutive. 
A few more baseball examples will clarify this distinction between internally and externally 
constitutive rules. Take for instance the rule establishing what happens when a runner on the 
batting team runs all the bases and safely touches home plate.142 Although many of the ways one 
could describe this runner’s actions depend on the game of baseball, one upshot of the rule in 
question is that in so acting the runner scores. And the game of baseball is not prior to scoring, 
                                            
142 See OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, supra note 139, 4.09(a), at 34. 
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because it is possible to score whether or not baseball exists.143 Thus the rule on scoring is 
externally constitutive at least on this formulation. Another baseball rule makes it possible for a 
player on the home team to hit a walk-off home run when he hits a home run that puts his team 
ahead in the score during the ninth inning or extra innings.144 So formulated, the rule is internally 
constitutive because baseball is prior to the act of hitting a walk-off home run. But the rule can 
also be formulated as externally constitutive since hitting a walk-off home run constitutes a way of 
winning a game for one’s team, and one can act under the latter description whether or not baseball 
exists.  
With these distinctions in hand, let us get back to our main topic by considering one final 
baseball rule that has both externally constitutive and regulative dimensions. According to 
baseball’s official rules, it is impermissible for pitchers to apply any “foreign substance” to the 
ball.145 Pitchers who do so in order to get unnatural movement from the ball are accused of 
doctoring their pitches and thus engaging in a forbidden action-type that is internal to the game of 
baseball. But such pitchers are also said to be cheating, and the game of baseball is not prior to 
cheating as such. So the rule that says it is cheating to apply a foreign substance to the ball is 
regulative (insofar as it prohibits certain acts) and externally constitutive (insofar as it establishes 
that certain acts within baseball amount to cheating). For my purposes, the crucial point is that 
those who play competitive games have a general obligation toward their opponents to refrain from 
                                            
143 Even scoring a run is possible without the game of baseball, thanks to the game of cricket. 
144 OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, supra note 139, 4.11(c), at 36. 
145 See id. 8.02(a)(2)–(6), at 74. 
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cheating,146 and so violating baseball’s idiosyncratic rules can amount to a violation of this extra-
institutional directed duty. Since players owe it to their opponents not to cheat, someone who 
violates a game’s rules in a way that qualifies as cheating violates a duty owed to a particular person, 
whether or not the conduct required by the rule is grounded in that person’s own interests or 
claims. Baseball’s rule against doctoring pitches strikes me as clear evidence for this claim, since any 
justification for the rule would likely be based on the rulemakers’ notions of what makes a more 
enjoyable game overall.147 Even though the rule against doctoring pitches seems to be justified on 
impersonal grounds like these, violations of the rule can still be violations of a duty toward the 
rule-violator’s opponent in particular because of the standing duty not to cheat.148  
But I do not mean to make my argument stand or fall with my interpretation of a single 
baseball rule. There are, I believe, countless examples of general standing duties to particular 
persons that are made determinate by institutional arrangements that are not grounded by those 
persons’ own interests or claims. Such institutional arrangements change what the duty-holder is 
doing and what the likely consequences will be. Take rules of etiquette, whose specific content is 
fixed by social conventions. It is hard to believe that individuals’ pre-conventional interests or 
                                            
146 To be sure, cheating can wrong others, too, including others who play the game or the game’s fans. My claim 
is only that cheating wrongs the cheater’s specific opponent in a distinctive way. 
147 Too many other aspects of the game are designed to make the batter’s job difficult to permit the conclusion 
that the rule exists principally out of concern for the batter’s own interests or claims. 
148 By contrast, there was no standing duty toward promisees identified in Rawls’s account of promising. It was the 
account’s lack of any standing directed duty, rather than its focus on society’s interests, that made it impossible to 
interpret as explaining promisees’ unique rights. 
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claims demand that etiquette’s rules have the specific content that existing rules have.149 It is easier 
to believe that every person has a claim to be treated with respect and courtesy—simply in virtue of 
his or her status as a person, perhaps—and that sometimes conventions of etiquette settle what 
conduct constitutes disrespectful or discourteous treatment in a given social context.150 Many such 
rules seem arbitrary, and for those there may be little to be said to justify their having the specific 
content they do. Other rules of etiquette may be justified primarily because they function better 
from the community’s point of view than salient alternatives. In academic lectures and other formal 
presentations, for instance, the applicable rule of etiquette usually dictates that the audience’s 
questions and comments be held until the end of the speaker’s planned remarks. One can imagine 
an alternative norm allowing certain interruptions that, if well publicized in advance, would not 
impermissibly infringe upon the speaker’s interests or claims. But that alternative might make 
these events less edifying overall than a practice of keeping questions until the end. So perhaps we 
observe the rule against any interruption in order to obtain such diffuse benefits. Nevertheless, 
given that the rule exists, violating it arguably constitutes violation of a directed, standing duty to 
show the speaker courtesy or respect in addition to whatever wrong it would be against the group 
as a whole.  
We can now put games and good manners aside and turn back to positive law, the social 
institution that concerns us most. As in the previously discussed institutions, law’s regulative 
                                            
149 Some imaginable rules, of course, would be ruled out as inherently incompatible with pre-conventional norms 
of equality or dignity. 
150 See Sarah Buss, Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners, 109 ETHICS 795, 796–97 (1999). 
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components can also be externally constitutive in a way that implicates our extra-institutional 
standing duties. Drivers, I take it, have a standing duty toward those they encounter on the roads 
not to drive recklessly. Surely some of what constitutes reckless driving does so whether or not 
traffic laws forbid it. Considering the brute facts alone, a person with good judgment knows that 
driving modern automobiles at extremely high speeds or under the influence of mind-altering 
substances would be reckless. In other cases, however, what constitutes recklessness depends on 
what the law says. The content of some of the relevant laws, like that of certain rules of etiquette, 
seems more or less arbitrary. For instance, legislators writing on a blank slate could justifiably 
decide either that cars should drive on the left side of the road or on the right. Yet as soon as they 
select one side over the other and the rest of society begins to respond appropriately, driving on the 
opposite side becomes highly dangerous and impermissible in normal circumstances. Many other 
legal decisions, perhaps even most, are based on reasons of one kind or the other. Even when those 
reasons do not show special concern for the safety of those who share the roads, however, the 
provisions they support may determine when one motorist wrongs another through recklessness. 
Imagine that decisions about who has the right of way at particular intersections are guided 
primarily by the goal of avoiding traffic slowdowns. Even though such decisions are not directly 
guided by safety concerns, disobeying such laws is very often reckless and a clear violation of the 
disobedient driver’s duties toward those he has placed in danger. Violating traffic laws can 
constitute an action that wrongs particular people, regardless of the nature of those laws’ 
justification. 
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The same can be said, I claim, about violations of intellectual property laws. In the last two 
chapters, I have argued that core provisions of those laws—those that prohibit unauthorized 
reproduction, development, and distribution of copyrighted or patented works—cannot be justified 
on the grounds that they help intellectual property owners get what they are already due. Yet those 
provisions nevertheless give rise to rights because they implicate a standing directed duty toward 
intellectual property owners: a duty not to deny others their legitimate opportunities for material 
gain. This duty may look somewhat familiar. The Lockean duty not to interfere with others’ labor, 
which I discussed at length in Chapter 2, is really just a more concrete version of the standing duty 
I am now discussing—a natural version, as it were. In Locke’s state of nature, the earth’s physical 
resources are initially free for the taking, provided that taking them would not deprive others of 
comparable opportunities, so that people can make use of those resources to gain the necessities 
and conveniences of life. What Locke described as labor was simply taking advantage of this 
opportunity, which was a legitimate opportunity for material gain, in my terms, because it did not 
harm others in any significant way.151 Interfering with laborers’ use of what they have taken denies 
them such opportunities and is impermissible, I explained, because it harms them without 
justification. 
In the real world, political arrangements and other social institutions constantly affect our 
opportunities for material gain, principally via addition. Intellectual property ownership, as defined 
                                            
151 Recall, however, that Locke further insisted that someone who takes commonly owned resources only to waste 
them wrongs others, even though such takings do not in any obvious way harm them so long as the enough-and-as-
good proviso is respected. If one accepts this part of Locke’s argument, some opportunities for material gain in the 
state of nature would not be legitimate ones even though they do not harm others.  
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by positive law, constitutes an additional opportunity for material gain beyond what is found in the 
state of nature. Our laws are designed not only to enable innovators to offset their costs, but also to 
turn a profit. Someone who engages in copyright or patent infringement simply to avoid having to 
compensate copyright or patent owners would therefore deny them an opportunity to reap material 
rewards from their innovative activities. Yet this account forces us to consider the extent to which 
intellectual property opportunities are legitimate ones, such that denying those opportunities 
would wrong the intellectual property owners who are meant to have them. Two sorts of worry 
arise. 
The first touches upon a very large question within political philosophy. What authority 
does the state have to bestow opportunities for material gain on select members? One can easily 
imagine objectionable opportunities of this sort, like the biblical publican who can amass great 
personal wealth collecting more than just the taxes actually owed the state.152 Intellectual property 
opportunities are certainly better than that: they serve private interests for the sake of serving those 
of society as a whole, and no one who is able and willing to forego the access to copyrighted or 
patented works that requires permission has to contribute anything to intellectual property owners. 
Moreover, intellectual property opportunities are available to anyone who meets the statutory 
requirements, not just a few specially privileged groups or individuals. Yet even if intellectual 
property opportunities are distributed fairly on paper, within a particular social context—especially 
one in which other goods are not distributed fairly—these opportunities might not be available as 
                                            
152 Cf. Luke 19:1–10. 
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widely as they ought to be. And in such a context, opportunities that would be legitimate in ideal 
conditions might be illegitimate in actual ones.  
The second sort of worry is narrower, at least in one obvious respect. Instead of raising 
general questions about intellectual property opportunities, one could ask whether those 
opportunities are compatible with the interests and claims of everyone else given the specific form 
that they take. In my view, these are exactly the types of questions we should be asking about 
individual intellectual property doctrines. And if we reject intellectual property utilitarianism (as 
opposed to functionalism), we cannot ignore these questions by assuring ourselves that the form 
intellectual property opportunities presently take maximize social welfare. Take for example, the 
fact that copyright owners’ opportunities for material gain are shaped in a way that enables them 
not just to obtain reasonable compensation for infringing uses of their copyrighted work, but also 
to keep infringing uses of their copyrighted work from ever occurring.153 Copyright owners thus 
have significant power over the expressive freedom of anybody who would use their copyrighted 
work in a manner classified as infringing to express his or her own thoughts. Whatever its merits, a 
critic might claim that this power is insufficiently respectful of the non-owner’s freedom of 
speech.154 And wielding this power in order to extract an exorbitant sum from someone wanting to 
use a copyrighted work for expressive purposes might even be viewed as capitalizing on an 
illegitimate opportunity for financial gain.  
                                            
153 See 17 U.S.C. §502(a) (2006) (empowering courts to grant injunctions for the prevention of copyright 
infringement). 
154 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (making this argument about preliminary injunctions in the context of U.S. constitutional law). 
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I only mention such concerns without attempting to rebut them, for that would take us 
too far afield. One cannot tackle the broader concern without a sound understanding of what 
distributive justice requires, and one cannot tackle even the second, narrower concern about 
copyright without a sound understanding of what freedom of expression demands. Since I have not 
attempted to dispel all the possible concerns, my conclusion is a conditional one: the portions of 
intellectual property law that are justified as socially beneficial incentives give rise to intellectual 
property rights to the extent that the opportunities for material gain that they create can 
themselves be adequately justified. But this conclusion still provides an explanation of how such 
intellectual property rights are possible.
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5. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLURALISM 
 
              
 
It is tempting to look for a justification for intellectual property through either the lens of 
natural rights or the lens of utilitarianism. Both ways of viewing the subject propose to make it 
intelligible to us in terms of a single purpose, although of course they offer competing portraits of 
that purpose. In the former case, intellectual property is preoccupied with securing what properly 
belongs to individuals and, in the latter case, with promoting the good of society as a whole. 
Because of their disagreement about intellectual property’s fundamental purpose, these two 
accounts are regarded as diametrically opposed. But having scrutinized natural rights and utilitarian 
accounts of intellectual property in the preceding chapters, I have come to reject the either/or 
mindset they pressure us to adopt. Instead of assuming that intellectual property is justified either 
as a matter of natural rights or on utilitarian grounds, we should accept a pluralist account of 
intellectual property’s justifications that incorporates what is most appealing in both the natural 
rights and utilitarian accounts. Intellectual property pluralism avoids the limitations of the natural 
right and utilitarian perspectives and allows for a richer understanding of the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and our intellectual property institutions. 
Natural rights–type justifications of intellectual property ownership do well in highlighting 
the perspective of those individuals who create intellectual goods, but they run the risk of 
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overemphasizing that perspective or of undervaluing the perspective of those whom intellectual 
property laws place under duties. In particular, natural rights accounts of intellectual property can 
proceed too quickly from a justification of physical property ownership to a justification of 
intellectual property ownership, disregarding the differences in the ways that intellectual property 
and physical property laws affect the relevant normative interests given the differences in the nature 
of intellectual and physical goods. In Chapter 2, I stressed how Lockean approaches to intellectual 
property rights are especially susceptible to this danger. A physical property owner’s interests in 
material gain are greatly imperiled by others’ unauthorized use of her physical property because 
such unauthorized use routinely interferes with the owner’s own use of her property. But in focal 
cases of intellectual property, especially works of creative expression and inventions, others’ 
unauthorized use of the property generally does not interfere with the owner’s own use of her 
property.1 On the other hand, unauthorized use of trademarked symbols that confuses consumers 
does interfere with the trademark owner’s ability to use the symbol to communicate with the 
consuming public. And so our discussion of Lockean arguments for intellectual property rights 
indicated that different intellectual property doctrines may have different justifications. Locke’s 
arguments against interference work pretty well in justifying central trademark doctrines but not 
those of copyright or patent law. The pluralist account of intellectual property that I am defending 
forsakes a unified theory of intellectual property not only by relying on a plurality of normative 
                                            
1 Or, more precisely, the only uses of a copyrighted work or patented invention that infringers routinely interfere 
with are uses that presuppose the existence and justifiability of intellectual property rights, such as using intellectual 
property as a source of licensing revenue. This sort of interference cannot be the basis of a natural rights–type 
justification for copyright or patent law without begging the question. 
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considerations, but also by advancing different justifications for different areas of intellectual 
property law.  
Taking some cues from Kant, Chapter 3 considered another possible natural rights–type 
justifications for intellectual property ownership. This discussion went beyond the preceding 
chapter on Locke’s labor theory by identifying another type of interest of intellectual property 
owners that is not reducible to Lockean interests in material gain. These other interests are 
interests in controlling one’s own actions and, relatedly, in having a public reputation that 
accurately reflects the actions one has chosen to do. I argued against a recent interpretation of 
Kant’s account of physical property ownership, according to which any unauthorized use of 
another’s property wrongfully limits that person’s freedom by conscripting her into the pursuit of 
ends that she has not chosen for herself. But, drawing on Kant’s own writing about copyright, I 
argued that there are particular ways of using intellectual property that unjustifiably violate the 
intellectual property creator’s interest in having control over her actions and/or reputation. In 
particular, falsely claiming credit for someone else’s work or describing someone else as responsible 
for choices that she did not in fact make would disregard this sort of interest without promoting 
the legitimate interests of others. Here, too, however, the arguments really only support core 
doctrines within trademark law—especially rules against passing off counterfeit goods as the real 
thing, or some instances of so-called “reverse passing off,” in which a person attempts to sell 
another’s goods as though they were her own.2 Although copyright law prohibits some examples of 
plagiarism, in most situations it does so under very general directives not to reproduce or distribute 
                                            
2 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003). 
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others’ work that do not explicitly refer to copyright owners’ interests in receiving attribution.3 
Originally, however, copyright ownership included a right to decide when to release a new work for 
the first time, and this right to release can be understood as protecting individuals’ interest in 
having control over their actions.4 
But the core of patent and copyright law—the parts that prohibit unauthorized copying 
and distribution of patented inventions and copyrighted works—are justified not by natural rights 
arguments such as those that Locke and Kant supply, but by more functionalist lines of thought. 
For instance, innovators, artists, and others who invest in creative endeavors would be reluctant to 
devote their resources to developing and commercializing inventions and expressive works in the 
absence of special encouragement, because it is too easy for others to copy such goods without 
compensating the people who invested in their development. On this way of thinking, copyright 
and patent law are largely justified by the widely shared interests of the members of a society in the 
availability of new inventions and creative works, not by the interests of inventors or artists 
themselves. The fact that copyright and patent rights supply socially beneficial incentives has often 
been considered the heart of the utilitarian argument for intellectual property. I argued in Chapter 
4, however, that we should resist the utilitarian label because utilitarianism characteristically directs 
us to formulate all normative questions in terms of the expected effects on overall amounts of well-
                                            
3 But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (granting visual artists a right to attribution). 
4 Others’ interests in having access to copyrighted works sometimes weigh against this right, however. Consider 
the example of a creative genius who has extremely high standards and insists on having her unfinished projects 
destroyed after her death. I find such cases much more difficult than cases in which someone merely publishes an 
uncompleted work without permission while its author is still in the process of developing it.  
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being. If social welfare provides the only proper measure of intellectual property’s justifications, 
policymakers’ appeal to overtly nonutilitarian considerations will always seem like an aberration or 
even an inappropriate distraction. This is an unwelcome consequence, in my view, because the 
effects of intellectual property laws on social welfare are somewhat indeterminate and because other 
sorts of normative considerations are important enough in their own right even if, on balance, 
furthering them does not prove to maximize social welfare.  
Consider, for example, a Kant-inspired argument for attribution rights: in light of an 
author’s interest in controlling her actions and in having a reputation that accurately reflects what 
she has chosen to do, intellectual property law is justified in prohibiting others from falsely 
claiming credit for her work. It is conceivable, however, that this attribution right would present 
significant administrative and enforcement costs, and it is also conceivable that very few people 
would be seriously unhappy to see it go. Likewise, it is conceivable—though I admit, not terribly 
likely—that social welfare would be increased if the law expressly empowered authors to sell their 
exclusive right to claim credit to the highest bidder. Even if it turned out that money would be 
saved or more books would be produced if the right to attribution were not legally recognized or 
were made transferable, I am not sure it follows that we ought to give up on recognizing a 
nontransferable version of it in our law. At the very least, it seems to me that we ought not to 
commit ourselves to designing our right to attribution in whatever way maximizes overall amounts 
of well-being solely because we think copyright law justified mainly because of the socially 
beneficial incentives it provides. 
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My endorsement of the functionalist argument and rejection of Lockean and Kantian 
arguments for copyright and patent rights suggest a noteworthy difference between justifying 
intellectual property ownership as a matter of natural rights and justifying it as a matter of social 
convention: the two types of justification do not seem to face the same argumentative burden. 
Establishing that there are natural rights of intellectual property requires showing that a person or 
group’s failure to respect the alleged right would warrant disapprobation, unless some sort of 
special excuse applied. Because failing to respect the particular right in question is presumptively a 
moral mistake, there must therefore be a decisive reason for respecting it. But for a social 
institution to have an adequate social convention–type justification, it suffices to establish that the 
institution serves the common good in an unobjectionable way. The reasons for establishing the 
particular institution need not be decisive. And yet, as I argued in Chapter 4, once a social 
institution is justified, even as a matter of social convention, it can have the power to generate new 
moral rights, respect for which is not completely optional. Our pre-legal or natural rights give 
shape to our legal institutions, but our legal institutions also give shape to our moral rights. The 
interplay between intellectual property rights and intellectual property institutions is thus highly 
complex and, without careful attention to the relevant normative considerations, even a bit 
mysterious. A pluralist account of intellectual property’s justifications does not eliminate the 
complexity, but hopefully it dispels some of the mystery. 
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